

The Hispanic American Historical Review

Vol. X

May, 1930

No. 2

FOREIGN ESTIMATES OF THE ARGENTINE DICTATOR, JUAN MANUEL DE ROSAS¹

Among the enigmatical personages of the "Age of Dictators" in South America none played a more spectacular rôle than the Argentine dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas, whose gigantic and ominous figure bestrode the Plata River for more than twenty years. So despotic was his power that Argentine writers have themselves styled this age of their history as "The Tyranny of Rosas". A political enemy named Rivera Indarte, who attacked the dictator from an asylum in Montevideo, alleged in his "tables of blood" that Rosas had assassinated 722 persons, shot 1,393, and beheaded 3,765.² Indeed, until the close of the eighteenth century the name of Rosas was often anathema in his native land. A dispassionate survey of the dramatic career of this bizarre figure was indeed not made until 1898. In that year Ernesto Quesada, a lawyer, historian, and sociologist of Buenos Aires published a monograph entitled "The Epoch of Rosas" in which he developed the thesis that this dictator was typical of his age, and furthermore that he laid broad and deep the foundations upon which the Argentine nation was successfully erected.³

¹ A paper read, in part, at the conference on Hispanic American history of the American Historical Association at Durham, N. C., on December 30, 1929.

² J. Rivera Indarte, *Rosas y sus opositores* (Buenos Aires, 1853), p. 317: cited by J. A. King, *Twenty-Four Years in the Argentine Republic* (New York, 1846), pp. 312-313.

³ E. Quesada, *La Época de Rosas* (Buenos Aires, 1898), was reprinted in 1923 in the Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, *Publicaciones del Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas*, no. XVIII, Buenos Aires, 1923.

Still, even today among the intelligentsia of Argentina there are doubters who are loath to yield this tardy tribute to the great dictator. To paraphrase an historical sociologist: if you ask an historian who was Juan Manuel de Rosas, he will say, a tyrant; if you ask a physician, he will respond, a neurotic; ask a descendant of one of Rosas's partisans and he will retort, a great man; a publicist will dub him a clever politician; philosophers will declare that he was a son of his age; while poets will denounce him as infamous. The gifted poet Andrade declared that in order properly to depict Rosas one would need to have the soul of Nero and the pen of Tacitus. The historian López took the view that the culminating scenes in the life of the tyrant were worthy of Shakespeare: Rosas is a tragic buffoon—a Hamlet engrafted on Falstaff. And, lastly, the people of Buenos Aires, whose life Rosas dominated from 1829 to 1852, execrate his memory as a curse.⁴ Perhaps the most scientific analysis of this historical enigma is that made by Ricardo Levene who, in his interpretative history of Argentina, declares that the two chief difficulties in the way of a complete judgment upon Rosas are the extensive, complicated, and stormy nature of his times, and the lack of sufficient documentary evidence.⁵

At least this is a case in which interesting sidelights may be obtained from the other shores of the Atlantic. In the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for 1835, M. Pavie contributed an article entitled "The Indians of the Pampas", in which he expressed the opinion that, because of the civil dissensions in which they had engaged, the generals who had won the independence of Argentina had made peace more dangerous than open warfare. Pavie proceeded to give his impressions of the dictator of the Argentine Confederation, whom he had observed during a recent carnival in Buenos Aires. "In fact", said the Frenchman,

⁴ C. O. Bunge, *Nuestra América* (Barcelona, 1903), pp. 165-166.

⁵ Levene, *Lecciones de historia argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1928), II. 402.

no one can tame a colt, or break a savage horse, or hunt a cougar better than Rosas. He made a show of compelling his fine Chilean steed to gallop through the worst paved streets of the capital; then he would suddenly wheel about, retrace his steps, and pirouette over the slippery stones, dodging not only the buckets of water but also the eggs which on that day, according to custom, the women showered upon the passersby.⁶

This clever sketch, as well as the allusions made by Pavié to the generals who had fought for Argentine independence, much provoked the government of Rosas. In a despatch to Paris, the Marquis de Peysac, the French consul at Buenos Aires, reported that both the dictator and Señor Arana, his minister of foreign relations, were full of resentment. In consequence, conferences were held between Arana and Peysac in which the latter felt called upon to inform the Argentinian that liberty of the press existed in France.⁷ But to allay the wrath of the Argentinians the marquis soon transmitted to his government an article refuting "the vile lies, and calumnious imputations concerning the political condition" of La Plata that had been published in the *Gaceta Mercantil* of Buenos Aires. This portrayal of the Argentine dictator by a partisan will perhaps serve as a foil for other characterizations.

The dexterity, agility, and hardihood of General Rosas in horsemanship and in exercises of strength are perhaps unequalled in the Republic, as well as his ability, experience, and knowledge with respect to all sorts of rural labors and customs. But I should add that to these estimable gifts he unites other eminent qualities; his talents, his vast knowledge, his political skill and judgment, and his valor in military campaigns have often saved the republic from ruin and desolation. Classic and luminous proofs of this truth are furnished by his public life from the memorable year 1820 until the present time. He is the only man among us who has known how to unite the administrative

⁶ Th. Pavié, "Les Indiens de la Pampa", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, January 1, 1845, 4th series, I. 144.

⁷ Vins de Peysac to the Duc de Broglie, July 27, 1835, Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, correspondance politique, Buenos Ayres, vol. 22.

talents of a most consummate statesman with the intrepidity, agility, and bravery of a warrior, and with the traits of a most clever gaucho. Then we must add to this happy union of singular and necessary qualities, an unshakeable patriotism, a severe virtue, and a noble disinterestedness—a combination of qualities that makes him the most perfect exemplar of the politician, the hero, the warrior, and the great citizen.⁸

Shortly after the Marquis of Peysac had reported an interview with Rosas concerning Pavie's skit, the Duc de Broglie, who had recently become minister of foreign affairs in his own cabinet, formulated his concept of the dictator in these words:

This general is not an ordinary man. The oddities of his manner or character do not prevent me from considering him as one of the most eminent chieftains brought forth by the revolutions in South America. It is to be hoped that the value which he seems to place upon the opinions of Europe will tend to restrain him from that misuse of power which men of the New World elevated to such a position are too often inclined to permit. I have gladly acceded to the wish that he expressed to you of having published in our journals a refutation of the article he has taken so much to heart which appeared in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. You can read this counterblast in the *Moniteur* in a version that has been rendered less bitter and more veiled.⁹

A more interesting estimate of Rosas was furnished in 1840 by an officer of the French fleet that had blockaded the coast of Argentina largely because of the dictator's policy of requiring military service from French subjects who were domiciled in that country. This officer avowed that Rosas still enjoyed the barbarous amusements that he had loved while he lived in the country with the gauchos.

In the secrecy of his home, where he had retired with companions of these farces, Rosas gave himself up to a thousand foolish notions

⁸ "Desmentido publicado en el no. 3,630 de la gaceta mercantil de Buenos Aires, contra un artículo titulado Los Indios Pampas, inserto en el no. de enero de la Revista de los dos Mundos, que se redacta en Paris," inclosure in Vins de Peysac to the Duc de Broglie, July 27, 1835, *ibid.*

⁹ Duc de Broglie to Vins de Peysac, October 31, 1835, *ibid.*

which are repugnant to our ideas of elegance, but which charmed those men who had grown up on the pampas in the midst of horse races and of manners and customs altogether different from those of Europe. This man, who founded his power upon the affection of the people, did not feel that he was degrading himself when he engaged in diversions which they loved. But when he found himself in the presence of a distinguished foreigner, whose esteem he desired to gain, the rude gaucho disappeared: his language became refined, his sonorous voice pleased the ear, his eye caressed, and his attentive and intelligent glance captivated. Though he had never distinguished himself by any remarkable feat of arms, yet no one ever denied that he had courage. The deep regret that seized him upon the death of his wife, as well as the extreme solicitude which he displayed toward his daughter, seemed to indicate that tender feelings had not been altogether banished from his heart. He made this cherished daughter the depositary of his most intimate thoughts and the heiress of his fortune. And because he had laid up great riches for her, he was accused of wishing to seat her upon a throne.¹⁰

With respect to the policy of Rosas in requiring military service from foreigners who had been domiciled in the country three years and whose governments had not arranged treaties with Argentina, in 1838, the French minister, Count Molé, in a report to King Louis Philippe thus expressed his views:

This monstrous doctrine has been marvellously conceived in the interest of a despotism whose wild actions know no check; it annoys the agents of foreign governments and hinders the exercise of their right to intervene in matters concerning their nationals.

Speaking of the fate of the impressed Frenchmen, Molé said:

Incorporated by force in the conscripted militia, arbitrarily arrested and condemned to the rigors of imprisonment, tormented by vexations and injuries the like of which only occur among barbarous nations—in a word assimilated to the sad condition of the aborigines—they have suffered the brutal and capricious violence of this heinous dictator—

¹⁰ "Affaires de Buénos-Ayres; expéditions de la France contre la République Argentine," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, January 1, 1841, 4th series, XXV. 361.

ship which has been so blindly conferred by the citizens of Buenos Aires upon General Rosas—a dictatorship that places their fortunes and their lives at the mercy of a bizarre and cruel despot. . . . The history of diplomacy does not offer another example of so many excesses coupled with a ruder abuse of international proprieties.¹¹

Ever on the alert to take advantage of an event or a principle to promote his designs, Rosas was quick to apprehend the significance of President Tyler's message to Congress of December 6, 1842, which epitomized his views in respect to the Doctrine of Monroe. After a survey of the relations of the United States with European powers, Tyler reasoned that as his government had carefully abstained from interference in all questions relating to the political interests of Europe, it might hope for "an equal exemption from the interference of European Governments" in what related to the states of the American Continent.¹² The Argentine dictator had this passage translated into Spanish and published in Buenos Aires, evidently for the purpose of using Tyler's declaration as a shield against French intervention in La Plata. Interpreting the insertion of this declaration in the Argentine official gazette as a pronunciamiento directed against any European intervention in the affairs of Hispanic-American nations, on June 26, 1843, Guizot, the French minister of foreign affairs, thus enunciated the policy of his government:

General Rosas deceives himself if he believes that such a protest would be accepted by the powers of Europe. On our part, if grave circumstances ever make it our duty to intervene in Spanish America, we would not pay any attention to this protestation. . . . In no wise do we dream of interfering in the affairs of the new American republics. But for the United States to wish to deny to European governments the right to intervene with regard to these republics in questions of international law and foreign policy would be an unjustifiable pre-

¹¹ "Rapport au Roi de M. Molé," April 23, 1838, Archives Nationales, Marine, BB 4, Vol. 576.

¹² J. D. Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, IV. 197.

tension—a pretension that certainly no European cabinet would be able to recognize.¹³

After describing the terrible murders that had been committed by a secret society in Buenos Aires at the behest of Rosas, a French traveler who had resided some months in La Plata deemed it only fair to depict another side of the dictator's personality. This Frenchman did not maintain that by his truly great qualities Rosas had offset his disdain for life and liberty, because these were defects for which no compensation could be made. But we do recognize, he continued, that Rosas really has great qualities, and that he would have been able to render his country splendid service, if only Heaven had given him more light and a more humane heart.

His great qualities were all related to the nature of his domination. Rosas knew how to command: he possessed the secret of commanding obedience. By virtue of this quality he might have become the benefactor and saviour of his country. He indeed saw that the evil was in the anarchy which devoured the land, in the confusion of all governmental power, in the weakening of all the springs of authority, and in the insubordinate habits of soldiers and generals. Unfortunately he over-emphasized the opposite tendency and gave to the power that had become irresistible in his hands an effect that was odious, destructive, and degrading. He substituted his personality for the existing institutions; he induced the entire population to adore his own portrait; he had incense burned before that portrait in the churches; he had himself drawn in a carriage by women, and by the most distinguished persons in the capital city; and he desired that discourses should be addressed to himself in public ceremonies. At least, if he did not direct this to be done, he encouraged these servile demonstrations which in their manifold forms have reduced the citizens of the capital to the moral condition of Asiatic people.¹⁴

¹³ Guizot to Lurde, June 26, 1843, Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, correspondance politique, Buenos Ayres, vol. 31. The author of this article plans to prepare a survey of French policy toward Hispanic America.

¹⁴ "Les deux rives de la Plata," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, April 1, 1843, 13th year, new series, II. 39.

The French minister, Baron Deffaudis, who had been sent on an extraordinary mission to La Plata to settle the interminable dispute between his government and Rosas furnishes a view from a different angle. On June 7, 1845, after an interview with the dictator, this envoy sent a dispatch to Paris conveying his impressions of that curious personage.

Despite the care which he takes to veil them, intelligence, artifice, and determination are deeply engraven upon his face. If one were not aware that he held the lives of his adversaries very cheap, one would perhaps never divine this at all; but when one knows this, one is not in the least astonished at his physiognomy. On the other side, age begins to leave its mark upon him. His postures are awkward and somewhat weak. His body is ten years older than his face. One does not notice in him the agility, skill, and vigor that placed him, as he once said, at the forefront of the gauchos. He has the air of a townsman endowed with a strong constitution, who has become corpulent and enervated by a sedentary life. In fact, he scarcely leaves his apartments, particularly when he is in the city, and only takes the air on the terrace of his house. Then, too, he has been attacked by a cruel malady, the gravel, which leaves him only certain intervals of repose. I further believe that those Europeans who represent him as rather disposed to spring into a saddle to resume the vagrant life of the pampas than to yield to the more just and moderate demands of foreign diplomacy are interpreting him by traits that are out of date. . . .

Each successive day General Rosas is becoming more and more a man of the cabinet: in this rôle he is now more redoubtable than as a gaucho. In the cabinet, in fact, he is a man full of will and perseverance as well as of astuteness and suppleness. He is absolutely indifferent about the nature of the means by which to gain success and clever to find the means which are suitable to his ends. He believes that men are full of vices and weaknesses, and boasts of his ability to discern by the first glance of his eye the species of seduction or corruption to which any particular man is susceptible. An indefatigable worker, he spends his days in supervising the smallest details of ministerial affairs, in corresponding directly with the civil and military authorities of the provinces in matters touching his personal policy, and finally in dictating and even correcting with his own hand an infinite num-

ber of articles destined for journals not only in his own country but also in foreign lands. The object of these articles is above all to depict his administration in the most attractive colors, to repel the attacks which are made upon it from every quarter, and also to make the most bitter criticism of every act of those governments with which he finds himself in disagreement.¹⁵

Another French diplomat, Count Walenski, who was later sent on an identical errand to La Plata, thus conveyed the impressions that General Rosas made upon him during an interview that lasted five or six hours.

General Rosas is ordinarily prolix and diffuse. His periods are long; and he departs with great facility from the main topic in order to engage in digressions that immeasurably lengthen the conversation. From time to time he tries the effects of eloquence or of gestures, and his intonations are cleverly calculated to impress the hearer.

The count affirmed that it was very difficult to pursue an argument with Rosas. "Warned in advance of this digressive tendency," said Walenski,

while listening religiously, I was forced constantly to lead him back to the question at issue, and it was only because of these persistent efforts on my part that we were able to consider the principal points in the negotiation. Otherwise twenty-four hours would not have been sufficient. Aside from this, the course of his argument was admirably arranged, and if his premises were well founded, there was nothing that could have been said against him.

These personages terminated their interview by an exchange of diplomatic courtesies. Rosas declared that he had always desired that his political conduct would meet with "the approval of France", and particularly with "the approbation of her king", for whose person he professed in lofty terms a high admiration. The dictator mellifluously avowed that he considered Louis Philippe as

¹⁵ Deffaudis to Guizot, Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, correspondance politique, Buenos Ayres, vol. 34.

the most enlightened of those sovereigns who today occupy the thrones of the world, and as the greatest statesman of the century.¹⁶

An attache of the mission named Brossard, who was present at this interview, was more successful than his master in discerning the salient traits of Rosas. A few years later, on a broad canvas and with a variety of pigments, this diplomat painted what was perhaps the best portrait ever made of the crafty despot. Here it is:

General Rosas is a man of medium height, quite stout, and apparently endowed with great physical vigor. His features are regular; he has a light complexion and blonde hair, and does not at all resemble a Spaniard. One might well exclaim upon beholding him, "Here is a Norman gentleman." His physiognomy is a remarkable mixture of craft and force. He is generally tranquil, and even mild; but upon occasion, the contraction of his lips gives him a singular expression of deliberate severity. He expresses himself with much facility, and as one who is a perfect master of his thoughts and his words. His style in conversation varies: now he uses well-chosen and even elegant phrases; and again he indulges in trivial expressions. There is perhaps a little affectation in the way in which he expresses himself. His remarks are never categorical; they are diffuse and complicated by digressions and incidental phrases. This prolixity is evidently premeditated and intended to embarrass the interlocutor. In truth it is quite difficult to follow General Rosas in the detours of his conversation. . . .

The dictator showed himself by turns to be a consummate statesman, an affable individual, an indefatigable dialectician, a vehement and passionate orator; as the emergency arose, he displayed with rare perfection, anger, frankness, and bonhomie. One realizes that, when encountered face to face, he could intimidate, or deceive, or seduce.¹⁷

Walenski's aid also contributed so discerning a political analysis of Rosas that in quoting it one scarcely knows where to stop:

¹⁶ Walenski to Guizot, June 12, 1847, *ibid.*, vol. 38.

¹⁷ A. de Brossard, *Considérations historiques et politiques sur les républiques de la Plata* (Paris, 1850), pp. 358-359.

Endowed with a reflective and persistent will, Juan Manuel is essentially an absolute ruler. Although force—that is to say, the principle of persons who have no principles—is the basis of his government, and although he constantly consults in his policies the necessities of his personal position, yet he is much pleased to be considered as a man of well-founded convictions. He professes a great horror for secret societies, *lojias* as they are designated, even though the *Mazorca* which he founded was nothing else than a secret society, which became publicly known because of its excesses. He becomes indignant when one supposes that he has the least affinity with revolutionists who are enemies of the social order; and as a statesman he assumes in his maxims a great austerity that does not exist in his private morals. “I know,” he avowed in his interviews, “that a good example should be highly esteemed by all people.”

Up to a certain point he has justified his pretensions and his words by reëstablishing material order throughout the country and in the administration, by causing the civil laws to be obeyed, and by enveloping his dictatorship with the constitutional forms that were observed before his advent. He busies himself with all the details of administration and carefully supervises them; he labors assiduously from fifteen to sixteen hours every day in the transaction of public business, and does not allow anything to pass without a minute inspection. Thus, as he has said, the entire burden of governmental responsibility falls upon himself. . . .

Raised to supreme power by astuteness, General Rosas has seen his domination violently attacked, and he has not known how to maintain himself except by force. Vindictive and imperious by education and by temperament, he was precipitated into despotism, and has cheapened in the interior of the country that liberty of which he has spoken so much. He resembles those men portrayed by Tacitus who placed liberty to the fore in order thereby to overthrow the existing order, and, who, when they became masters of the empire, turned upon their mistress. Because of this tendency he has committed those sanguinary acts that have surrounded him with an aureola of terror. Because of this tendency he has been obliged to concede extravagant favors to abandoned men, who are bound irrevocably to his chariot by their vices and crimes as well as by his favors and whose prosperity is an insult to morale and to public misery. From this tendency there has arisen the system of legal oppression by which he persecutes all his enemies,

who, it must be said, compose the most polished and intellectual part of the nation.

A man from the country, Rosas has in fact been the leader of the reaction of the men of the campo against the predominant influence of the capital city. Imbued with the prejudice of Castilian pride, he detests *en masse* those foreigners whose labor and capital could enrich his country, and accords them only a niggardly hospitality. An agriculturist by birth, by education, and by taste, he does not appreciate industry. . . . Nourished in the monopolistic maxims of Spanish colonial law, he neither understands nor permits trade except when it is hemmed in by prohibitive tariffs and rigorous regulations.

On the other side, General Rosas is much occupied with the means by which a government may influence the morale of a people. Thus it is that he attaches great importance to matters concerned with public education; for he considers both education and religion as means of political influence. This same motive causes him to intervene actively in the periodical press. He subsidizes periodicals in France, in England, in Portugal, in Brazil, in the United States, and directs his journals of Buenos Aires, namely, the *Gaceta Mercantil*, the *Archivo Americano*, and the *British Packet*.¹⁸

In the belief that persons of the so-called Latin race have an insight into each other's character that is often denied to Anglo-Saxons, I have purposely used estimates of Rosas that emanated from French contemporaries. They present the concepts of foreigners whose viewpoint though prejudiced was much more detached than that of Argentine observers. My study convinces me that the treasure trove of unexploited material in the French archives will cast a glow of interpretative light upon both the domestic and the foreign policies of the Hispanic-American nations. So far as Rosas is concerned, these inedited papers demonstrate that he was a consummate poseur. They convey hints that his iron constitution was corroding. These papers further reveal that the dictator maintained an insidious diplomatic as well as journalistic propaganda both at home and abroad. At many points they confirm the view of other contemporaries with regard to

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 456-459.

the personal methods, the genuine ability, the strength, the resourcefulness, the astuteness, and the unscrupulousness of the gaucho tyrant—traits which he possessed in a more marked degree than many other Hispanic-American tyrants. In truth he was compared by one contemporary with the gloomy Paraguayan dictator Francia, while another contemporary likened him unto the French nationalistic monarch Louis XI. The iteration and reiteration of the cruelty and ruthlessness of Rosas in these accounts indeed provoke the query whether in the rehabilitation of the tyrant the historic pendulum may not have been swung from the extreme of denunciation too far in the direction of justification, and whether as fresh and discriminating sources are utilized the historian of the future may not bring the pendulum back to a median position. In any event this brief study brings up the perennial problem of the good and the evil in dictatorial rule in Hispanic America.

WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON.

University of Illinois.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION OF 1917

In presenting to the world the story of the foreign policy of the United States at the outbreak of the World War, little attention has thus far been given the region immediately to the south of us. Yet it is probably true that nowhere were the changes in our foreign policies of greater significance than in our relations with states in and bordering on the Caribbean. In the critical days of the war, when the American public was overwhelmed with information and misinformation on the affairs in Europe, the events in the rest of the world passed by unnoticed except in circles that were clearly affected by them. Now that the main developments of those stirring years are in process of being properly evaluated, it is possible for the historian to turn his attention to some of their less known phases. One such is the attitude adopted by the United States toward the Cuban insurrection against President Menocal which broke out in February, 1917.

Few political disturbances occurred to mar the early years of President Menocal's administration which took office in 1913, and it seemed reasonable to expect that the president would make good the statement attributed to him just after his election that there would be no revolution while he was in office. Difficulties began to arise, however, the moment it became clear that he would stand for reelection in spite of his pre-election promise not to run a second time. This decision brought a split in the ranks of the conservative party which had already been badly hit by the collapse of the alliance with the Asbert liberals that had made the victory of 1912 possible.¹ Nevertheless when the party delegates assembled on January 16, 1916, Menocal was able to secure his renomination

¹ Charles E. Chapman, *A History of the Cuban Republic* (New York, 1927), p. 347.

although it is alleged he had to resort to high handed methods to do so.² As candidate for vice-president, the conservatives chose General Emilio Núñez, formerly secretary of agriculture in Menocal's cabinet. While Núñez had been one of those originally opposed to renaming Menocal, probably because he hoped to become the party's standard bearer himself, he dropped his opposition during the convention and accepted second place on the party's ticket.³

In the ranks of the opposition party, the liberals, was a host of rival candidates, all leaders of more or less powerful factions. The choice of candidate, therefore, was bound to be the result of considerable political bargaining. After a bitter struggle in the convention, Alfredo Zayas finally managed to carry off the prize in spite of the hostility of ex-president José Miguel Gómez. Realizing that defeat without his support was certain, Zayas proceeded to settle his differences with the former liberal chieftain on terms exceedingly favorable to Gómez. Other deals were also made, of which the most important was the one with the Asbertists, who, in the election of 1912, had turned the tide in favor of the conservatives. The support of this faction was a distinct gain to Zayas for it practically assured him victory in the important province of Havana. As the campaign got under way and the liberals managed to bring more unity into their faction-split ranks, the prospects of a sweeping conservative victory disappeared. In proportion to the increase of opposition, the rivalry between the two parties grew in intensity and bitterness. Considerable violence developed during the campaign, resulting in many deaths. In fact, so serious did matters become in that respect that the Menocal government decided to appoint military supervisors over the election. As was to be expected, this led to more friction, the liberals charging that the military

² Raimundo Cabrera, *Mis malos Tiempos* (Havana, 1920), p. 37.

³ It is claimed that an agreement was made with the followers of Menocal whereby in return for a promise of support for the presidency in 1920 he agreed to accept the nomination for vice-president.

officials used their power to further Menocal's candidacy rather than to insure fairness in the campaign. It is to Menocal's credit that he then appointed a mixed commission to settle controversies arising out of the actions of the supervisors. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the sympathies of the military supervisors led them to continue to exercise their power in favor of the conservative candidates. On the other hand, the liberals also resorted to questionable methods in the districts which they dominated. In fact, there is every reason to believe that both sides were about equally guilty of fraud in conducting the campaign. This is clearly shown by the results of the election. About 800,000 votes were cast out of an electorate which could not possibly have been much over 450,000, for the census compiled in 1919, three years later, indicated only 477,786 eligible voters.⁴ When one considers that the election was close, the activities of both parties during the campaign become apparent. The first results of the November election indicated that the liberals had won. Later returns from the rural districts, however, strengthened the poll of the conservatives. Some writers state that Menocal was willing to concede victory to his opponents at first, but was later induced by members of his family to falsify the returns. To substantiate this charge it is pointed out that telegrams from local precincts to the central electoral board in Havana were stopped on November 2, the day after the election, and when received again they came via the secretary of government. This was illegal, inasmuch as the election law required that they be received directly from the telegraph stations. Furthermore, when on November 4 the central electoral board protested against the government's action, reports ceased entirely.⁵ Meanwhile the work of counting the returns went on very slowly and not until many weeks later were they published.

⁴ Chapman, *ut supra*, pp. 353-354.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 354-355; Cabrera, *ut supra*, pp. 48-49.

Other arbitrary methods seem to have been practiced by the government. At any rate, when the liberals carried their protests to the central board they were sustained. Later an appeal to the supreme court⁶ led to the same result. This is all the more damaging to the conservatives when one considers that the liberals in the first place had been loathe to permit the dispute to go to the supreme court, believing that the court with its conservative tendencies would decide against them.⁷ Needless to state, the unexpected judicial victory elated the liberals. On the other hand, Menocal was embittered by the decision, in spite of the fact that he had previously expressed confidence in the court as the only proper arbitrator and had announced that he was determined to suppress all opposition to its findings.⁸

In its decision, the supreme court failed to pass on the returns of a few precincts in the provinces of Oriente and Santa Clara. New elections to decide these were therefore set for February 14, 1917. Only one of these provinces was necessary to a liberal victory, and since under the court's findings that party already enjoyed a majority of 1,164 in Santa Clara, with only six precincts in dispute, the result of the election was hardly a matter of doubt. The certainty of Menocal's defeat was indicated at the time in a confidential report of the United States minister, William Gonzales, to the secretary of state, in which he pointed out that the "maximum honest vote could not exceed 1,500 with party strength of neither side preponderant".⁹ Only by fraud could this be prevented. That illegal practices would be adopted by the conservatives was expected by many, including the United States minister. Gonzales, while personally sympathetic to Menocal's reelection, analysed his mental attitude following the court's decision as

* In persuading the liberals to submit their case to the tribunal and to discountenance revolt at the time the influence of the United States minister, Gonzales, was very important.

⁶ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 350.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

one which would find justification for any methods in order to overcome the established liberal majority in Santa Clara. This attitude, he went on to state, meant "employment of force, killing of liberal managers at the polls and declaration of palpably fictitious result" which would lead to a revolution much more bitter, destructive, and difficult of solution than that of 1906.¹⁰ The possibility of an uprising which would upset "the extremely good economic conditions" in Cuba was deplored by the United States, a fact which Gonzales was instructed to impress upon the Cuban government.¹¹ In reply, the Cuban government gave the United States minister the assurance that "there need be no apprehension of lawlessness or misuse of Governmental Powers".¹² Nevertheless, some liberals, doubtful of the good intentions of the administration, considered an appeal to the United States to supervise the February elections. Many of them also began to talk openly of revolution in case the vote went against them.¹³ That they could easily gain their end by such action few doubted. For this belief there were some good reasons. Most important was the season of the year. No better time could present itself. It was the harvest season for sugarcane, which, because of the demand created by the war, was selling at a high price. This fact alone, argued the more radical leaders, would cause the United States investors to put up such a clamor against a revolution that threatened destruction of property that the United States would be forced to intervene as it had in 1906, in which case the liberal cause would again be upheld.¹⁴ To few did it occur that since 1906 the United States might have undergone a change of heart in the matter of upholding revolutionary movements. Nor did the liberals take into consideration that the United States, while realizing it could not

¹⁰ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 350.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 351.

¹³ Cabrera, *ut supra*, pp. 118-124.

¹⁴ Cabrera, pp. 118-124; Chapman, pp. 362-363.

permit the sugar crop to be destroyed by insurrection, not only because of heavy United States investments in the sugar industry, but also because of the approaching complication with Germany, might decide that the best if not the most just solution to Cuba's problem would be a vigorous support of Menocal who had shown himself far more friendly to the United States than had the liberals under his predecessor, Gómez.

At all events, on February 10, when it became apparent that hostilities would develop, Secretary Lansing sent a long note to the Cuban government which was made public the next day. In it he exhorted the Cubans to bury their animosities and settle their dispute in a peaceful and patriotic manner. As an example where "patriotism was elevated by a resort to law rather than by faith in arms",¹⁵ he called attention to the settlement of the Hays-Tilden controversy in the United States. This appeal, however, fell upon deaf ears. Ten days earlier it might have had some effect but by the 11th the situation had gone beyond the point where any appeal to self-control could sway either party. A strong, definite statement indicating the course of action the United States intended to adopt in the event of an upheaval might have averted trouble. That was exactly what all parties wanted to know and the fact that the United States left its position vague in that respect, unfortunately gave rise to some doubt concerning it. The Menocal government felt the note implied that the conservatives were resorting to illegal methods to win the election.¹⁶ On the other hand, the liberal leaders, with the exception of those who criticized it as being "paternalistic" in tone,¹⁷ failed to pay any attention to it.

Meanwhile, the government claimed to have uncovered a plot against the life of the president hatched up by army officers. Liberal leaders are emphatic in their denials that such

¹⁵ *Foreign Relations* (1917), pp. 351-352.

¹⁶ *Foreign Relations* (1917), pp. 353-354.

¹⁷ Cabrera, pp. 116-122.

a plot existed or if it did that it was in any way part of their plans.¹⁸ On the other hand, the conservatives quite naturally made much of it and pictured the alleged plotters as typical of all their opponents. Several arrests were made and warrants were issued for others who the government claimed were implicated. Thereafter, the situation rapidly became critical. On the 11th, slight uprisings in which there was some bloodshed began in the provinces of Havana and Santa Clara. They were put down by government forces.¹⁹ Numerous arrests followed. The next day trouble began in earnest. Organized revolt in which large numbers of rural guards participated against the government broke out in Camaguey, Santa Clara, and Oriente.²⁰ A plan on the part of liberal sympathizers in the army to take Havana by surprise on the night of the 11th failed, however, and the conspirators were forced to flee the country. The Menocal government, nevertheless, faced a crisis. Most of the leading liberals, Gómez, Machado, Mendieta, Acosta, "Pino" Guerra, had gone "out" in opposition and within a few days no province was free from organized rebellion. A quick descent upon Havana would very likely have been successful, for the government forces were too scattered to meet such a movement.²¹ In fact, that seems to have been the intention of Gómez who had become the recognized leader of the movement. His plans were frustrated, however, by the government forces who had sense enough to destroy the railroad bridge across Jatibonico River²² in Camaguey on February 13. This not only prevented an immediate advance on Havana from the east but served to give the government time to organize its forces.²³

Why the liberals decided to resort to force before the partial elections were held is difficult to understand. Their defense

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 190-196.

¹⁹ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 354.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 354-355.

²¹ Chapman, p. 371.

²² *Foreign Relations* (1917), pp. 355-356.

²³ Chapman, p. 371.

is that they were convinced that the government proposed to resort to fraud and force to keep them from the polls and that as a protest and in order to forestall such methods they revolted.²⁴ While there was some basis for such beliefs, there can be little question that the action taken weakened their case, particularly in the eyes of the United States government. It would seem that the better policy would have been to wait until the election had proved their contention. Had they done so they could have avoided much of the responsibility for the troubles which Cuba underwent in the ensuing months.

The failure of the liberals to march on Havana and win a decisive victory in the first few days proved to be disastrous to their cause. Menocal showed himself to be of a different stamp than the unfortunate Palma in 1906. Instead of appealing for intervention to the United States, he prepared to fight the matter out with his opponents. The time gained by the check administered to the liberals at Jatibonica was put to good use. The army was reorganized, and thanks to the good will of the United States government which permitted the sale of ten thousand rifles and five million rounds of ammunition, was soon far better equipped than the revolutionists.²⁵ What was perhaps more important, however, was the definite attitude which the United States adopted. When the news of the outbreak of hostilities reached Washington there was considerable apprehension concerning the new developments. To strengthen the constitutional government the state department decided to announce its policy in terms which would leave no doubt about its position. On February 13, therefore, Minister Gonzales was instructed to issue the following statement to the Cuban people as coming from the Government of the United States:

²⁴ *Foreign Relations* (1917), 370-371, Gómez to Gonzales.

²⁵ *Current History* (March, 1917), V. 1017; *Independent* (February 26th), LXXXIX. 344; *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 368.

The Government of the United States has received with the greatest apprehension the reports which have come to it to the effect that there exists organized revolt against the Government of Cuba in several provinces and that several towns have been seized by insurrectionists.

Reports such as these of insurrection against the constituted Government cannot be considered except as of the most serious nature since the Government of the United States has given its confidence and support only to Governments established through legal and constitutional methods.

During the past four years the Government of the United States has clearly and definitely set forth its position in regard to the recognition of governments which have come into power through revolution and other illegal methods and at this time desires to emphasize its position in regard to the present situation in Cuba. Its friendship for the Cuban people, which has been shown on repeated occasions, and the duties which are incumbent upon it on account of the agreement between the two countries force the Government of the United States to make clear its future policy at this time.²⁶

A more definite announcement of the policy the United States proposed to follow could hardly have been made. But it came too late to prevent widespread violence. Had such a statement been issued on the 10th, instead of the vague one of that date, the liberals might have been restrained from adopting the use of force to secure their aims.²⁷ Coming as it did after the revolution was already under way, it failed of that purpose. Liberal leaders were already far too much committed to revolution to turn back. To be sure, the note probably prevented many from joining the movement, but there is no evidence to indicate that because of it those who had gone "out" suffered any change of mind toward the use of force to overthrow the existing government. On the other hand, the note served greatly to strengthen the position of Menocal, who, in spite of his temporary success in checking the tide of

²⁶ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 356; Telegram, Lansing to Gonzales.

²⁷ Cabrera, p. 121.

revolt, was still in a precarious situation. Had the note not been sent, there is good reason to believe that his government would soon have collapsed.²⁸

For the time, the struggle continued without any material advantage on either side. To be sure, the liberals strengthened their position in some places, particularly in Oriente and Camaguey. The city of Santiago and several towns fell into their hands, but to compensate for such outbreaks the government managed to regain control over some of the disaffected regions in Santa Clara.²⁹ The real crisis, it was clear, would come when the government forces met those of Gómez in Camaguey. This was a subject of much concern to many supporters of the government, including members of the cabinet, who distrusted the loyalty of the army in battle. In this connection, Gonzales reported that because of this danger "many of them would be glad of almost any compromise".³⁰ On the other hand, there were some who realized that if the army proved itself loyal in a real fight, it would give rise to a strong movement favorable to the government.

One doubtful success had already been achieved by the government in the matter of elections in Santa Clara province. In spite of the advice of the United States to postpone them, Menocal decided to let the voting take place on the 14th. The election proved to be a mere farce since the liberals refused to participate and the conservatives had things all their own way. Some idea of the methods that must have been employed is indicated by the fact that the conservatives managed to poll a vote of 2,427 when the voting list, which was known to be padded, contained but 2,401 voters upon it.³¹ The elections in Oriente, which were to be held on the same day, were postponed until February 24th because the uprising had put the

²⁸ *Foreign Relations* (1917), pp. 359-360.

²⁹ *Foreign Relations* (1917), pp. 358-359.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

³¹ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 350; Chapman, p. 372. Minister Gonzales reported on January 22, that the "maximum honest vote could not exceed 1,500."

disputed districts under liberal control. After several postponements, the elections were finally held on April 9. As in Santa Clara the liberals stayed away from the polls, leaving the voting entirely to the conservatives, who, repeating the tactics of February 14, carried the districts by majorities that indicated a complete conversion of all the voters to the cause of the government.³²

In the meantime, the United States took an active hand in controlling the uprising. To protect American interests in Santiago, the U. S. S. *Petrel* was dispatched to that port while other vessels were sent to various other danger zones. The Cuban government also decided to send a vessel to Santiago in an effort to subjugate the insurgents who had seized that city. To prevent such action the insurgents, on February 16, purposed to seal the harbor entrance by sinking two merchant vessels in the channel. This plan was frustrated, however, by the commander of the *Petrel*, who informed the insurgent leaders that he would not permit such action.³³ Considerable excitement ensued and some protests were made by Americans in Santiago, who, it seems, quite generally sympathized with the cause of the liberals rather than with the government.

On February 18, the state department took drastic action against the insurgents when it sent a note to Minister Gonzales which he was authorized to publish in order to inform the Cuban people as to the American government's attitude on the situation in their country. The essential portion of the note read:

1. The Government of the United States supports and sustains the Constitutional Government of the Republic of Cuba.

2. The armed revolt against the Constitutional Government of Cuba is considered by the Government of the United States as a lawless and unconstitutional act and will not be countenanced.

³² Cabrera, pp. 397-398.

³³ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 362.

3. The leaders of the revolt will be held responsible for injury to foreign nationals and the destruction of foreign property.

4. The Government of the United States will give careful attention to its future attitude towards those persons connected with and concerned in the present disturbance of peace in the Republic of Cuba.³⁴

This announcement, practically outlawing the revolution and threatening its leaders, was naturally received with anger and resentment by the liberals. It was denounced as an autocratic and wholly unjustified act of interference.

In the United States, the events in Cuba received scant attention due to the fact that they were completely overshadowed by the threatening crisis with Germany. What comments were made in the press were usually favorable to the conservatives, who were viewed as more friendly disposed toward the United States than the liberals.³⁵ Then there was also the belief in some circles that the insurrection had been stimulated by German agents in order to cause embarrassment to the United States with which war was rapidly approaching. For such views there is absolutely no evidence and one must conclude that they were due largely to the unbalanced judgments of the time which assigned every unfavorable situation in international affairs to propaganda and sinister activities of enemy agents. Although the note of February 19 practically eliminated all possibility of liberal success, the revolutionary movement did not collapse. Conditions in the island rapidly went from bad to worse, chiefly in the province of Oriente where the insurgents, losing patience, began to threaten all sorts of violence.³⁶ Business enterprises felt the effects of the agitation very seriously. Mills had to be shut down for want of labor while the banks closed their doors for lack of funds and fear of disturbances.³⁷ On February 22, the

³⁴ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 363.

³⁵ Cabrera, pp. 135-136.

³⁶ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 363.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

Santiago chamber of commerce sent a petition to President Wilson requesting diplomatic mediation to end an intolerable situation. Its substance indicated a willingness on the part of the commercial and industrial leaders to deal with the liberal government which continued to control the city.

To this petition President Wilson, on February 23, instructed Secretary Lansing to make the following significant reply:

The Government of the United States has clearly defined its position in the present armed conflict against the Constitutional Government of Cuba and it will attribute any disturbance of economic conditions or ruin of crops to the action of those in rebellion against the Government. Moreover, it cannot hold communication with leaders of this rebellion while they are under arms against the Constitutional Government. No other question except the reestablishment of order throughout the Republic through the return of those in rebellion to faithful allegiance to the Government can be considered under the existing conditions.

The Government of the United States, as has been made known to the people of Cuba, will support only constitutional methods for the settlement of disputes and will exert every means in its power as a friend of the Cuban Republic, to effect such a settlement, but, until those persons who have revolted against the Government lay down their arms, declare allegiance to their Government and return to peaceful pursuits, the Government of the United States can take no further step.''³⁸

Nevertheless, in spite of such declarations regarding the position of the United States government, the revolutionary forces continued to work for intervention. While at first they hoped to have the United States assume charge of the partial elections they now depended on intervention to relieve them from the wrath of their opponents.³⁹ To bring that about, it was generally predicted they would soon resort to the wholesale destruction of sugarcane and mills.⁴⁰ Should they adopt such

³⁸ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 366.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

methods in earnest, Minister Gonzales felt the government would be helpless in dealing with the situation inasmuch as it lacked sufficient forces to hold the towns, keep the railroads open, and at the same time run down the innumerable bands hiding in the woods and cane fields.⁴¹ In his opinion, the United States could give the greatest support to the Cuban government "by occupying ten or twelve ports and keeping open the Cuban Railway, an American corporation".⁴² Only by so doing could security to hundreds of American estates be insured in case the rebels, failing in the field, resorted to destruction.⁴³

On February 27, following a defeat of the rebel forces on the 26th, came the first reports from Guantanamo that the systematic destruction of cane had commenced.⁴⁴ Marines from the naval station were landed at once to prevent further disorder and possible loss of life. At the same time it was reported that two companies of marines from the U. S. S. *Connecticut* were landed at San Francisco.⁴⁵ Much apprehension prevailed among the owners and managers of sugar mills. Many of them were friendly to the liberal forces and some twenty-five addressed a letter to the United States consul calling attention to the fact that the district was under the control of the insurgent leader, Rigoberto Fernández, rather than government forces as claimed by President Menocal. It ended with a plea that the President of the United States "apply whatever remedy he may deem convenient" to avoid the enormous injuries that had resulted from the disturbed conditions.⁴⁶ The United States government, however, consistently refused to accept all invitations to deal with any forces hostile to the existing government. With it, the sole consideration was the fact that the rebellion was one

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 367.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 369.

against constituted government and could not, therefore, be in any way recognized.⁴⁷ To all endeavors to force it to adopt a different attitude, the government answered in the spirit of its reply to the Santiago chamber of commerce. Anything like compromise it believed would be acclaimed as a victory by the revolutionists and would constitute a step away from stable government.⁴⁸ Yet the United States government was very anxious to bring the uprising to an end as soon as possible in order to avoid the destruction of property which was bound to increase the longer the disturbance continued. Therefore, on March 1, Gonzales was instructed to counsel President Menocal

in the most earnest fashion to make clear to the people of Cuba and the rest of the world his position as a patriotic advocate of constitutional methods for the settlement of electoral disputes and as a supporter of the mandates of the Supreme Court by immediately issuing a proclamation setting forth that coincident with the laying down of arms by the insurgents and return to their allegiance, elections will be called in Santa Clara and Oriente provinces and an amnesty granted to those concerned in the revolt.⁴⁹

Gonzales was to point out that failure to comply immediately with this suggestion would result in guerrilla warfare which would probably force the United States government "to take such action as might destroy the moral effect of the Constitutional Government's successes".⁵⁰ Menocal, however, was not inclined to heed the advice of the United States, asserting as a basis for his attitude that an amnesty to the rebelling officers would bring ruin to the Cuban army since "all self-respecting officers would resign". As to the election proposal, he remained silent. In closing his reply he confidently ex-

⁴⁷ This position had been taken earlier in dealing with the Huerta government in Mexico.

⁴⁸ *Foreign Relations* (1917), pp. 373-374.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 371-372.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 372.

pressed his ability to suppress the disorder and asked a reasonable amount of time in which to do so.⁵¹

Strong pressure upon Menocal in the matter of promising new elections, as soon as the rebels laid down their arms, was discouraged by Minister Gonzales, who was clearly out of sympathy with the revolution. In his view, it was not exactly just that

the United States should insist upon the purifying of six precincts where the Conservatives benefited from ballot box stuffing without considering the hundreds of precincts where similar or more gross frauds were practiced in the general elections and from which other party was probably greater beneficiary.⁵²

As a result of Minister Gonzales's views, the state department waived the point in regard to the disputed precincts in Santa Clara. Secretary Lansing did, however, instruct Gonzales to "impress" upon the president

the importance of issuing a proclamation providing for constitutional elections in Oriente province, after arms have been laid down and the rebels have returned to their allegiance.⁵³

While the United States government was thus seeking to bring about a peaceful solution to the problem in order to prevent further excesses, General Gómez, as leader of the insurgents, sent a message to the commander of the U. S. S. *Paducah* stating that if no provision was made for reholding the partial elections (presumably those in Santa Clara were meant), he would proceed with the destruction of property.⁵⁴ Before he could carry out his threat, however, he was disastrously defeated on March 8, at Placetas, in the province of Santa Clara. Not only was his army completely shattered, but he, with two hundred of his followers, was captured. The

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 374-375.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 376-377: Gonzales to Lansing.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 378.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 373.

government was jubilant over the victory as was Minister Gonzales who confidently reported that "except for the activity of a revolutionary leader in New York, I see nothing to sustain even a destructive policy".⁵⁵ But Gonzales, as future events were to show, had underestimated the strength of the revolutionary movement. The liberals, while badly demoralized by the capture of their leader and the destruction of his army, were by no means ready to lay down arms and return to the allegiance of the government, in spite of the fact that, following the battle, President Menocal exhorted them to do so, promising "all possible indulgence" for those sincere in their repentance.⁵⁶

Menocal, nevertheless, was unwilling to agree to holding new elections in Santa Clara and so informed the United States government on March 9. To this Secretary Lansing replied by offering to send General Crowder and other representative Americans to adjust the election question.⁵⁷ This suggestion was a decided break with the vigorous policy of non-mediation at first announced by the department of state and can only be explained on the basis of the international situation in the spring of 1917 and the apprehension on the part of United States interests that the insurgents, if driven to desperation, would carry fire and destruction to their properties. Considerable losses had already been suffered which had led to repeated protests to the state department.⁵⁸ The seriousness of these complaints was impressed upon the Cuban government from time to time and the United States went so far as to offer military support to check the activity if the Cuban government could not handle the situation. The answer in such cases was always that the reports of losses were greatly exaggerated and that all the government needed was

⁵⁵ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 379.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 379-380.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

⁵⁸ See section entitled "Protection of American Interests" in *Foreign Relations* (1917), pp. 414-431.

a fair opportunity to demonstrate its ability to end the conditions unaided by United States forces.⁵⁹

Meanwhile, the commander of the U. S. S. *Montana* sought to bring about a settlement by inviting the Cuban government officials and the liberal leaders in the vicinity of Guantanamo to a conference on board his vessel. Much was hoped from the parley but the whole plan fell through when the liberals declined to attend because the armistice granted for the purpose did not include the whole province.⁶⁰ The open interest of the naval officials in the settlement of the problem, however, had the effect of encouraging the insurgents in the hope that intervention was about to take place. That such a policy would have been very welcome is indicated in a statement of a group of rebel officers to J. A. Lee, lieutenant of the United States navy.⁶¹ For a time there were good reasons to believe that the United States was wavering in its original policy of supporting the constitutional government and refusing to have dealings with the rebels. This attitude of the state department was doubtless due in part to the conflicting reports on the situation that were being received from the consuls and naval officers on the one hand and the Havana legation on the other. Gonzales several times expressed his annoyance over the activity of the navy men which gave rise to rumors of American intervention. On one occasion he referred to a recommendation submitted by a naval officer as one which while

urging a course calculated to quell the immediate disorder,—does not seem to consider the effect which justification of the rebellion might have on the future peace of Cuba.⁶²

These rumors, he pointed out in an urgent dispatch of March 23, tended “to encourage continued opposition to the Govern-

⁵⁹ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 421.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 389-390.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 388.

ment at the time of most discouraging conditions of insurgents in the field".⁶³ To offset their effect, he urged his government to make another "unequivocal declaration" along the lines of earlier messages. Such a statement he believed "would probably result in a general and immediate collapse".⁶⁴ Apparently the arguments of Gonzales had some effect on the state department, for on March 23, it sent the following note to him and to the commanding officer of the United States naval forces, authorizing its publication:

It has come to the attention of the Government of the United States that a report is current and persistent in Cuba that the United States in response to requests from leaders of those in revolt against the Constitutional Government is considering taking steps in their behalf. The Government of the United States is at loss to understand how its attitude in the present situation in Cuba could be misunderstood.

In order to avoid any further misunderstanding with reference to the several statements made by the Government of the United States and published throughout the Republic of Cuba which statements have defined the attitude of the Government of the United States in unequivocal terms, it is desired to reiterate essential points set forth in the above mentioned statements, which are as follows:

1. The Constitutional Government of Cuba has been and is being supported by the Government of the United States in the endeavor to restore order throughout the Republic.

2. The Government of the United States, in emphasizing its condemnation of the reprehensible conduct of those in revolt against the Constitutional Government in attempting to settle by force of arms disputes for which adequate legal remedies are provided, desires to point out that until those in revolt recognize their obligations as citizens of Cuba, have laid aside their arms and returned to their allegiance to the Constitutional Government, the United States cannot hold communication with any of them and will be forced to regard them as outside the law and beyond its consideration.⁶⁵

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 387-388.

This action of the state department definitely repudiated the negotiations which had been carried on by the naval officers in Oriente. The result was a decided change in attitude on the part of the insurgents toward all Americans including the navy men who they felt had betrayed them.⁶⁶ Some sought to see German influence behind the new spirit but such views were groundless. At least that was the opinion of the United States minister, who attributed the increased animosity to a conviction on the part of the rebels that the United States had failed to keep its word and had in other ways broken faith.⁶⁷ When one considers that, for weeks prior to the publication of the note of March 23, the insurgents had been on good terms with United States naval officials and had become confident of the navy's friendly attitude, their change of attitude is logically accounted for. One unfortunate result of the changed feeling was an increase in cane burning and property destruction. Menocal had been quite successful in breaking up the larger armed insurgent bands but he seemed unable to cope with the smaller groups which, often leaderless, roamed the eastern provinces robbing, burning and otherwise making life and property unsafe. The state department was constantly petitioned by the victims to do something to end the conditions. Chief among them were the Manati Sugar Company of New York, Atkins and Company, the United Fruit Company, the Cuba Company, and the Bethlehem Steel Company. All insisted that the Cuban government was not extending sufficient protection and some demanded the sending of marines to check the excesses.

The United States government, impressed with the serious situation confronting the United States interests in the island, and after having lodged many protests with the Cuban government calling on it to remedy conditions, finally sent a strong note on March 31 to Gonzales instructing him to insist in no uncertain terms that the Cuban president despatch ade-

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 400.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

quate forces to the danger zones in order to give the necessary protection to United States interests. In part these instructions read:

You will further say to him that inasmuch as he has assured the Government of the United States on repeated occasions that he is capable of putting down the rebellion and of giving ample protection to lives and property of foreigners he must undertake immediately to give such protection.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, the United States was rapidly drifting into war with Germany. On April 6, came the actual declaration. The same day President Menocal appeared before the Cuban congress and delivered a war message asking that body to coöperate with the United States in the struggle. With this request, congress complied the next day by declaring war on Germany. From a political point of view the decision of Menocal to join the United States in the struggle was a wise one. By putting his country into the war on the side of the allies he could stigmatize his opponents as friends of Germany. Furthermore, the foreign war somewhat diverted the attention of the Cuban people from their internal problems and centered it upon other tasks. But more important was the fact that it insured him continued support from the United States government which had at times during the disturbance indicated a willingness to bring about a compromise with the insurgents, the "Gonzales notes" of February 13 and 18 and the reply to the Santiago chamber of commerce notwithstanding.

While relations between the United States and Cuba since the beginning of the disturbances were considerably influenced by the international situation, with the entrance of both nations into the war this factor became predominant. The chief concern of the United States was to keep Cuba productive and to prevent the island conditions from becoming a source of danger. There was considerable fear, which it appears was

⁶⁸ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 423.

unwarranted, that the Germans might take advantage of the civil war in the island to establish a submarine base there. When one considers the strength of the United States naval forces in Cuba at the time, which would have made it practically impossible to maintain a base there even if attained, this apprehension seems ridiculous. How much pro-German sympathy existed in Cuba it is difficult to estimate. That some of the more embittered insurgents must have harbored such sentiment is only natural, but there is nothing in the available records of the time that indicates that this created any real apprehension in official circles. Nowhere in the official dispatches of Gonzales is there any mention of danger from German agents nor is there evidence of it in the utterances of responsible Cuban liberals. On the contrary, Gonzales at various times explained the anti-American feelings as being due to Cuban conditions rather than to enemy propaganda. Even such pro-Menocal historians of the February revolution as Merino and Ibarzibal are forced to confess that, in all their investigations, they found no definite proof to justify the charge that the liberals aided the enemy against their country.⁶⁹

The effect of the entrance of the two countries into the war was disastrous to the insurgents. Nevertheless, a sufficient number, particularly in the province of Oriente, remained in the field to cause considerable uneasiness. While organized resistance there had received a severe blow through the flight of the liberal leaders, General Fernández and other officers, with \$140,000 in cash, armed bands of marauders remained active. United States interests continued to clamor for adequate protection which the Cuban government was unable to extend.⁷⁰ As a result, Gonzales recommended that one thousand marines be brought from Haiti to Guantanamo naval station, where, with those already there, they would be quickly available for the protection of the iron and copper mines and

⁶⁹ See footnote quotation from *La revolucion de febrero* in Chapman, p. 380.

⁷⁰ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 394.

the railroads connecting them with the ports.⁷¹ He also pointed out that the employment of marines as a police force would release federal troops for the task of pursuing the elusive rebel bands.⁷² Such a use of United States forces he believed could be made without publicity and in a manner acceptable to the Cuban government.⁷³ To this suggestion was added a similar recommendation from Consul Walcott in Santiago. He reported a "decided lack of energetic activity" on the part of the government troops.⁷⁴ It was perfectly clear that in the face of the pillaging and destruction of property some action was imperative, especially so after the national council of defense⁷⁵ informed the state department that it considered the production of sugar in Cuba of the utmost importance to the United States and the allied powers. In addition to this there was the need of protecting the rich iron mines around Nipe Bay which were of considerable importance in the production of war munitions.⁷⁶

The navy department, however, had no additional marines to spare for duty in Cuba.⁷⁷ It was necessary, therefore, to sound the Cuban president as to the advisability of sending United States troops. This was done in a note of May 11. At the same time the state department requested Menocal's views on issuing a statement to the effect that inasmuch as Cuba had declared war against Germany and had aligned itself on the side of the United States

⁷¹ Marines were already stationed at Santiago, Manganillo, Nuevitas, and El Cobre.

⁷² *Foreign Relations* (1917), pp. 401-402.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 401.

⁷⁵ A body composed of six cabinet officers: the secretaries of war, navy, interior, agriculture, commerce, and labor. Its purpose was to advise congress and the president on the mobilization of the industrial, transportation, and agricultural interests in national defense.

⁷⁶ *Foreign Relations* (1917), pp. 403-404.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 404.

the United States will be forced to consider as its own enemies those persons in revolution against the Constitutional Government, unless they immediately return to their allegiance.⁷⁸

Menocal welcomed the suggested statement, but discouraged the idea of sending additional forces, asserting that he was capable of handling the situation himself. In this latter view Minister Gonzales concurred. Nevertheless, the state department continued to press the plan and on the 15th instructed Gonzales to use his influence with the president

to induce him to agree to the sending to Guantanamo of a force of American troops in order to protect sugar production, which must not be interrupted.⁷⁹

On the same day, the secretary of state sent the following statement to the United States minister, the commanders of the United States naval forces and all the United States consuls and consular agents in Cuba with instructions to make it public:

The declaration of war against the Imperial German Government by the Government of Cuba, marking the entrance of Cuba side by side with the United States of America into the conflict which is now being waged for the highest rights of humanity and in defense of principles of international law, has been received by the Government of the United States with feelings of deep appreciation and friendly pride.

Now that the Cuban and American peoples are even more closely bound together by lasting ties of common interests, the Government of the United States feels that it is incumbent upon it again to reiterate its many published statements concerning its attitude toward those Cubans who are under arms against the Constitutional Government and to add in emphatic terms that it considers that the time has now arrived when all internal political questions must be set aside in the face of the grave international danger.

⁷⁸ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 404.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 406.

In calling this to the attention of the people of Cuba, it is felt necessary to state that in the present war, in order to insure victory, Cuba, as well as the United States, has two great obligations, one military and the other economic. Therefore, as the Allied Powers and the United States must depend to a large extent upon the sugar production of Cuba, all disturbances which interfere with this production must be considered as hostile acts, and the United States Government is forced to issue warning that unless all those under arms against the Government of Cuba return immediately to their allegiance it may become necessary for the United States to regard them as its enemies and deal with them accordingly.⁸⁰

Three days later, on the 18th, the state department requested the war department to send a military expedition composed of two regiments to Cuba in order to relieve the marines who were needed in Haiti and to coöperate with the Cuban government in bringing about complete order in the disaffected provinces should it be desired.⁸¹ This action of the United States was a death blow to the hopes of the insurgents. In the United States, the liberal mission composed of Orestes, Ferrara, and Raimundo Cabrera had earlier been effectively silenced by a warning from the state department on March 25 that if it continued its propaganda against the constitutional government, arrest would result.⁸²

On May 20, Menocal and Núñez, having carried the partial elections in Santa Clara and Oriente, were duly inaugurated as president and vice-president. The disorders that were expected in Havana did not materialize and many liberals of consequence were among those who congratulated the president.⁸³ The uprising except for the activities of a few isolated bands, had come to an end. For the next few years, the Cuban people gave themselves whole-heartedly to the task of providing the United States and the allies with sugar. Many

⁸⁰ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 407.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 409-410.

⁸² Johnson, *The History of Cuba*, IV. 339.

⁸³ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 410.

of the marines were withdrawn for service elsewhere and, with the approval of the Cuban government, troops were sent to take their place. At the same time, Menocal graciously offered the United States camp sites in Cuba in case it wanted to take advantage of the mild Cuban weather for winter training purposes.⁸⁴ In its desire to send troops to Cuba the United States was governed not only by the need of maintaining sugar production but also by the necessity of having forces in the Caribbean region in case the marines in Haiti and Santo Domingo should need reinforcement.⁸⁵

So far as the situation in Cuba was concerned, there remained only the problem of liquidating the revolt. Most of its leaders were either in jail awaiting trial or in hiding. An exception was Zayas, the liberal candidate for the presidency, who, after authorizing the rebellion, failed to take an active part in it following the first defeat at Placetas. Perhaps he felt that Gómez was fighting more for himself than for the liberal's presidential candidate. At any rate his inactivity in the uprising gained him no friends among those who had risked their lives.⁸⁶ So uncomfortable did his position in the liberal party become that he soon resigned as its leader and announced his intention of returning to the practice of law.⁸⁷ Later he organized his following into the so-called popular party and by striking a bargain with the conservatives in 1920 managed to squeeze himself into the presidency for a term.

Asbert, the former governor of Havana and a one-time supporter of Menocal, after spending some weeks in jail charged with rebellion, was released early in June. Undoubtedly, the fact that he had been only a lukewarm supporter of the rebellion was partly responsible for the easy treatment he received. Perhaps more important was the agreement he reached with the government to support President Menocal

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 412.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 412.

⁸⁶ Cabrera, *Mis malos Tiempos*, pp. 275-276.

⁸⁷ *Foreign Relations* (1917), p. 411.

and aid in restoring good feeling among the Cubans.⁸⁸ How much influence the United States minister exerted in favor of Asbert is a question but there is some reason to believe that he acted in the case under instructions of May 28, 1917, from the state department.⁸⁹

Many other liberals were sentenced to death or given jail sentences in varying terms. Fortunately for the continued peace of Cuba, Menocal pardoned those condemned to death and reduced the prison terms of others. Gómez was kept in prison until the end of September, 1917, when he was released and allowed to retire to the estate he had established for himself in the United States.⁹⁰ Later he returned to lead the liberal party in the campaign of 1920 against Zayas, his old rival. Other liberals who were not freed by Menocal's use of the pardoning power were released under the provisions of an amnesty bill of March 18, 1918.⁹¹

To what extent the policy of clemency adopted by Menocal was due to pressure from the United States is difficult to determine. That the United States insisted from time to time that there be no bloodshed is quite certain. In this course it may itself have been influenced by Orestes Ferrara, the leader of the liberal commission which had been sent to the United States. When it became evident that the revolt would collapse, he strongly urged the United States in the interest of peace and humanity to use its influence to prevent the conservative government from executing the liberal leaders who had been captured. There is some evidence also that Minister Gonzales assured foreign diplomats in Havana that no death penalty would be exacted as result of the uprising.⁹² Liberal leaders have constantly insisted that what leniency was shown in liquidating the revolt was due to the United States rather

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* Gonzales to Lansing. Referred to but not printed.

⁹⁰ Chapman, *A History of the Cuban Republic*, p. 383.

⁹¹ Chapman, p. 383.

⁹² Cabrera, pp. 201-205.

than to Menocal who they maintain wanted to execute Gómez and other leaders and was only prevented from so doing by the opposition of Secretary Lansing to such a course.⁹³

On the other hand, however, while it is quite clear that the United States urged a policy of magnanimity, there is no sufficient reason for attributing the policy adopted entirely to pressure from this country. Menocal may very well have followed the course he did without being influenced by others. His training in the United States and his record as a conciliator in the troubles of 1906 make it not so difficult to believe that he himself may well have been responsible for the adoption of lenient measures in dealing with his defeated opponents.

Of the greatest significance in bringing peace to the turbulent republic was the tremendous wave of economic prosperity that swept over the island due to the rapid increase in sugar production. Sugar, in fact, was Cuba's "contribution" to the cause of the allies. It was the task of the island republic to supply a world need which had grown acute owing, indeed, to many reasons, but primarily to the loss of Germany's beet sugar, decreased shipping, and dislocated trade. To this end, new plantations and mills rapidly sprung up in all parts of the island, but chiefly in the central and eastern provinces which had been the scene of the recent disturbances. So valuable was the crop of 1920, for instance, that it has been estimated that if equally divided it would have brought \$400.00 to every inhabitant of Cuba, a sum almost as great as the per capita wealth produced by all the mines, farms, and factories in the United States in the same year.⁹⁴ Naturally these developments created a strong demand for labor, which in turn brought high wages. Under conditions which admitted of such economic opportunities, the field laborer, who always fur-

⁹³ See quotations (October 29, 1924) from *Heraldo de Cuba*, Ferrara's paper, in Chapman, p. 384.

⁹⁴ W. J. Showalter in the *National Geographic Magazine* (January, 1920), pp. 1-10.

nished the material out of which uprisings were created, temporarily lost his interest in politics. A few years later when the collapse of the sugar market brought acute economic distress to the island his attitude again changed, but for the time being it was one that made for political inactivity.

LEO J. MEYER.

New York University.

THE FIRST EPISCOPAL SEES IN SPANISH AMERICA

No sooner had Columbus reported to Ferdinand and Isabella the discovery of new lands inhabited by infidels than they sent to Alexander VI. a petition that he cede to them the title to what had already been discovered and what might yet be discovered in the same region. The pope granted their request, defining their possessions¹ in his brief *Inter Cætera*, in which he laid upon the sovereigns, as a condition of their right to the new territory, the following responsibility:

And in addition we order you in virtue of holy obedience to send to the aforementioned islands and mainland learned, God-fearing, experienced and skilled missionaries who will exert all their powers in instructing the inhabitants in the Catholic faith and imbuing them with good morals.

No other charge could have been so much to the queen's liking, and even Ferdinand, egoist though he was according to the consensus of historical opinion, as a Catholic made the conversion of the Indians the first business of the new world. The difficulties and obstacles were obviously almost insurmountable, the instruction of the Indians involving, as it did, the establishment of a common language and the subsequent translation into a primitive tongue of new and abstract ideas that entailed distinction between right and wrong, with precepts restricting personal desires and freedom in ways never before imagined. It was a brave little handful of men who responded to the call of the crown for priests and religious to accompany Columbus on his second voyage in 1493.

¹ Bull *Inter Cætera*, text given in *Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias*, (Madrid, 1681) lib. i, tit. i, ley 2; in Henry Harrisse, *The diplomatic History of America: its first Chapter, 1452-1493-1494* (London, 1897), chap. iii; "Alexander VI and the demarcation of the maritime and colonial domains of Spain and Portugal, 1493-1494," by H. Vander Linden, in *American Historical Review*, October 1916, XXII. 1.

Few though they were in number, however, they formed a complete unit, for at their head was a vicar apostolic, appointed by the pope at the request of the sovereigns. The man whom they chose for this new office was Fray Don Bernal Boyl, a distinguished monk who, as acting superior of the Benedictine monastery of Montserrat, had had business with Ferdinand, and had so impressed the king by his prudence and holiness that he had sent him as ambassador to France to arrange matters involved in the restoration of the province of Roussillon to the crown of Aragon.² Father Boyl had successfully acquitted himself of his diplomatic mission, and at the time of the discovery of America was engaged in the establishment of a new religious order³ in Spain, a work which he must have delegated with reluctance. Ferdinand had such confidence in his ability that when there arose the difficult task of founding the Church among infidels in an alien land, his was the name the crown submitted to the pope. Father Boyl, however, failed in the new assignment. He disagreed with Columbus over policies of government, and viewed the whole colonizing venture as a chimerical scheme. Recognizing besides that he was not adapted to missionary work, at the end of a year he came back to Spain. The sovereigns were disappointed, but they did not abandon their purpose to have a priest vested with superior ecclesiastical power sent to the new world, there to direct the work of the Church among the Indians and the new colonists. Upon Father Boyl's return, therefore, the sovereigns wrote again to Rome and obtained a form of appointment for a successor,⁴ with a blank space left for the name of a priest, and they sent this to Juan de Fonseca, at that time bishop of Badajoz and royal agent at Seville, with the following instructions dated April 9, 1495:

² *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* (Madrid), XIX. 173-175, 187-190, 268-281, 354-356, 556-557, XX. 160-162, 183-184.

³ Father Boyl changed from the Benedictine order to the Minims, a Franciscan order founded by St. Francis of Paula, who at that time was in France. Father Boyl was made vicar-general of the order in Spain.

⁴ *Boletín*, XIX. 199.

Since Fray Don Bernal Boyl, who had faculties from the Holy See for episcopal cases in the Indies, is not going back, there is need of some learned and pious priest to replace him; we are sending you the same faculties for his successor, whom you are to name.⁵

It is to be presumed that these instructions were carried out and that some priest among those who sailed in that year was chosen. But there is no mention made of him in the early chronicles nor have any documents been published that tell of further appointments of vicars apostolic. On the contrary, a letter written in 1516 by the Dominican fathers of Santo Domingo to M. de Chièvres, minister of Charles V., refers to the administration of Ovando—that is, to sometime between 1502 and 1509—as a time when

there was no bishop nor any other person to govern the Church except priests paid either by individual Spaniards or by the king.⁶

It seems strange that the sovereigns, so prompt in 1492 to provide a distinct ecclesiastical organization for the Indies, should have failed to work for its continuance, allowing ten years to elapse before they took steps again to give the Church a resident head there. It was not from lack of interest or of zeal; for during this time they issued calls for priests and religious at least in 1495⁷ and 1501,⁸ and, probably, in the intervening years; while the instructions⁹ to Ovando as governor, dated March 1503, show familiarity with the spiritual needs of the Indian and an assumption that there were enough priests on the island to attend to them.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 200-201.

⁶ *Colección de Documentos inéditos . . . del Real Archivo de Indias* (Madrid), VII, 428-429. The subject of the letter was the marriage of an Indian to a Spaniard, performed by Bishop Xuárez de Deza without permission of the civil authorities. Inasmuch as Ovando had placed a penalty of a hundred lashes on any Spaniard marrying an Indian, the court inflicted the penalty on the man in question. The Dominican fathers protested that the presence of ecclesiastical authority altered the situation.

⁷ *Ibid.*, XXX, 343. Cedula dated April 9, 1495.

⁸ *Ibid.*, XXXI, 199.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

I understand that the Indians ought to be in villages and in family groups. Let the governor see to it that such villages be formed and that a church be built in each one and a chaplain be placed in charge to instruct the Indians in the doctrine of the Church, baptize them, teach them their prayers, administer the sacraments to them, assemble the children daily, and induce all to dress and act like Christians. Build hospitals to care for the poor, both Spanish and Indian.

The explanation of the apparent change in the manner of establishing the Church in the Indies—that is, in Española or Haiti, which was the only Spanish settlement in America at that time—may lie in the change of point of view in regard to the status of the island itself. In 1493, when a company of fifteen hundred sailed with Columbus, hope was high that a new Spain would soon be flourishing in the distant land, and absorbing into its civilization the untutored native inhabitants. Such a colony would demand the familiar parish and, as a necessary consequence, the diocese and the hierarchy; but the hope was not fulfilled. Disease and vicissitudes of pioneer life ravaged the new settlements, so that from 1495 until 1503 there were never more than five hundred men,¹⁰ barely enough to hold the island, and these remained reluctantly, for the most part under pay of the crown to subdue the Indians, hunt for gold, and found a permanent colony. Española was thus for awhile but an outpost of civilization planted in the midst of a barbarous people, and the work of the Church was limited to the ministrations of the individual priest to whatever Indians he could reach. The problems that arose in the little mission were simple ones which the pastor himself could solve and they concerned almost entirely the spiritual regeneration of the native. Except for the administration of the sacrament of confirmation these first missionaries had little need of a bishop for either spiritual or temporal matters. These latter

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, XXX. 356; Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia general de los hechos de los Castellanos en las islas y tierra firme del mar océano* (Madrid, 1601), dec. ii, bk. iii, chap. ii; Bartolomé de Las Casas, *Historia general de las Indias* (Madrid, 1873), bk. ii, chap. i.

were cared for by secular authority, for the mission was supported by the crown, in the early years from the general funds dedicated to the colonization venture, and later from tithes, due the Church by common and ecclesiastical law.

The bull *Inter Cetera*, as we have seen, directed the sovereigns to establish the Church in the Indies, and since in so doing they incurred expense it was natural that they should meet it as far as possible with ecclesiastical funds. In November, 1501, in answer to a petition, Alexander VI. gave to Ferdinand and Isabella and their successors the right to levy and collect the tithes, on condition that they set aside a sufficient amount of money from the treasury for the construction of churches, the support of the clergy, and the expenses of carrying out the ritual in a fitting manner, in accordance with the decrees of future bishops.¹¹ The tithes, a tenth part of the produce of the land, and of the increase of animals, were collected at first by the royal officials,¹² an account was kept of them and the proceeds deposited in the treasury, and from them were paid the salaries of the missionaries,¹³ the cost of sending to Rome for decrees,¹⁴ and the expense of building churches.¹⁵ Later, as we shall see, they were assigned in definite fractional parts to various ecclesiastical needs. Often they were insufficient and the treasury made up the deficit.¹⁶ With the financial affairs thus completely assured by civil officials, and with no other business requiring superior authority, it seems from the evidence available that the first missionaries worked undirected except for an occasional suggestion from

¹¹ Bull *Eximie devotionis*, original in archives in Seville. Published in *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 2nd series, V. 79.

¹² *Doc. ined.*, 1st series, XXXIV. 111 ff; *Boletín*, XX. pp. 600-601. Letters to Pasamonte, royal treasurer in the Indies.

¹³ *Doc. ined.*, 1st series, XXXI. 388; XXXIV. 111 ff. *Doc. ined.*, 2nd series, V. 133-135.

¹⁴ *Boletín*, XX. 286-287.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-279.

¹⁶ D. Petrus Frasso, *De regio patronatu Indiarum* (Madrid, 1677), chap. xviii, par. 16; Juan de Solórzano y Pereira, *Política Indiana* (Madrid, 1647), tit. ii, bk. xxii, chap. 43.

the governor, and that each priest kept his affiliations with his own diocese in Spain.

In 1502, Spain made a second tremendous attempt to populate Española with Spaniards,¹⁷ twenty five hundred sailing with the new governor, Nicolas de Ovando, knight commander of the military order of Alcántara. During the few preceding years gold had been discovered in larger quantities, the mainland, with its pearl fisheries, and the other Antilles had been discovered, and there was more reason for hope of a successful colony than heretofore. Ovando himself was an esteemed and noble leader and attracted many. Their expectations were realized and the colony flourished. Thereupon, the sovereigns returned to the original policy of establishing a separate ecclesiastical unit. In November, 1504, they obtained by the bull *Illius fulciti præsidio*¹⁸ the creation of an archbishopric and two bishoprics on the island of Española. The archbishop was placed as metropolitan over the whole island and in immediate charge of the diocese of Hyaguatensis located along the south coast from Higüey on the east to Xaragua on the west, that is from the extreme southeastern point to the present-day Port au Prince, and extending inward from the coast a varied and indetermined number of miles. Santo Domingo was included in this diocese and is the only name not Indian mentioned in the bull. The original names of these localities disappeared before the earliest geographical description was written, and therefore the exact location of all three dioceses is a matter of conjecture. The two bishoprics, called Maguacensis and Bayunensis, were located respectively in Maguá, which later became the city of Concepción de la Vega, and in Baynoá near the spot where later Lares de Guahabá was built, the former in the central part of the island, the latter some sixty miles to the northwest of Santo Domingo.¹⁹ These three

¹⁷ Las Casas, *op. cit.*, bk. ii, chap. iii, description of the expedition.

¹⁸ *Doc. ined.*, 2nd series, V. 86-91.

¹⁹ Carlos Nouel, *Historia eclesiástica de la Arquidiócesis de Santo Domingo*, Santo Domingo, 1913-1914, I. 26.

sees did not reach the point of being established, for reasons that we are about to examine, but they are important as evidence of the effect on the sovereigns' minds of the early reports from the new world. Ferdinand and Isabella were planning for populous communities to be built upon the resources which seemed so full of promise, and proceeded to carry out their ideas at once, with the over-confidence of those accustomed to success. Hyaguatensis is the only example in history of an archbishopric set in a wilderness. The practice of the Church from antiquity was to place its sees in cities, not in villages, and when, because of geographic position a village needed a bishop, the pope raised the status of the village to that of a city;²⁰ but Hyaguatensis was not even attached to a village; its location was given in the bull as in the province of Hyaguata, and this in spite of the fact that there were villages in this province as large as Maguá or Baynoá, and that Santo Domingo, the center of Spanish activity, was named as one of the villages under the jurisdiction of the archbishop. European colonies across the sea, and whole nations to be raised from barbarism, made a novel situation, and Pope Julius II. was evidently willing to act contrary to precedent and to accept the archdiocese and dioceses as submitted by Ferdinand and Isabella, but the perplexing question is why they should want such a topheavy organization, and want it ardently enough to proceed against established custom.

Soon after the death of Isabella in November, 1504, the bull *Illius fulciti præsidio* reached Spain, and with it three bulls making the following appointments: archbishop of Hyaguata, D. Pedro Xuárez de Deza,²¹ member of the Dominican order, and nephew of D. Diego de Deza, archbishop of Seville; bishop of Baynoá, D. Fray Francisco García de Padilla,²² a Francis-

²⁰ Solórzano, *op. cit.*, tit. iv, bk. v, chap. 11.

²¹ No biographical data appears in any contemporary writers so far as examined, with reference to this Dominican.

²² Gil González Dávila, *Teatro eclesiástico de la primitiva Iglesia en las Indias occidentales* (Madrid, 1649), I. 259.

can; and bishop of Maguá, D. Alonzo Manso,²³ canon of the cathedral of Salamanca. In addition to the appointment of these three prelates whose names they had presented, the sovereigns had asked for the same rights of patronage in the Indies as they enjoyed in Granada,²⁴ that is, the right to present to the pope names of archbishops, bishops, and abbots, and to bishops nominations for all prebends, canonries, and benefices. In the bull, the pope did not grant the patronage to the crown; on the contrary, he laid upon the bishops the obligation of erecting in their dioceses all ecclesiastical benefices. Upon receipt of the bulls, Ferdinand wrote at once to his ambassador at Rome directing him to ask the pope to send two new bulls reversing his decision, one in which the bishops would be denied the right to appoint any beneficed clergy who had not been presented by the crown, and the other awarding this right of presentation or patronage to the crown.²⁵ The bulls of appointment would not be delivered to the archbishop and bishops elect, he wrote, until this patronage was satisfactorily arranged. From late in 1504 until July 28, 1508, the matter was held up, partly because of Ferdinand's preoccupation with the Italian interests of the crown of Aragon, and partly because of the reluctance of the Church to act. Julius II. was unwilling to grant so inclusive a right as that of nominating the higher clergy of an entire new province whose boundaries were being widened every day, while Ferdinand, always jealous of the rights and privileges of the crown, was bent upon protecting his new kingdoms against the possible influence of foreign priests. Twice Ferdinand and Isabella had forced the pope to withdraw the appointment of an Italian to a Spanish see, in 1482 to the diocese of Cuenca, in 1485 to the archdiocese of Seville, and the appointment of Italian prel-

²³ Herrera y Tordesillas *op. cit.*, dec. i, bk. ix, chap. ix; González Dávila, *op. cit.*, I. 288.

²⁴ Rafael Altamira y Crevea, *Historia de España y de la Civilización española* (Barcelona, 1902), II. sec. 590; Roger Bigelow Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire* (New York, 1918-1925), II. 153.

²⁵ *Boletín*, XX. 590.

ates to Spanish abbeys had been common. Ferdinand did not want the same conditions to obtain in the Indies. Each foreign prelate appointed foreign priests to at least some of the important positions under his jurisdiction, and neither the crown nor the Spanish people as a whole liked the foreigner. These considerations led Ferdinand to insist upon more extensive patronage than the ecclesiastical power had ever granted before except in his own province of Granada.

At last by the bull *Universalis Ecclesie*,²⁶ of July 28, 1508, Julius II. acceded to Ferdinand's demand, ruling that no church, monastery, or chapel could be founded or built in any part of the Indies without the consent of Ferdinand and his daughter Juana or their successors, and granting them and their successors the right of presenting suitable and acceptable candidates for all ecclesiastical benefices in metropolitan or cathedral churches, whether of the class filled by the consistory in Rome, that is, archbishops, bishops, and abbots, or of that belonging to the ordinary or bishop, to fill, that is, dignitaries, canons, and minor beneficed clergy. On account of the long distances involved, the four months allowed a patron by canon law to name an acceptable person were lengthened to a year from the first day of the vacancy.

Ferdinand could now deliver the bulls of 1504 and have the three priests named in them consecrated. Española was clamoring for them and Ferdinand anxious that they should go. But the situation had so changed in Española, the centers of population had so shifted because of the migration or death of the Indians and the consequent change in locality of the Spanish villages, that the three sees created in 1504 were no longer desirable. The king, therefore, petitioned the pope to annul them and to create two new ones in Española at Santo Domingo and at Concepción de la Vega, and one in San Juan, or Porto Rico, all three to be suffragan to Seville. A letter from Ferdinand to the casa de contratación in Seville, dated

²⁶ Francisco Javier Hernández, *Colección de Bulas, Breves, y otros Documentos relativos a la Iglesia de America y Filipinas* (Brussels, 1879), I. 24-25.

August 14, 1509,²⁷ shows that he was trying to conclude the matter at that time:

You forwarded me a letter from Diego Columbus saying that he had sent me a draft of the division of dioceses in the Indies. I have not received it. Have you it there? If so, send it by some responsible person, because I need to see it.

There is plenty of evidence that the Church needed a head in Española. Its temporal affairs were being referred to the *casa de contratación* and to the king for settlement, and encroached upon the time of royal officials both on the island and in Spain. The question of suitable church buildings, for example, occupied the king and the *casa* as much, if not more, than the building of fortresses. Cement and other materials had to be sent directly from Spain, as well as master mechanics to do the work. On November 14, 1509, the king wrote to the *casa*:²⁸

Make haste to send mechanics and materials for the churches. There is not yet one of stone, I believe. There is no way of reserving the Blessed Sacrament. Thus many die without the Sacrament.

On February 14, 1510, the king again wrote to the *casa* as follows:²⁹ "Send the master stone workers; hasten to sign the contract with them." The contract³⁰ was signed May 25 of that year, and two architects, Juan de Herrera and Orduño de Bretendón, with workmen under pay for three years, sailed from San Lucar, June 13.

We might follow the correspondence of the king through 1512 and even later, during the time between the consecration of the new bishops in Spain and their arrival in Española, but we should find only what these two letters show, namely, Ferdinand giving personal attention to minor details of the

²⁷ *Doc. ined.*, 2nd series, V. 195-196.

²⁸ *Boletín*, XX. 286-287.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, R. P. Fidel Fita, (b.1835, d.1917), director of the Spanish Academy, says that the contract is in the archives in Seville, Muñoz Col., LXXV., fol. 244.

temporal affairs of the Church. The burden of these cares, added to the greater consideration of the real need that then existed for ecclesiastical authority in the new colony, made Ferdinand anxious to have the sees established. Finally, on August 13, 1511, after inquiries and negotiations of nearly three years from the award of the right of patronage, the pope by the bull *Romanus Pontifex*³¹ suppressed the three sees of 1504 and created three new ones, two in Española and one in San Juan, as the king had petitioned. The same three priests were named for them: Francisco García de Padilla for the diocese of Santo Domingo which comprised the southern part of the island, Pedro Xuárez de Deza for the diocese of Concepción de la Vega which comprised the northern part, and Alonso Manso for San Juan.³² The bulls reached Spain in November, 1511, and on May 12 of the following year they were authenticated in Burgos. There a concordat³³ was signed by the crown and the three bishops-elect, regulating the choice of men for the priesthood, their ordination, the dress and conduct of priests, the declaration of feast days, the levy and collection of tithes, and the royal right of patronage. Ferdinand did not himself present names at this time, but he kept control of the situation by instructing the archbishop of Seville to choose suitable candidates for election by the new bishops for the benefices of their cathedrals.³⁴

The cathedral organization as actually set up in Santo Domingo consisted³⁵ of a dean, who had supervision over the choir of canons, over processions, and over the chanting of divine office; a chanter, who trained the choir and who was himself "experienced and learned in music"; a master,³⁶ with a degree of bachelor of law or arts from a university in Spain,

³¹ *Doc. ined.*, 1st series, XXXIV. 25-35.

³² Herrera y Tordesillas, *op. cit.*, dec. i, bk. viii, chap. x; Las Casas, *op. cit.*, bk. iii, chap. i-ii.

³³ Hernández, *op. cit.*, I. 21-24.

³⁴ Solórzano, *op. cit.*, tit. iv, bk. iii, chap. 26, and tit. iv, bk. iv, chap. i and ii.

³⁵ See *ante* note 33.

³⁶ Scholasticus or maestrescuela.

who was to teach Latin grammar to the altar boys, to the minor clergy, and to any one else desirous of learning it; an archpriest or rector who attended to the care of souls in the parish of the cathedral and presided over all the other rectors or pastors of the city and diocese. These officers or dignitaries were part of the cathedral chapter, to which fell the administration of the diocese in the absence of the bishop and vicar general or when the see was vacant. The members of the chapter were priests called canons, and of these there were five at first in Santo Domingo. The canons chanted divine office daily and each in turn celebrated the principal mass of the day. In addition to the chapter there were the following appointments: three deacons, called *racioneros* because they enjoyed the income of a chaplaincy, and a sacristan who was a kind of assistant treasurer. This cathedral body was as large as the revenues then available permitted, but much smaller than European usage demanded or the canonical erection of this cathedral itself provided for in the instrument signed by the bishop-elect of Santo Domingo and the archbishop of Seville in the latter's palace, in November, 1512.

The organization as erected on paper was as complete and practically as large as that of the cathedral of Toledo,³⁷ but approximately one half of it was suspended by the concordat until such times as finances should make it possible to increase it. The officers to be added, in the order of their importance, were as follows: an archdean,³⁸ who was to examine the deacons for ordination to priesthood and to take charge of the administration of the city and diocese in the absence of the bishop, if the latter had no vicar general; a treasurer,³⁹ who besides being bursar must see to it that the church was opened and locked, that the bells were rung, and that all the prop-

³⁷ Mariano Cuevas, S. J., *Historia de la Iglesia en México*, (Mexico, 1924), II, 110.

³⁸ Vázquez de Ayllón, member of the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, in a report on the Church in 1522 stated that this dignitary had been appointed (*Doc. ined.*, 1st series, XXXIV. 111 ff.

³⁹ See *ante*, note 38.

erty of the church was well guarded; five additional canons; three additional deacons as *racioneros*; three sub-deacons who were to enjoy half the revenue of a chaplaincy and were therefore called *medio racioneros*; six chaplains; six altar boys; an organist; a beadle who was to arrange and lead processions; a majordomo to take charge of the construction and upkeep⁴⁰ of the church and also of the hospital which was part of the work of the Church in Santo Domingo, as in every other city or town in the Indies; a notary in charge of contracts and like documents and a porter⁴¹ who was

to chase stray dogs out of the church and sweep it Saturdays, vigils of feasts, and whenever else the treasurer might order.

In the document of canonical erection, also, the salary of each officer was fixed, varying from one hundred and fifty gold pesos paid the dean to the twelve paid the altar boys and the porter; in addition, the clergy who sang divine office were to receive rations for each day they were actually in attendance or excused for sufficient reason. This salary scale was followed later in all cathedral churches of the Spanish colonies wherever the tithes, assigned as we shall see in definite fractional parts, were not enough to insure as a minimum income the amounts specified in this document.⁴² From the canonical erection of the cathedral of Santo Domingo as here described, and of those of Concepción and San Juan, which were erected in like manner at the same time, we see that the Church was established in the years immediately following 1512 as formally as in any part of Spain. Santo Domingo was fast becoming an attractive place in which to live—"surpassed in beauty by none in Spain but Barcelona", as Oviedo⁴³ in his

⁴⁰ The term "*fabrica*" includes all the expenses of the church except salaries. It sometimes means the trustees in charge of the temporalities of the Church. Cf. Fr. "*fabrique*".

⁴¹ *Ostiarus*.

⁴² Frasso, *op. cit.*, chap. xviii, par. 16.

⁴³ Gonzalo Hernández de Oviedo y Valdés, *Historia general y natural de las Indias* (Madrid, 1535), bk. iii, chap. x.

enthusiasm describes it. The Spanish colony attempted in 1493, and again in 1502, had become a reality and the ecclesiastical organization so out of proportion to its surroundings in 1504 had, in a somewhat modified form, become a necessity which was supplied through the initiative and energy of Ferdinand.

Spain had more authority over the Church in the Indies than any other state has ever had over the Church. In the early years, the crown supported it, for the most part, expending on it sums of money that would have been used for other expenses of the crown had not Isabella and Ferdinand foreseen that the success of the colonial venture depended upon the firm establishment of the Church and the consequent conversion of the natives. Owing to the twofold nature of their task, political as well as religious, their conception was not that of missions as they have since developed—conversions first and the gradual building of a native church—but the church first and the speedy assimilation of the Indians. “Make the Indians behave and dress like Christians”, Ferdinand wrote to the priests in the field. This was the strong motive back of the almost continuous endeavor of the sovereigns from 1493 on, to establish the Church in Española as the solid centralized system they knew in Europe.

In Spain at this time, the Church was supported by tithes, where the parish was not endowed by a founder. In Española, the priests who came at first with Fray Bernal Boyl, and those who came in 1495, as doubtless all others who arrived during the first decade, were paid from the royal treasury. In 1501, as we have said, Alexander VI. gave the right to levy and collect tithes to Ferdinand and Isabella and their successors, under the guarantee of previous assurance that the Church would be supported in a fitting manner by the crown. It will be profitable to pause and examine the custom of the century in regard to tithes both in Spain itself and in the colony. They were of two sorts, personal, that is, of the fruits of industry, such as wages, profits in buying and selling, etc., and predial,

that is, of the fruits of the land and animals.⁴⁴ Spanish custom was against the collection of the former,⁴⁵ and no personal tithes were levied in the Indies after 1530.⁴⁶ From 1514 on, it appears that the amount collected as personal tithes was but one twenty-fifth of the whole; for in that year the king had a document drawn up in which Bishop Padilla agreed not to collect above that amount; and in which his successors were pledged to the same limit.⁴⁷ This agreement the king sent to the deputies of Española with instructions to them to secure a like contract from Bishop Xuárez de Deza, to whom the king said he was writing on the subject.⁴⁸

This will be gratifying to the inhabitants of the island, because previously they have been obliged to pay them in their entirety.

Inasmuch as it is doubtful that there was a systematic collection of tithes before 1508 or 1509, the years in which full personal tithes could have been collected were few. In Bishop Manso's diocese of San Juan the people refused to pay them when he made demand for them upon his arrival in 1513, in spite of the severe censures which he laid upon them. He took the matter to Spain, where the king vindicated the people, and the bishop on his return to his see in 1519, gave up the demand.⁴⁹ Many of the settlers of San Juan had been inhabitants of Española and it would seem from their vehement opposition to Bishop Manso on this question that they had never been accustomed to paying this sort of tithe.

Under predial tithes in their broadest sense minerals were included, and Spanish common law considered them collectible,⁵⁰ but the king never collected them from miners,⁵¹ and a

⁴⁴ *Analecta Juris Pontificii* (Rome, 1871), XI. 477-490.

⁴⁵ Solórzano, *op. cit.*, tit. iv, bk. xxiv, chap. 28.

⁴⁶ Frasso, *op. cit.*, chap. xix, par. 31.

⁴⁷ *Boletín*, XX. 605.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 606.

⁴⁹ Herrera y Tordesillas, *op. cit.*, dec. i, bk. ix, chap. ix.

⁵⁰ Solórzano, *op. cit.*, tit. ii, bk. xxii, chap. 14.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, tit. iv, bk. xxi, chap. 12.

bull of Julius II.,⁵² dated April 8, 1510, specifically released the sovereigns from paying any tithes on gold, silver, or metals of the Indies. This release applied, presumably, to the mines operated by the crown, and not to the part due the crown from all mines. The church law on tithes was that they must be paid under penalty of ecclesiastical censures wherever the clergy needed the proceeds of them for their support.⁵³ The fourth Lateran council, in 1215, however, had legislated that the contribution of the people should be decreased in proportion to the wealth of the church in each diocese.⁵⁴ Where a church was sufficiently endowed, the people were to contribute nothing, where the tithes of the fruits of a province were more than the church needed, the people were to give a smaller percentage. In no case could the tax be raised above a tenth of the income of each individual. The tithes of the Indies were due from Spaniard and Indian alike,⁵⁵ and from converted and non-converted Indian; from the latter on the same legal ground that tribute was due from them, as infidels subject to a Christian prince.⁵⁶

Although the tithes had belonged to the crown since 1501, there seems to have been no systematic collection of them for several years. Royal instructions to Ovando, in 1503,⁵⁷ directed him to pay the clergy out of the royal treasury, without mention of any special fund of tithes, but those to Diego Columbus in 1509⁵⁸ designated the tithes as the fund to be used for this purpose. In 1508, the towns sent special representatives to the crown to complain of conditions in Española, and one of their grievances was that the churches had been built at the expense of the towns. The king gave them redress,

⁵² *Eximiae devotionis*, in *Doc. ined.*, 2nd series, V. 205-209.

⁵³ Solórzano, *op. cit.*, tit. ii, bk. xxii, chap. 30; *Codex Juris Canonici* (Canon 1502).

⁵⁴ Solórzano, *op. cit.*, tit. ii, bk. xxii, chap. 33.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, chap. 5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, chap. 3.

⁵⁷ *Doc. ined.*, 1st series, XXXI. 199.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 388.

ordering that churches be built from the tithes collected by Miguel Pasamonte.⁵⁹

In the report of the oidor Vásquez de Ayllón⁶⁰ occurs the following statement:

This is what we, Ayllón and Alvaro de Castro [dean of the cathedral church of Concepción de la Vega], know about the income of the cathedral of Santo Domingo: Ferdinand, in 1513, gave as alms to the Church the tithes of 1509, 1510, 1511, and 1512. In those four years the tithes were collected by the crown and the salaries of the clergy and the other expenses of the church were paid from the royal treasury. The tithes amounted to more than 15,000 pesos, of which 5,000 were spent and 10,000 still remain in the hands of Pasamonte. All this you directed to be given to Bishop Padilla. Besides, another decree granted likewise the tithes of 1508, but we do not know whether these were collected.

There must have been some collecting of them by the royal officials before 1508, as we know from the response of the king to the deputies whose complaints bore the date of April, 1508, but it would seem from this report from Ayllón that they were not set aside as a separate fund until Miguel Pasamonte took charge.

The deputies objected also to the method of collecting the tithes. Evidently the practice of compounding for them, that is, discharging the obligation by paying a lump sum annually, had been in vogue. Ready money was scarce in Española at this time, due to periodic inflation of prices in the months of the smelting of gold and the consequent high price of purchasable commodities, and thus it was that the land owners petitioned to have the collection of tithes made in kind rather than in money. The king's answer⁶¹ reads as follows:

The deputies petition me to order that the tithes and first fruits should be farmed out and not compounded for as they have been up to the

⁵⁹ *Boletín*, XX. 276-279.

⁶⁰ See *ante*, note 38.

⁶¹ *Boletín*, XX. 275-279.

present, for from this practice the island and the people suffer. And in order that these people may not be harassed or inconvenienced over the tithes and first fruits I have ordered that these be collected in kind, each one by itself;—but in case there is no one to whom to farm them, the people cannot be excused from depositing money as security for the payment of them.

In the bull of 1504 creating the sees of Hyaguata, Maguá, and Baynoá, Julius II., in spite of the fact that the tithes had been donated to the crown by Alexander VI., gave to the archbishop and bishops the right to levy and collect them. It is true that when tithes were awarded by the popes to the laity, the collection of them still remained by canon law an episcopal right, but it seems that in this case Julius II., in ignoring the pronouncement of his predecessor, assumed that the crown would consider it logical and desirable to give the tithes back to the Church upon the creation of the bishoprics, for the financial management of the Church could be nothing but a burden to the crown. Thus the event proved when the sees of Santo Domingo, Concepción, and San Juan were created.

The bull of 1511 creating the sees of Santo Domingo, Concepción, and San Juan, in the same manner as the bull of 1504, gave the bishops the right to levy and collect tithes and first fruits except gold, silver, other metals, and precious stones, "which we declare exempt and free". On May 8, 1512, the concordat signed at Burgos to which we have already referred, gave the tithes back to the Church, and the instrument of the canonical erection of the cathedral of Santo Domingo, whose clauses on the membership of the cathedral chapter we have examined, divides them into fractional parts designated for various uses, a division that became more or less a standard for the Indies. One-fourth was to go to the support of the bishop and one-fourth to that of the cathedral chapter; the remaining half was divided as follows: two-ninths belonged to the crown; four-ninths to the pastor and curate of parishes, the pastor receiving one-ninth intact and one-half of the other three-ninths; three-eightieths were to be used in the con-

struction and upkeep of the church and the same proportion in that of hospitals. In addition, there were assigned to the construction and upkeep of the church tithes of cement, lime, bricks, etc., and the tithes intact of one parishioner, chosen by the majordomo in charge of church construction, with the proviso that he should not be the richest man in the parish but the one second after him in wealth. The three-ninths or six eight-eenths dedicated to construction and upkeep of the parish church and of the local hospital were themselves subject to tithing for the construction of the cathedral and of the diocesan hospital. All tithes were collected in parish units, given over to the diocesan treasury, and reassigned to parish needs.

In the bull of 1504, the right to levy first fruits as well as tithes was given, and in the concordat seven-eighths of the first fruits were granted to the rector and one-eighth to the sacristan. The term "first fruits" was sometimes used to refer to the tithes themselves, that is, to the part of them that represented the first fruits of the year. In theory, at any rate, the tithes were laid aside before the rest of the crop was used or marketed, and so the tithes would be the first tenth gathered, and some part of these would be actually the first fruits of the season. In the other use of the term, they represented a voluntary offering of thanksgiving to God, a pious practice still in vogue in parts of Europe. As such, there was no compulsion on anyone to present them to the Church. It seems as if in the above mentioned bull, the first fruits referred to were included in the tithes, for in the concordat they are taken into account only in this one place, as additional income for the rector, and as support for the sacristan. This interpretation of first fruits is borne out by the fact that the support of the sacristan was soon transferred to a fraction of the tithes assigned to the rector.

Such was the system that Ferdinand meant to plant in Española. In pursuance of this plan, he expected the newly appointed bishops to leave Spain as soon after November,

1512, as they could complete their preparation, as is clear from the letter⁶² he wrote the preceding July to Pasamonte:

Since the bishops, Padilla and Deza, are coming and can best do the work of the Church, give over to them the tithes that you have collected since you reached the island, except those you have expended on churches and bulls. Henceforth, the bishops will do the collecting, according to the terms of the concordat and the canonical erection.

The bishops, however, did not go at once, but they sent vicars general, accompanied, probably, by the dignitaries, canons, and racioneros who had been appointed. An order⁶³ dated September 13, that is, two months before the canonical erection in Seville of the cathedral of Santo Domingo, assigns a certain amount in maravedis to pay for the transportation to the Indies of Carlos de Larréa, archpriest or rector of the cathedral of Santo Domingo, to which he was to go as vicar general, "with the power of bishop". The date of this order indicates that the personnel of the cathedrals sailed soon after their appointment in November, 1512. Bishop Padilla never reached his see. In a letter⁶⁴ to the king, dated February 2, 1514, the archbishop of Seville wrote:

It seems as if the bishop of Santo Domingo is hanging back from his responsibilities although, really, anyone with such a task, where there is so much need, ought not to be indolent if his constitution is strong enough for the work.

As the bishop died the following year, it is quite possible that his health had begun to fail in the years between his consecration as bishop and the archbishop's letter quoted above. The vicar general, Carlos de Larréa, in the meanwhile, administered the diocese in Santo Domingo, and the bishop directed and assisted him from Spain, an arrangement that seems to have been recognized and accepted by the king in the

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 600.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 601.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 603.

following letter⁶⁵ written to the officials of the city of Santo Domingo:

Bishop Padilla tells me that you, supported by the dean and chapter of the cathedral, are endeavoring to obstruct the collection of tithes belonging to the construction and upkeep of the church and to the bishop, saying that you have the authority to place an agent to collect and distribute them. Neither canon law nor the bulls permit this. No one but the bishop or a person appointed by him can collect the tithes. He has named Larréa and asked me to write you. Let Larréa collect the tithes and spend them on repairs and construction of churches.

Bishop Manso of San Juan or Porto Rico was the first bishop⁶⁶ to take possession in person of his see. Xuárez de Deza, bishop of Concepción, arrived in Española towards the end of the year 1513. In February, 1514, the archbishop of Seville, Diego de Deza, uncle of Xuárez, wrote:⁶⁷

A letter came two weeks ago by boat saying that the bishop of Concepcion arrived safely. Everyone in the island is delighted, and I believe that he will promote the glory of God.

With the settlement of these three bishops in their sees the church was definitely established in America.

E. WARD LOUGHRAN.

. Boston, Mass.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 607.

⁶⁶ Herrera y Tordesillas, *op. cit.*, dec. i, bk. ix, chap. 9.

⁶⁷ See *ante* note 64.

DOCUMENTS

PEARL FISHING ENTERPRISES IN THE GULF OF CALIFORNIA

THE EXPEDITION OF SEBASTIAN VIZCAINO

The pearl oyster is found along the east coast of the Peninsula of California from about the neighborhood of Cabo Pulmo to Mulejé. The most productive fisheries have been in La Bahía de la Paz and near Loreto. The oysters are found at some depth, rarely in less than five or six feet of water and are very firmly attached to the rocks by their beards. Although it was, and still is customary to think of them as being found in beds, the expression is not strictly accurate as the bottom to which they cling is extremely rough. They are therefore difficult to obtain and what is worse very few have any pearls in them, not even small ones; only at rare intervals has a really valuable pearl been discovered. In spite of these facts, obvious to all pearl fishers, the business has always exercised a peculiar fascination for the speculatively inclined who had their attention drawn to it. Hernando Cortés, the conqueror of Mexico, was the first California pearl fisher to try his luck, having heard of them from one of his followers, who had escaped from a massacre, somewhere on the peninsula in the pearl region, in which most of his companions had been killed. He organized and led an elaborate expedition in 1535 with the intention of colonizing the country. The enterprise was a ghastly failure. There is no contemporary record that he or any of his men obtained any pearls except from the natives who were accustomed to throw the oysters on the fire to open them, a practice which invariably resulted in either burning or discoloring any pearls that might have been in them. It is however not unlikely that during the long stay of his men near La Paz they did find a few good pearls as pearl oysters were

originally very plentiful in that vicinity. The fact that he abandoned the country and no later steps were taken, so far as known, to send over another expedition is rather positive proof that no great number was found nor any of great value.¹

After the return of Cortés an occasional expedition must have been made to look for pearls, but we only have a record of one during the following fifty years. Baltasar Obregón in his *Cronica*² tells us that he went to the Island of Cardona in California with his father-in-law, Antonio de Luna, apparently just before the settling of Chiametla by Francisco de Ibarra in 1564.³ Referring to California as a country of high, bare mountains he says: "It is an island of thorny thickets and inhabited by naked cannibals, the most uncivilized, immodest, dirty, and vile which have yet been seen or discovered in the Indies." He adds that

They are notable divers, getting pearl oysters at a depth of fifteen to twenty fathoms, on which, together with all kinds of wild reptiles, game and *pitahayas*⁴ they ordinarily live. . . . In three days with the aid of the native divers of the island, he [Luna] obtained a number of

¹ On December 10, 1535, testimony was taken in Compostela before one of Nuño de Guzman's agents regarding the actions of Cortés in New Galicia and California. Juan de Jaso and Jorje Cerón had come back from California, probably in November, and left some men on the coast who were examined and testified, giving some details about affairs in California. One of the witnesses, Francisco Muñoz, said that in an excursion from the camp some forty burnt pearls of little value were taken from the Indians, and another witness, Alonso de Caballos, said they found a few burnt pearls. None of them spoke of having obtained any from the beds, but Cortés's party remained for some time after these men left. *Colección de Documentos Inéditos* . . . *Real Archivo de Indias*, XVI. 5.

² *Crónica comentario ó relaciones de los Descubrimientos antiguos y modernos de Nueva España y del Nuevo Mexico*, by Baltasar Obregón, 1584. Original in Archivo General de Indias, 1-1-3/22. In 1924 this was so carelessly published in Mexico by P. Mariano Cuevas that it contains many errors. A translation from the original text by George P. Hammond and Agapito Rey was published in Los Angeles in 1928.

³ Ibarra undertook the conquest of Chiametla in April, 1564, and founded the town of San Sebastián, January 20, 1565. Cuevas in his Introduction says that Luna began his expeditions in 1563, basing his opinion no doubt on Obregon's statement, as so far as known there is no other reference to this expedition.

⁴ There are two edible varieties of *pitahayas*, the so-called sweet and bitter, both fruit of different varieties of cactus.

oysters in which a quantity of misshapen pearls were found. The natives had pearls burnt, unbored, and damaged by fire. The Marqués [that is, Cortés] found one valued at more than five thousand ducats, and there were many others of great value among the soldiers whom he took with him. If Don Antonio had gone at the proper time and season and had persevered in his enterprise there is not a doubt that he would have obtained a quantity of large pearls. Those who go to the island have to provide themselves with sweet water at a distance of two harquebus-shots from the sea within the entrance of the port of Marqués Don Hernando Cortés, in the spring which flows out in the salt water, and which has to be taken at low tide. . . . The mountain chain of the island runs north more than six hundred leagues on the route from the Philippines, where those sailing have seen a great number of smokes and many Indians on the beach. It is believed that the coast and mainland are inhabited by many people, and it is possible that they wear clothes and possess silver and gold. It would be advisable for your Majesty to send to look into this and find out the secrets of a country so extended and so likely to contain good towns in order that the holy evangel may be planted among such nations, our Lord be served and vassals accrue to your Majesty.⁵

Obregón does not tell us from what point he went to California, but very likely it was from Culiacán, as at that period this was the only Spanish settlement on the west coast north of those near Compostela, the intervening country having been swept clean of Spaniards by the natives. His party evidently stopped in the Puerto de La Paz judging from his description of the spring. He claimed to have gone up the Gulf of California as far as the Río Tizón, that is, the Colorado, and estimated it to be five hundred leagues in length and less than a hundred in width. He seems to have had an idea that when the tide was high California was an island and when it was low it formed part of the mainland,⁶ all of which is very good evidence that he never reached the mouth of the Colorado River.⁷

⁵ These extracts are translated from Chapter XXXVI of the original text.

⁶ This idea persisted for a long time.

⁷ Cuevas in his Introduction, states that Obregón pronounced California to be a peninsula, due no doubt to a reading of a few words on page 197 of his book. In that ambiguous passage Obregón was apparently not referring to California, but to the country near the Colorado River.

In 1573, Philip II. issued his famous cedula to regulate discovery.⁸ His idea apparently was to bring under one set of ordinances all the provisions it was deemed advisable to grant to persons engaging therein, and at the same time to place restrictions on the exercise of rights which such persons had previously claimed, either under the general laws or special contracts. Little change was made in these rights, most of those accruing to discoverers under the new ordinances being the same as those which had been repeatedly granted to individuals by concession. Some general restrictions, however, were introduced, the principal one being that no one without a license should embark on any voyage of discovery by sea or land or even make a settlement in what had been previously discovered. The viceroys and the other governing authorities in the Indies were prohibited from granting licenses for new discoveries without obtaining the consent of the crown, but in already discovered country, such officials could grant a license to make a settlement subject to confirmation. Very precise rules were laid down for the conduct of such expeditions, most if not all of which had previously formed part of special concessions or contracts. Great insistence was placed upon the duty of the settlers not to injure the natives and to doctrienate them in the Christian religion, in fact, so much was made of this that it might almost appear as if the sole object of making new discoveries was to convert the natives. This feature, of course, did not pass unnoticed, and for a long time all the promoters who wished licenses to fish for pearls or hunt for gold and silver, enlarged upon their eagerness to extend the true faith. The immediate cause of prohibiting expeditions of discovery without license does not appear. It was frequently customary in cédulas to set forth, as a sort of preamble, the motives or causes for their issuance, but in this case nothing of the kind appears. It may not be very far-fetched, however, to suspect that the principal reason was the action of the Spaniards in the Philippines who, ever since

⁸ The cedula is printed in full in *Col. de doc. ined.*, VIII. 184 *et seq.*

they had landed there in 1565, had embarked on a series of aggressions on their neighbors, and were always clamoring for more men and more guns from Spain for new expeditions.

While the Audiencia was ruling New Spain after the death, June 19, 1583, of the Conde de Coruña, a license was given to one Hernando de Sanctotis and associates to construct a *fragata* and launch in Navidad for the purpose of carrying on trade from there to California, that is, on a discovered coast, the principal object being, apparently, to find pearls. Sanctotis was an accountant, who in 1584 received the appointment as *contador* from the viceroy, Pedro Moya y Contreras. Moya employed him in special work in investigating some frauds, which must have been performed very much to his satisfaction, as August 7, 1585 he gave him and his associates a formal license of considerable value. In granting this he was apparently acting under the provision of the new ordinance of 1573 which allowed him to give a license to make a settlement in a country which had already been discovered, a fact set out in the license. As this is the first official recognition of the California pearl fishing business, a translation follows of a copy of the original document in the archives in Seville.⁹

Don Pedro Moya y Contreras, archbishop etc. Whereas Hernando de Sanctotis, Antonio del Castillo, and Pedro Lobato del Canto, have informed me that license had been granted them by this royal Audiencia while governing, to construct a *fragata* and a launch in Navidad, or some more commodious place, and for this purpose Indians and necessities had been granted them (they paying for them); that in conformity with this, they engaged in building the said *fragata*, the launch, and two boats for their service, and in a very short time had finished them and launched them, in which work they have spent a great quantity of *pesos de oro*; that their intention is to trade from Navidad to California, a coast which has been discovered, in clothing, cacao, fish, and other things, and if they find pearls, to continue in that, in which his Majesty would be served and his subjects aided; and

⁹ Letters from Moya y Contreras, A. G. I., 58-3-17 and 60-4-1. The license was afterward embodied in the cedula of October 14, 1595.

that in view of the expenses which they must incur, they have asked me to give them a license to engage in such trade and traffic and fishing of pearls in the region above declared, and that from the pearls which they may find, they shall not be obliged to pay more than a twentieth part for twenty years to his Majesty: therefore, taking into consideration the above, by these present I give a license to Hernando de Sanctotis, Antonio de Castillo, and Pedro Lobato del Canto to carry on the said trade and traffic on the coast from Navidad to California, seeing that it is a discovered coast, and for a period of ten years next following they shall not be obliged to pay more than the twentieth part of the said pearls found, which they may pay in the pearls themselves or in money at their option, at the price at which they are appraised. Every four months they must appear before the officials of the royal *hacienda* to register what they have found, and if some judge previously orders them to register them in order that there may be more light on the matter and fraud be avoided, they shall so do, taking a *testimonio* of it. On making manifestation and paying the duties at these periods of four months each, no other person shall mix in the business except the said judges. Having settled in any fishing place, I ordain that no one during the said period of ten years shall settle or fish within four leagues around where they have the said fisheries and settlement, under penalty of losing their ships and apparatus. In order that there may be good order and no fraud but everything clear about the pearls which they secure, I ordain that no person of any condition whatever shall engage in any trade or traffic with their slaves and servants who may be engaged in the business, under penalty of 1,000 *pesos de oro comun*, and of banishment from the place where such may happen to twenty leagues around. With these declarations, I order all the *justicias* of his Majesty on that coast to place no embargo on them or obstruct them in any way, but rather to give them all the necessary favor and help for the said purpose, as well as the supplies and other things which they need at such just and moderate prices as they may be worth in those provinces. This grant as above set forth I make in the name of his Majesty and for the time stipulated, with a condition that within three years immediately following they shall bring before me or the person who governs this New Spain, the approbation of his Majesty of what is contained in this grant, and if they do not do so in that time, this will have no value, and they will have to pay the fifth part of the pearls they may take out. . . .¹⁰

¹⁰ A. G. I., 1-1-1/20 No. 5, R. 7. (Velasco's final cedula of October 14, 1595).

On April 29, 1587, Philip II. issued a cedula, confirming this license, setting forth that this was done because it did not appear that any inconvenience would follow from so doing, but only a public benefit, and that furthermore the petitioners had spent more than 15,000 ducats in the necessary preparations.¹¹ What was done under this license beyond making preparations is unknown, but it appears that one or more expeditions were made to California, as Sebastian Vizcaino afterward alleged that Sanctotis had found some pearls which he had neglected to register.¹² Thomas Cavendish while on his raid on the west coast of Mexico entered Navidad, August 24, 1587, and burnt two new ships of 200 tons burden each, which were under construction on the stocks. It subsequently transpired that one of these belonged to an Antonio de Castillo, from which we may reasonably assume that it was being built for the account of Sanctotis and his partners. After this disaster very little seems to have been done for some time. Sanctotis afterwards alleged in judicial proceedings that they had spent 40,000 pesos in the enterprise, and that one of his partners, Lobato del Canto, had died while engaged in it.

After Luis de Velasco arrived in New Spain, and had taken up his duties as viceroy, he was approached by a new set of promoters who wished to embark in the pearl fishery. July 28, 1592, Sebastián Vizcaino,¹³ Gonzalo Rodríguez Calbo, Diego de Torres Navarro, Melchior de las Roelas, Hernán Rodríguez, Juan de Valencia de Peña, Simón López de Castillo, Matheo de Solis, Garci Núñez de Prado, Sebastián

¹¹ Velasco's cedula of October 14, 1595.

¹² There are other indications in the documents that Sanctotis sent out some expedition under his concession; in fact, he so stated himself. There is some reference to him in a letter of the audiencia of November 20, 1586, and in one of the Marqués de Villamanrique of November 15, but nothing about the progress of the enterprise. The letters of Sanctotis are in A. G. I., 58-6-21, 58-6-23, and 58-6-30; although his two in the last file are half destroyed it can be discerned that something is said in them about his lawsuit.

¹³ For an account of Vizcaino, see the writer's *Spanish Voyages to the Northwest Coast of America in the Sixteenth Century*, p. 169.

Bezerril, and Clemente de Zúñiga,¹⁴ for themselves, and in the name of their other partners, presented a petition, stating that on the coast of the South Sea from Navidad to California, there were many places where a great quantity of pearls, tunny fish, sardines, codfish, and other kinds of fish could be taken, and plenty of salt with which to treat them; that in the country within there was a great amount of silver metals for smelting, and of gold, which they said the Indians of that region had been seen to wear; and further, that they had information that there was an open way there which led to New Mexico, easier and shorter than that by land. They asked for a license for a period of twenty years, during which all of the said partners could resort freely to these ports and enjoy the fishing of pearls and other things, and no other person could go to nor traffic in the places and ports of California, or on all that coast, nor fish beyond Navidad, except by the agreement of the petitioners, for which they asked a royal order with severe penalties. If given the license, they were ready to make a contract with the crown in a certain form which they presented with their petition. In this it was set forth that all the expenses during the period of the contract would be met by the company, but that in order to get under way quickly it was necessary for the viceroy to give them a small *fragata* which was beached in Acapulco and one-half of a large ship there belonging to the crown, which it seems had already made some voyage to the coast up the gulf during which the Indians had killed two of the crew. Besides these they wanted fifty muskets and eight or ten *versos* with necessary ammunition for the ships, and two pieces of artillery for a fort which they proposed to build on one of the islands, or on the mainland, to guard their forces, which they claimed would in itself result in the coasts being fortified against enemies such as the Englishmen who had captured the *Santa Ana*. Later they intended to make many small vessels for use in the fishery, which

¹⁴ This man's name is here spelled Aguiñaga in the original text, but the one given seems to be correct. Both occur in later documents.

would also serve for the ships from China which might come looking for a friendly port where they could take refreshment. All this material was to be appraised and returned at the end of the contract, the company agreeing to pay for any shortage there might be and the crown for any overage. They offered to give satisfactory security for this property and during the twenty years would pay the fifth part of all the pearls, silver, and gold, whether obtained from mines or by barter, one-tenth of the fish, delivered salted in barrels, free of charge, but without the obligation to pay duties on the balance when first sold. They asked that an order be directed to the officials on the coast to give them the right to take male and female Indians, on payment of just wages, and such food and supplies as were necessary at the prices and in the same way as if taken for the service of the crown. They also requested the viceroy to name a captain and asked for two Jesuits to convert the pagans.¹⁵

As a result of this petition which seems to have received the active support of Viceroy Velasco, a suit began before the Audiencia between the partners and Sanctotis during the course of which the latter produced the confirmation of his license by the crown dated April 29, 1587. The suit continued for some time but July 9, 1593, the audiencia in affirming a previous decision in favor of Vizcaino did so with the proviso that if Sanctotis should tender his ships and supplies to Vizcaino, the latter, once his contract was settled, must receive them at an appraised price. The making of this contract now became the order of the day. Vizcaino made a specific request for arms, artillery, naval supplies, and the small vessel in Acapulco for which he had previously asked. As but only a portion of this material was available and the vessel was too old, Vizcaino, in order to secure more material, offered to reduce the time allotted for the closed fishery for pearls to two years and the twenty years requested for other fishing to

¹⁵ In the same document referred to in note No. 10. Velasco was extremely partial to the Jesuits, which no doubt accounts for this request.

five. A decree was issued that he must pay in money for all the government material furnished and limiting his monopoly of pearl fishing to a space of four leagues around a specific place which he must name. In answer to this, Vizcaino set up some good reasons against such a limitation and also objected to paying cash for the arms and supplies. He made large promises that the crown would receive 100,000 pesos a year out of the revenue and that he would find out whether the Gulf of California had another entrance to the ocean or reached to New Mexico,¹⁶ the singular statement being made that Japan was only some seven hundred leagues distant. He also claimed that they were going to spend upward of 20,000 pesos on the enterprise, send out more than one hundred men on five or six vessels, and build a fort to protect their men, which incidentally would be useful for the ships coming from China and in keeping the coast guarded. After a long wrangle the government agreed that he should have four years in which to name a place as headquarters for his enterprise and ten leagues of territory around that place after that time, but that in other respects he must carry out what had been already decreed.

On November 16, 1593, Velasco issued a cedula in which is incorporated the concession, of which the most essential parts are as follows: Vizcaino and his partners were to have the right to fish for pearls, tunny, codfish, sardines, and other fish, from Navidad to what was called the Californias, the pearl fishing to be for four years, and the other fishing for twenty years, running from March 1, 1594, on the understanding that before the four years allotted for pearl fishing had expired they should select a district of ten leagues on any part of the coast of California where for the sixteen following years they could continue in the pearl fishing business. During these periods, no persons could fish in the territory allotted to them,

¹⁶ At this time the movement to occupy New Mexico was gaining headway. We begin here to see the idea afterward extensively entertained that the Gulf of California extended north to a junction with the ocean.

under penalty of losing their equipment and whatever they might secure, as well as banishment from New Spain for ten years. One-fifth of the pearls taken out and also of the silver and gold, no matter how acquired, was to be paid to the crown, and one-tenth of the fish was to be delivered salted and barreled at some port on the coast to be designated, at their cost, without expense to the king, the other nine-tenths to be admitted without payment of duty. For the fitting out of the expedition, the defense of the fishery and those who were going to engage in it, and of the port where they might locate, they would be given what was necessary in the way of artillery, ammunition, and other supplies, a *fragata*, or vessel, if the same was not necessary in the port, all to be appraised by the factor in the port, and by another person acting for the partners, security to be given for the value, to be paid within four years, on condition that the artillery be returned at the expiration of the contract, and if not returned, or if damaged, the same to be paid for. All the food, clothing, tackle, and other things necessary for the use of those employed in the expedition could be taken out without paying duties, but those which were sold or traded were to pay duties. When Vizcaino should point out the places where he was going to make the fishery, and wished to build boats on the coast at Navidad or other places, taking Indians for the purpose by way of *repartimiento* and paying for their labor, the viceroy would provide what would be convenient. A promise was also made of the necessary dispatch for some equipment requested from the Philippines, and another that if they complied with the contract, the same should not be taken away from them to give to other persons, although they should promise greater duties and more profits. Finally, they were obliged to secure the approbation of the contract by the king inside of three years. On November 11, 1593, a bond was executed by the partners to comply with the terms of the contract calling for the payment of money, etc.¹⁷

¹⁷ In the same document referred to in note No. 10. Several of the cédulas already mentioned are also contained in a huge *testimonio* in the archives in Seville,

The contract having been executed, Sebastián Pérez del Castillo was appointed to command the expedition at the instance of the partners. They took over the material belonging to Sanctotis and having fitted out a ship called the *San Josef*,¹⁸ the expedition must have departed early in 1594. How far it went is not known, but evidently no great distance, as the captain was accused of an unnatural offense and brought back to Mexico City, where criminal proceedings were begun against him. Dr. Antonio de Morga, who was on his way to the Philippines, was appointed a special judge to try the case during the course of which the prisoner died. The breaking up of the expedition and the consequent loss of a great part of the money invested in it cooled the ardor of the adventurers, most of whom wished to give up the enterprise. The *fiscal* intervened in the criminal investigation and asked that the partners be ordered to continue. On November 18, 1594, Dr. Morga rendered judgment that the *San Josef*, which had been taken for another purpose, should be returned to Vizcaino, or if this was not available, another just as good should be given him, and then they should put the enterprise into execution within three months in conformity with their contract. The partners appealed to the *audiencia* from this decision, and as it was a criminal case, it was heard by the criminal *alcaldes* who pronounced final sentence January 21, 1595, confirming the judgment of Morga, and ordering them to comply with their contract. A lack of funds now became manifest, the different partners being either unable or unwilling to put up more money. Vizcaino and the viceroy, who were determined to

1-1-1/30, which consists of copies of a large number of documents brought together from 1628-1632 in the investigation about California conducted by Licentiate Juan de Alvarez Serrano. The first 132 folios of the document relate to the Sanctotis enterprise and the first expedition of Vizcaino. A comparison of the contents with the original documents shows that they were very carelessly copied but the *testimonio* contains copies of many documents not elsewhere to be found from which copyist extracts have been made in this article.

¹⁸ This may have been one of the ships purchased from Sanctotis. See the writer's *The Voyage of Sir Francis Drake* where in a note on p. 477 the theory is advanced that Juan de Fuca accompanied Pérez del Castillo or was at least cognizant of the affair.

go on with the project, had most of the partners arrested during the summer. Vizcaino and Roelas were also arrested but immediately released on bond. In September, Pedro Martínez and Juan Bautista Martínez were still in jail as the court would not accept their bondsmen.

On October 14, 1595, Velasco after some negotiation issued another cedula containing a new contract with Vizcaino and his partners. Very little change was made, none in fact in the principal features. Vizcaino had asked for the *San Bartolomé*, a Philippine ship in Acapulco belonging to the crown, and which was too old to make the voyage back to the islands. His request was denied but he did secure the right to use Indians from the towns on the coast, provided they were not married and their services were paid for.¹⁹ On November 5, the Conde de Monterey replaced Velasco as viceroy. The latter however remained in Oculma for some time and on December 22, 1595, wrote the king stating that he had recently made a contract for fishing for pearls and fish in California with a certain Sebastián Vizcaino, a resident of Mexico, and some others associated with him, but that, in the meantime, the Conde de Monterey had arrived, to whom he had turned over all the papers in the case and who would duly inform him.²⁰ On December 20, the Conde de Monterey wrote about Vizcaino's contemplated expedition, stating that certain doubts had arisen in his mind about carrying out the project.²¹ On February 29, 1596, he again wrote that, after Velasco had made the new contract, Vizcaino had begun to raise forces, and on desiring to see his papers he had found that the decree pertained solely to the fishing and in no respect to entry and pacification. He feared that Vizcaino did not have the necessary force of character to handle an unruly lot of Spanish soldiers who were accustomed on similar expeditions to perpetrate outrages on the natives. He wished therefore to put a

¹⁹ This cedula, the one referred to in note No. 10, contains the documents previously quoted from it and a general history of the case from the beginning.

²⁰ A. G. I., 58-3-12.

²¹ *Ibid.*

stop to the enterprise, but after having consulted with some individuals and the audiencia he concluded that it would be unjust to do so in view of Vizcaino's contract, the forward state of the business, and his inability to find any reason in Vizcaino's previous career to justify him in depriving him of his command. He wrote that he had therefore concluded to allow the enterprise to proceed. Plainly the conde had no confidence either in Vizcaino's judgment or in his ability to handle his men, an opinion fully justified in the sequel. He took such steps as were available to him to see that Vizcaino embarked in his ships in Acapulco the supplies of food and stores which he had agreed to take with him, and sent a confidential agent to Salagua to see that the same was done in that place and to report on any disorders which might have occurred during the transit by land of some of Vizcaino's soldiers to that place.²² It seems that the conde's letter created a pessimistic impression in the council of the Indies as when it was read before that body on May 27, 1596, they recommended that a letter be written to him to take away from Vizcaino the command of the enterprise and to advise them to what other person it could be entrusted who could conduct it with more satisfaction and with greater hope of success.²³ When this letter reached Mexico it was too late; Vizcaino had already departed.

Meanwhile in April, 1596, Vizcaino had presented a petition asking that his partners be compelled to comply with their part of the contract, and on the third of that month, the viceroy issued the order. The various parties were duly notified. Bezerril denied being a partner but most of them admitted their obligations. Juan Bautista Martínez said he had no money, Roelas said that he was ready to comply *pro rata* as one of the five who were under an obligation to do so, and had already put up 2,700 pesos, Juan Bautista Martínez was again called up, and said that he had gone on the preceding voyage and was without money. Diego de Torres Navarro

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Indorsed on the margin of the letter of February 29, 1596.

was in Acapulco engaged in the dispatch of the ships. In May, Vizcaino was still endeavoring to get money from his partners, claiming that he was complying with his part of the contract, and demanding that they be made to comply with theirs. The viceroy issued the necessary orders to them to come forward with their allotments; some complied and others stated that they were unable to do so.²⁴

At this time, Mexico was very busy outfitting three expeditions, that of Vizcaino, another of Juan de Oñate for the conquest of New Mexico, and a force of recruits for the Philippines. On April 17, 1596, the viceroy wrote the king that the departure of the California force was approaching, part being already on the coast and the others on their way except Vizcaino, who was still in Mexico to gather up some odds and ends and conclude his suit against his partners. He said that he hoped the enterprise would go well, as up to the present it had proceeded with somewhat more order and substance than in the beginning, although the force had already begun to disintegrate, and he was very anxious about this increasing as the time came to embark.²⁵

The provincial in Mexico appointed Francisco de Balda, Diego Perdomo, Bernardino de Zamudio, Nicolas de Saravia, and Cristóbal López, the last a lay brother, to accompany the expedition. Balda was made commissary. It will be noted that Vizcaino took Franciscans with him in spite of the fact that in 1593 he had asked for Jesuits. No explanation of the change was given, but quite likely it was due to the intervention of the new viceroy, Monterey, who probably was not as favorably disposed toward the Jesuits as Velasco had been. In later years, the Franciscans claimed a preferential right to evangelize the Californias, going back for a precedent to the days of Cortés, who had Franciscans with him.

The facts regarding the expedition are found in Vizcaino's own account written on December 8, 1596, the day after his

²⁴ These details are from the testimonio in 1-1-1/30.

²⁵ A. G. I., 58-3-12.

arrival at Salagua, and in that published by Juan de Torquemada in 1615 in his *Monarchia Indiana*,²⁶ as well as in a few statements communicated in later years by other members of the party. Vizcaino himself, in connection with subsequent petitions, furnished abridged accounts of the expedition, one on November 11, 1597, and the other on April 16, 1598. They are professedly taken from his original account, whether from the one dated December 8 or not is rather uncertain; they contain, however, nothing fresh of importance. Some more detailed diary of the expedition must have been brought back by him and given to the viceroy, together with some maps to illustrate it. As these, however, have never been found, it is probable that copies were never sent to Spain, the report of December 8 having been deemed sufficient.²⁷ Torquemada's account was made up from that of Vizcaino and from one written by one of the friars, probably Zamudio who succeeded Balda as commissary.

During the investigation about the Californias, which began in 1628 before Licentiate Juan de Álvarez Serrano, several people who had accompanied Vizcaino made declarations, namely, Gonzalo de Francia, who officiated as boatswain on the *San Francisco*, Sebastián Gutiérrez, a merchant, Alonso Ortiz de Sandoval, who carried the sounding-line and claimed to have made a chart, and Lope de Argüelles Quiñones, who was probably in command of the launch on the expedition to the north. Enrique Martínez also made a declaration regarding the expedition although he did not accompany it. He used a somewhat different account, and gives a few additional facts.²⁸

We will let Vizcaino tell us his own story and then add the statement of Francia who mentions some interesting details.

H. R. WAGNER.

San Marino, California.

²⁶ Vol. I. 682 of the edition of 1723.

²⁷ These documents are in A. G. I., 141-1-1.

²⁸ These documents are in A. G. I., 1-1-1/30.

VIZCAINO'S NARRATIVE

The account of what happened on the expedition to California from May 12, 1596, when I left Mexico to undertake my voyage in compliance with the order of your Excellency, until December 7 of the same year, when I returned to the coast of New Spain, at the Puerto de Salagua, is as follows:

I left the Puerto de Acapulco June 15, in the same year, with three ships, two small ones and a large one of 500 tons burden, carrying 230 men, seamen and soldiers, and fourteen horses, with their arms, ammunition, and supplies, twelve pieces of small artillery, and food for eight months, together with other things for the service of the fleet, as is recorded in the register which the royal officials sent to your Excellency from that port. I arrived at Salagua July 5, where I took on board another 120 men and fourteen horses, a quantity of corn, and other vegetables as supplies for the fleet, and left there on the twenty-third.²⁹ I reached the Puerto de San Juan de Mazatlan,³⁰ on the coast of New Spain, August 13, and while there the father commissary, Fray Francisco de Balda, who, with four other friars of the order of San Francisco, had come with me on this expedition, ran away without being sick, or for any other binding reason. He left his fellow friars on board, and went away from the port, leaving us all highly scandalized and the business of our Lord and the service of our king abandoned. He took with him many soldiers, the best in the fleet, who deserted, encouraged by his example. On account of this, the voyage came near being given up and would have been except for the great efforts I made, because this friar had called together all my force, and, placing before them the uncertainty of success, the certain danger and doubtful gain, persuaded them to give up the enterprise.³¹

²⁹ Martínez says the 24th.

³⁰ Torquemada refers to this place as also the Puerto de San Sebastián affording evidence that the Puerto de San Sebastián, so frequently referred to at this period, was in reality the present harbor of Mazatlan. San Sebastián was some twenty miles inland.

³¹ Torquemada: "In this port more than fifty soldiers fled, because they said that the food and supplies were insufficient for such a long and uncertain journey, a defect which always happens on these expeditions when it is not the king who sends them out. From here Fray Francisco de Balda, the commissary, returned because he was a fat and heavy man and had become sick through the incidents of the voyage and could not go on."

I left this port on the day of San Bartolomé, August 24, having made all haste possible to put on board some corn and salt meat, which I took there, and to collect the rest of the few soldiers whom Fray Francisco de Balda had left me, namely, about three hundred men, seamen and soldiers, some of them married, who, having their wives with them, were therefore of no service. Most of them were boys, miserable fellows, and poorly disciplined, Fray Francisco having carried off the best ones with him. With this force I crossed over from the coast of New Spain to California, from the latitude of 24°.

During the journey I had some squalls and bad weather, so that, although from the number of leagues it should take about three days, I was detained eleven until September 3, when I reached land on the other side in a very large bay in 24°, capable of holding an infinite number of ships, which can take shelter there from any weather with great security.³² There were some fires on the beach which with the smoke indicated to us that there were people about. Embarking in the shallop with a squadron of soldiers, well armed and on our guard, I saw a number of Indians without any kind of covering or clothing, very notably large and well made, with bows and arrows and hardened³³ lances the length of half-pikes whose points are like darts. We gradually approached the land, veering away from where they were and taking note of their gestures and demonstrations to see if they wished to prevent our landing. Leaning their arms against some bushes, they came toward us making signs of friendship and inviting us ashore, which, looking somewhat good, was all that could be hoped for, but their bad appearance disillusioned us very shortly. The country is sandy, hot, extremely rough, and very rugged. There are neither trees, a river, nor a spring, since everything being sand, the rain sinks into it and filters to the sea underground. The people are so bestial and uncivilized, that whether standing or seated, whenever they take the notion, they attend to the necessities of nature without any nicety or respect. Their language is so barbarous that it sounds

³² Torquemada states that Vizcaino went ashore two days after he sighted land and found some Indians, but as the country did not look good, went on the same day to a port they named "San Sebastián". Martínez stated Vizcaino reached California on September 1 in a bay in 24° 30'. The bay was probably Bahía Ventana opposite the south part of the Isla Cerralbo, but in view of the latitude ascribed to it by Martínez and the failure to mention Cerralbo it might have been Bahía Rosario north of that island.

³³ *Sp.*, *tostado*, hardened in the fire; that is, the points.

more like the bleating of sheep than the speech of men. The animals are very large deer and numerous hares and rabbits. The birds are small pheasants, partridges, crows, gulls, and pelicans. The mountains are bare, and in the forests there is nothing but cactus,³⁴ *pitahayas*,³⁵ and other small trees without any fruit.

Coming back to the Indians, I say that they received us with much affection and joy. I had something to eat brought them from the ship, corn, biscuit, meat, and wine, at which they were no less astonished than at our manner of speech, our arms, and our clothes. I gave them to understand by signs that we came to be their friends, and asked them if they wished us to remain in their country. They made signs that they did and that we should go to their settlements where they would give us what they had. At this I ordered all the force ashore in order to fortify myself and from there to make some discoveries. After midday, the Indians took leave of us and went to their homes, pointing to the sun and giving us to understand that when it appeared on the following day they would return to see us. In this interval I made a stockade of stakes and brush on the shore at a spot which seemed to me most convenient, in which we laid out a town of tents, arranged with its streets and a plaza. The following day the Indians came back more than two hundred in number, and having put my force under arms, I received them with many gifts, and there with due solemnity in the presence of all, sinking the royal standard in the ground, I took possession in the name of his Majesty, giving to the town the name "San Felipe", to the port, "San Sebastián", and to the province, "Nueva Andalucia".³⁶

The Indians this day brought me some presents of fruit of the country, such as *pitahayas* and some round fruit of the shape and size of white Castilian plums,³⁷ with a rough skin like that of peaches and of a pleasant taste. The pits contained a pith of the same flavor as the nuts of Castile. They brought us many of these during the week we were there, and also regaled me with lizards and dead snakes, food which must be held in high estimation among them, but was a manifest sign to us of the wretchedness and sterility of the country. They

³⁴ *Sp.*, *espinos*, thorn bushes; actually "cactus" as translated.

³⁵ Nowadays the fruit of the giant cactus but at that time the cactus which bore this fruit was called "pitahaya".

³⁶ On this expedition Vizcaino did not follow the custom of naming places after the saints on whose days they were discovered.

³⁷ *Ciruelas* (*Tapirira Edulis*).

brought us some other fruits of a triangular shape, of the size of chick-peas and of the same taste as hazelnuts, some other black ones with a hard shell and of the size and taste of pine nuts, and some white roots as thick as an arm and of a fair flavor, which is the ordinary bread on which they live.

During this time, on account of the lack of fresh water, we made some wells in the beach and from them obtained some thick and brackish water of which all the force and the cattle drank during the days we were there. Four days after landing, I made an entry inland with a hundred well-armed men to see what was there, and found a settlement of the Indians who had proclaimed themselves our friends.³⁸ They were about four leagues distant from our camp, and on seeing us all fled to the forest, not a man remaining. There we lost our way, and found the forest of thorns and pitahayas so thick that it was not possible to go forward.³⁹ We therefore returned to our camp, where the Indians came the next day and brought us some little pearls,⁴⁰ which I am sending with this to your Excellency. In exchange for these I gave them beads, looking-glasses and some knives, with which they went away very happy, showing that they thought highly of them. At the end of seven days stay, I decided to go with the two small ships, namely the *almiranta* and the launch, to coast along the land to see if I could discover some river where it might be presumed there was a town, and putting aboard them 100 well-armed men, I left the *capitana*, the *San Francisco*, anchored in the bay with a force to guard it, and eighty other men in the town of San Felipe, with whom Captain Rodrigo de Figueroa, my lieutenant, remained, with an order that after putting water on board the *capitana*, he should embark all the force, the horses and the cattle which were on shore, and at once come after me, running along the coast to 34°. With this agreement, I left the port on September 10.

³⁸ Torquemada: "Here the *General* sent inland with the Indians thirty soldiers and a friar to make an examination of it, look at their towns and settlements and bring back an account of what was seen. As the soldiers did not know the country, they lost themselves in a forest, where they wandered around for three days, and returned as they could to the port, where the ships and people were. Two of these soldiers became separated from the others." See Gonzalo de Francia's account. Torquemada relates this as if the expedition set out from La Paz.

³⁹ Vizcaino is here referring to the dense almost impassible forest of cactus and mesquite which extends south from the Bahía de la Paz.

⁴⁰ There is not much mention in any of the accounts of the pearls obtained, but all except Vizcaino himself said that they were discolored by fire and streaked.

Having sailed twenty leagues,⁴¹ I discovered in the latitude of 25° another very large *ensenada*,⁴² and some level country which looked to me rather good. We entered to inspect it, and found in some canebreaks some very good sweet water like river water which there runs under the sand, but everything was desert and sandy country like the first.⁴³ We went to take water for the two vessels and found many Indians, who by signs proclaimed themselves our friends and who were as bestial and short of clothing as the first ones. These brought us a great quantity of the plums previously mentioned. I remained here two days, seeking a site in which to fortify myself, and from which to discover the *ensenada* which enters the land more than eight leagues.⁴⁴ I found on the shore of the sea some high ground which looked as if it had been made by hand, 100 paces square, very level, and around it a ditch like a moat. On erecting some tents in this and sinking some stakes, we found some ends of horse shoes, nails, arrow points, keys, and other iron articles so old and so wasted by time that we considered that this was the same place where the Marqués del Valle was lost when he came on this journey.⁴⁵

Here I had news by four harquebusiers whom Captain Rodrigo de Figueroa sent me by land (as he thought I would be in this *ensenada* by reason of the weather prevailing during those days) that having left the Puerto de San Sebastián with the *San Francisco* to follow me on September 12, while doubling the point of the *ensenada*, in which I was, the ship being under sail, the weather good, and the depth of water sufficient, it had suddenly run on a reef. For two days the ship had been striking without their being able to get it off, and he begged me to send him some help with the *almiranta* and the launch to unload it, as it was very heavily laden, although when the ship struck he had at once discharged as a matter of great importance, the powder, lead, matches, flour, and biscuit in the shallop and in a great raft

⁴¹ Francia: ten leagues.

⁴² Vizcaino uses the word "ensenada" not only for the Bahía de la Paz, as here, but for the Gulf of California.

⁴³ This seems to have been farther up the bay than the spot where he subsequently located the camp.

⁴⁴ That is, the inner bay.

⁴⁵ Acting on this undoubtedly correct assumption, the place according to Enrique Martínez was named Puerto de Marqués. Cortés's camp was on the mainland opposite the small island now known as San Juan Nepomúceno and the anchorage in front of it in 24° 15' is now called Pichilingue.

which he made of empty hogsheads and two yardarms, which the ship in question carried. All this he had taken to an island a league away where he also sent all the women and children and other timid people aboard the ship, in order to preserve everything in case the ship should open.⁴⁶ I at once went with the *almiranta* and the launch to help them and having lightened the ship and cut down the mainmast, God was pleased to save it from its dangerous position without notable damage. I had it enter the bay as far as the right of the camp and ordered what had been disembarked to be loaded in the two ships. We came back to the camp itself. Now some undisciplined soldiers began to get frightened, it appearing to them that the carelessness or little experience of the pilots was a portent and sign from heaven, interpreting it all as a disaster which promised to be as great as the *marqués* had encountered in this spot. Much patience was necessary in adjusting at times the decision of the few men to the opinion of many boys, as in my judgment most of them were in their words and in their deliberations. Others setting forth some matters falsely to find out the opinion which each had, divided into bands and argued about the wretchedness and sterility of the country, saying they had been deceived, as if I knew about it better than they did before coming, or as if in coming here I had adventured less than they had.

In a petition they asked that since the people were so barbarous that in no way could they be understood so as to convert them to the faith as we had no interpreter, and the country was so sterile, wretched, and rough that it was of no advantage to the service of his Majesty to conquer it, they might return to New Spain, making a legal protestation before me of their grievances, their wages, damages, and losses. I spoke to all in public reprehending the laxity of their spirit and ordering them under the penalty of losing their lives not to hold any meetings, or form little groups, and that whoever wished to ask for anything should do so in writing. I said my desire was to discover all this inside coast, as far as the end of the Ensenada de California, and until this was done, they had nothing to complain about, as farther on I had hopes in God that within this would be lands of much utility, and if not, then I would provide at their petition what was

⁴⁶ This island must have been the one now known as Espiritu Santo, as the *San Francisco* was entering through the San Lorenzo Canal which is about three and one-half miles wide at its narrowest part. The ship probably ran on Scout Shoal, which at present has only two fathoms of water on its shallowest part and is chiefly composed of loose stones.

most agreeable to the service of God and his Majesty. I said I wished to go quickly with 100 men up to 34°, working for all, in the two vessels, the *almiranta* and the launch, and meanwhile there would remain in this camp Captain Rodrigo de Figueroa my lieutenant, in order to repair the *San Francisco*, as in the opinion of the seamen, since its mainmast had been cut away when it grounded, it would be necessary to take down all the upper works in order to navigate it, and with the 120 men who would remain with him he would endeavor to keep the camp well fortified and the forces in great watchfulness, not placing any confidence in the Indians, even though they showed themselves to be very friendly. There were some so badly intentioned that they claimed I intended to go with the two ships to New Spain, leaving them to perish in that country. When this came to my ears I left with them for their security my seven year old boy, whom I had brought with me, as a pledge that if a lack of food should distress us, as some feared, we would, on our return without having found any good country, have sufficient food to go to New Spain and if a good country was discovered I would send one of these ships to Culiacán with what remained of my silver service plate and with my boy, to pawn it for 2,000 pesos which his mother would pay on demand in Mexico. All of this would be expended on corn, wheat, salt meat, and whatever else they found for our subsistence, with which we could go onward. All agreed to this and having chosen the force, I made eighty men, who seemed to be the best, embark in the two ships with the necessary food for a month and a half, and with very good arms and ammunition. I departed from the port which we called "La Paz",⁴⁷ and is in 25°, on October 3, and went in pursuit of my voyage.

I reached as far as 27° where I found a great number of uninhabited islands of as poor appearance as the country we had just left. A week having passed since I had left La Paz, the need for water obliged me to approach land. I was alone with the *almiranta* as the launch had become separated from us four days before during a storm, and

⁴⁷ Torquemada and Martínez both state that the name was given on account of the peaceable character of the Indians. Estéban Carbonel afterwards stated that the bay was in 24° on the map which Fray Antonio de la Ascensión had given him, saying that Fray Antonio "puso el Puerto de la Paz en la frente de la isla que mira a medio día, costa de leste veste". Nevertheless, on the manuscript map in the same *legajo* and one with which Fray Antonio evidently had something to do, La Paz is located in 26°. See the writer's *Spanish Voyages*, p. 386, where the map is reproduced.

lost to view had gone on without our knowing anything about her. On arriving near the coast Sunday, October 13, about nine o'clock in the morning, five canoes like *balsas*, very well made with canes and strong, came out from the shore. In each were three or four Indians with their bows and arrows, somewhat smaller than the first ones but much more agile and as naked as they were. As they came paddling toward us in their canoes they invited us with signs of much joy to go ashore. As from their boldness they appeared to be more warlike and daring than the first ones, after anchoring near land with all necessary care and vigilance, I ordered twenty-five well-armed men to land in the shallop and sent the *sargento mayor* with them to see where there was any water. As it seemed to me that many Indians were assembling on the beach, I ordered him from the ship to stop and I at once went ashore myself with another twenty-five men. From there we proceeded in good order in search of a lake of sweet water to which the Indians guided us, as we had asked them to do by signs. We arrived there, about a half a league inland, and took water, eating some fish which the Indians brought us. From there we went on with them to their settlements where they gave us another very good small bit of fish, all with much joy, but, it appearing to me that they were much too forward and being suspicious of them, I ordered my men to return slowly toward the beach in the order in which we had come. As we were marching on, when we had arrived near it, we saw some arrows fall in the midst of the squadron, and turning about we saw up to a hundred Indians coming behind us shooting arrows at us. I ordered a halt and a face about, and caused four harquebuses to be fired over them to frighten them. Although they were terrorized by the noise, when they saw that our weapons did no damage they soon began again to shoot arrows at us with greater violence. I then ordered six harquebuses to be fired, the weapons being lowered, and this time three fell dead on the ground and others, I know not how many, were wounded. At this all fled together and we came on little by little to the shallop of our ship.⁴⁸

I then determined that we should all embark until we saw what the Indians were doing and the number of them who should assemble.

⁴⁸ Vizcaino concealed the real reason for the attack at this place which was the striking of a woman with the butt of his musket by a soldier in an endeavor to take away from her the pearls she was wearing. The viceroy was afterward directed by the council of the Indies to reprimand Vizcaino for not having punished this soldier. Francia's account is more accurate.

So, on the counsel of all, I left the *sargento mayor* with the twenty-five best armed men on land, and embarked with the others and went to the ship, at once sending back the shallop for them to do likewise. Those who remained with the *sargento mayor* were not willing to embark, saying that first each had to kill I do not know how many Indians. In passing these opinions, they delayed about an hour, and would not make a timely retirement, notwithstanding my shouts from the ship and the demands I made. I ordered the retreat sounded and still they did not wish to comply. At this moment more than five hundred Indians howling loudly appeared at the foot of a hill with their bows and arrows, whereupon, although late, it seemed to my soldiers that it would have been well to have taken my advice and obeyed their officers. They threw themselves all together into the shallop, and shoved off somewhat from shore. As all went to one side to obtain shelter with the other from the arrows the Indians were shooting at them, and as the vessel was small it was an easy matter to upset it and throw them all to the bottom, to which they soon went with the weight of their arms. Nineteen men were drowned, among them some captains and officers, without our being able to give them any help from the ship, as the shallop was sunk on shore. Six of them escaped by swimming to the ship, all wounded by arrows and stones.⁴⁹

As we had no boat to land a force and punish the daring of the Indians, it was the unanimous opinion that we should return to La Paz without searching for the launch, of which we had no news, because we were afraid that the Indians in that port might have gone to the camp and killed Captain Rodrigo de Figueroa and those who had remained with him, it being known at my departure with the two ships that not many people could have been left in guard of the camp. So we returned from there, arriving October 18.⁵⁰ We found the

⁴⁹ The bay where this killing occurred was afterward known as Puerto de Matanzas, or Baia de Matanzas, usually placed in 28°. If Vizcaino's estimate of 27° was correct, the anchorage would have been off Mulejé. It is likely, however, that his latitude was at least as much too high as the one he ascribed to La Paz, that is nearly one degree and consequently that Puerto de la Muerte was actually at San Bruno, at 26° 12', or more likely, at Loreto, in about 26°.

⁵⁰ Torquemada states that two days after the return the launch came back having, it was alleged, gone 100 leagues and discovered a good country and plenty of pearl beds. Ortiz de Sandoval, who was on board this vessel, made a declaration in 1632, in which he described the coast, but whether from his own experience or not, is not clear. It might be inferred, however, that he himself had reached a Rio de Matanzas, in 31° and from there had seen the coast as high

San Francisco repaired, the people quiet and in peace, and the camp well fortified with an entrenchment around it, which Captain Figueroa had made from some trees he cut, stakes, and brush of cactus and *pita-hayas*, as wide and as high as a pike, in which work all had labored more than could be imagined.⁵¹ The six men who had escaped from the Indians and those who had remained on board the *almiranta*, came back so terrified that as soon as they reached shore they commenced to hold meetings, with the result that they began to demand loudly to return to New Spain, and some having communicated their opinions to others, there was now not one man among them who would discuss going forward. The following day, October 19, as evils never come unaccompanied, another misfortune happened, namely, that a soldier, while making his rounds, inadvertently let fall a spark on the match in the touchhole of his harquebus, which being discharged blew to pieces his left hand, which was over the mouth of the gun. The ball catching him under the jaw passed out of the crown of his head, in consequence of which he shortly died. To this there was also added another case no less unfortunate, namely that on the 21st of the month a storm blew up from the north with such great fury that it carried the fire from a hut where they were cooking a little fish to the roof of the house, which, being of cane and dried grass, was ablaze in a moment. The fire communicated at once to all the other houses and tents which it could reach in that direction, more than half the camp in all, burning all the goods of the married people, who were those that had brought some, and if I had not arrived in time to save the sails of the ship, which I had ordered sent ashore to assure myself from the men, all

as 32°, which he said looked very fertile. At this point he refers to the Isla de Amaca, undoubtedly Angel de la Guarda. The latitude is far too high, as it is very certain that the launch did not pass beyond the southern end of Angel de la Guarda, which is in about 29°. He also speaks of a Baia Verde in 26¾°.

⁵¹ In the camp a small church had been erected, and alongside of it a small dwelling for the use of the friars. Torquemada gives a long account of their efforts to teach Christianity to some children and boys given them by the Indians, at least the rudiments of the faith, and how to make the sign of the cross and say the four prayers. The Indians, according to him, displayed a great love for the friars, and a corresponding aversion to the soldiers, who took away from them by force whatever they had. He remarked that the natives were very jealous about their women, but were lovable and affable, and did what the friars ordered them to do. He also stated that when Vizcaino came back from the north some of the men wanted to take one of the vessels and go to the mainland after food but that Vizcaino refused alleging that they would never come back.

would have been burned. Many of the arms and much of the munitions and the food of the camp were also burned.

The people were so cast down by this, some with grief over their loss and others with a feeling of misfortune, that they all renewed their first petition to return to New Spain, adding thereto new reasons for it which had arisen. They said that on account of the arms and the food having been burned, the return could not be delayed without notable danger of all losing their lives, as they had no expectation of any help from New Spain, since those who were under obligations to bring it had not come, although fifty days had passed beyond the time allotted, nor did they know where to find us. Taking into consideration, therefore, all these reasons and that part of the food I had brought had been eaten, part lost in the wreck, part rotted, as was the case with the biscuit and flour, and now another great part had been burned, leaving me but little to make an entry into the country with the entire force, I ordered the ships to be made ready, and thirty chosen men with six sailors to embark in the *almiranta*, I with them, and with the corn and beans which seemed to me necessary for two months, in order to make a turn around all this *ensenada* and discover what there was in it. I ordered all the rest of the force with the remainder of the food to go to New Spain in the *San Francisco* and the launch; and to disembark in the Puerto de Valle de Banderas, Salagua, and Acapulco, and then go with God where they pleased, as people who true to their nature had never accomplished any good thing. With this resolution, which was pleasing to everybody, I made ready for my voyage, and on the 28th of the month we left La Paz, some for New Spain, and others for the end of the Ensenada de California. In a short time we separated and lost sight of each other.⁵²

Proceeding on my voyage, on the second day a north wind began to blow, so contrary and so violent that we rode out the storm in great risk for six days almost without hope of saving our lives, as the coast is dangerous, the sea narrow, the land unknown, and islands everywhere. It was a miracle that we could lay the ship to and save our lives. When the storm was over we found ourselves in 27°, which was where the nineteen soldiers had been drowned. Many were of the opinion that we should land at the same spot where the disaster had occurred, which we called the Puerto de la Muerte, in order to avenge

⁵² It seems according to a statement by Martínez that the *San Francisco* reached Navidad November 16.

our companions, but it seeming to me that what the Indians had done was the work of barbarians and what we were going to do would be that of bad Christians and not in conformity with the ideas his Majesty had in ordering these discoveries, which are directly intended for the conversion of souls and the settlement of the country, I persuaded them not to do so, and went farther on to anchor at an island which we called "Perro". There we took water, which we found to be good, and remained two days, as we did not have the wind to pass onward.

On November 9, I made sail with the land wind, and went along the coast up to 29°, where with a northwest wind no less violent than the first I fell back to the Isla de Lobos, which is in 26°. ⁵³ Here the ship began to make much water, which alarmed us considering the danger in which we were, as the winds were contrary and the sea was narrow to run before them. The islands were very close together, and full of warlike Indians, the ship was alone and very battered, and, if any disaster should occur, we could get no help from any quarter. If we accidentally struck a land so dangerous we could not escape being drowned or eaten by the Indians. With all this, although many were discouraged, I spoke very kindly to them, exhorting them to go on with the enterprise, easing up on their work and assuring them against danger. I held up as an example my boy, a creature only seven years old who suffered as many hardships as any of them and from the same danger as all, and myself, who in seeing him suffer, suffered as much as all of them put together. I encouraged them to finish the discovery of this *ensenada*, saying that God would aid us as it was His affair. With this, I ordered the chief pilot, Antonio de Olivera, to examine thoroughly the inside of the ship so as to find out where it was making water, and endeavor to stop it. Pursuing this work with great diligence, he found between two planks near the prow a hole made by hand with a knife by some bad Christian with little fear of God and a great desire to return to New Spain so as to force us to do so. A gush of four fingers of water was coming through, which was soon stopped and the ship repaired, but I could not find out who had done it.

From this island I made sail and with a little southwest wind again attempted the enterprise, this time reaching the Cabo de San Antonio

⁵³ Neither Perro nor Lobos can be identified on account of the large number of islands along the coast. It seems likely, however, that Lobos was San José.

in $29\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$.⁵⁴ We had a view of the country at 30° , which was all bare mountain, rough and desert country like the first. From there we could not pass on because it truly seemed that there came upon us all the fury of hell. Night caught us near the land and was so dark and so charged with thunder, lightning, and rain squalls that we were at the point of death. The wind was east-northeast blowing directly on the coast which we were following, and the sea reached the sky. We wished to lay the ship to, fearing that we would strike the land which was very near, but we did not dare to do so on account of its weakness. We went to tacking, and so we passed almost two days with greater hardship and misery than could be imagined. November 14 dawned with the sea somewhat calm, and we found ourselves between five small islands. While making all sail to get out from among them all the gudgeons of the rudder broke, leaving the ship without anything to steer with and in greater danger than ever. Seeing this misfortune and the danger in which we were, and that the currents were carrying us on the coast, the chief pilot made some braces to the rudder with the ends of cables with which the rudder went back into its place, and thus we passed the time until the sea all calmed down and we escaped from between the islands.

The pilot advised me that the ship was not able to stand a press of sail or to go onward, because from what had happened during those days, it had begun to leak in certain places to such an extent that all of us had to serve the pump eight times a day and still the water was never emptied. He said that the rudder would serve to sail with the wind astern if it was not very strong. He therefore made a protestation and demand as a matter of conscience, that I should return to New Spain, because since the moon had begun and five days had passed with north and northeast winds, it was to be presumed that the rest would continue in the same manner. We would finish, he said, by being lost if we stayed among those islands without steering gear and with such poor tackle. The captains and soldiers who were with me made the same request. I took declarations of the pilot, the boatswain, and the sailors, and with these and the opinions of the men in whom I had the most confidence, we resolved to return to New Spain be-

* This name has not appeared before, nor does Ortiz de Sandoval mention it, so perhaps Vizcaino named it at this time. It was probably Punta Concepción or Punta Chivato in about 27° , especially as the small islands referred to in the following paragraph were most likely those now known as Santa Inez.

cause with the water and the past storms, all the corn, flour, and dried beef had become wet and rotten, so that there was now nothing to eat in the ship. The lack of a rudder was the principal cause of our return. Sailing before the wind, we returned by the way we had gone, looking for water, of which we now had none, in order to cross over to the coast of New Spain. Wednesday at night, November 15, we reached the Puerto de la Muerte, and I at once sent Captain Rodrigo de Figueroa ashore with twenty-five well-armed men to take water in a lake there with much caution and vigilance, as the country was suspected and there were declared enemies. They were there until three hours after nightfall in doing this, as it was somewhat distant. When they embarked the captain ordered some canoes which were on the beach to be burned. This having been done, and all being collected on board, I at once began to cross over to the coast of Culiacán, and on the 17th we sighted land on this side, and came coasting along it to the Puerto de Salagua, where I arrived December 7 with the ship almost submerged and open. I could not land on the coast of New Spain although I reconnoitered it for more than a hundred leagues on the north part of the province of Sinaloa in the plains of Cibola,⁵⁵ because besides the fact that we were running with a strong northwest wind, there are many shoals along the coast which extend more than four leagues into the sea. I saw some smokes and fires on shore, made by people who seemed to be numerous, but for the reasons given I did not see them.

I report to your Excellency what I found out about the country and the people in the three hundred leagues that I went coasting along from the Puerto de la Paz and San Sebastián as far as the Cabo de San Antonio,⁵⁶ and that is that so great is the number of Indians in it that I cannot exaggerate the number, there being no island among the many I discovered where there were no inhabitants, while those

⁵⁵ Vizcaino was using his imagination here, Cibola was far away. If he meant that he followed the coast 100 leagues to Salagua he covered about four degrees of latitude on a NW-SE coast or from about 23° to 19°, that is from the neighborhood of Mazatlan south. It might be argued that the 100 leagues or four degrees should be counted from the north, say to Mazatlan, which is in Sinaloa, that is from 27° to 23°.

⁵⁶ A gross exaggeration; 300 leagues on that coast would be at least twelve degrees of latitude, at least twice as much as he previously claimed, even allowing that his Cabo de San Antonio was in 29½° as he states. In reality he probably did not sail even 100 leagues along the coast.

on the mainland were numberless.⁵⁷ The Indians are easy to influence, and it seems to me that they would receive the holy evangel without much difficulty, because when they saw the image of our Lady, they went down on their knees, put their hands together, and raised their eyes to heaven. When they saw the cross they did the same and kissed it, giving us to understand by signs that the image was something from heaven. They performed all the rest of the ceremonies and acts as they saw us do, and when I took leave of them at La Paz they showed very feelingly that they were sorry at my departure, and by signs asked when I would return. I left with them and with those at San Sebastián a large cross which we made set up in the Plaza de Armas and they gave me to understand that they would not take it away before I returned. The country is extensive, being twice as large as New Spain; the climate and the succession of winter and summer are the same as those of Castile.

I do not regret, Illustrious Sir, the money I have spent, the time I have lost, nor the hardships I have suffered on this journey, as I owe all this to my king and master, but I am grieved to think that I did not find there any way or have had the good fortune to employ myself in the service of his Majesty and your Excellency, as I desired. However, if anything new offers in which I can do so here, I am so attached to the service of his Majesty that neither the loss of my property nor the peril of my life will prevent me from doing so. This time I was not wise, having departed so late, as I left in June when I should have commenced the navigation in the month of March. Now that it is known what I have encountered, it will be easy to succeed better, if his Majesty should wish to lend his aid to the enterprise. May our Lord keep your illustrious Excellency many years as we your servants desire.

From Salagua, December 8, 1596. The humble servant of your Excellency,

SEBASTIÁN VIZCAINO.

MEMORIAL OF GONZALO DE FRANCIA

In 1597 [1596] I accompanied Sebastián Vizcaino as boatswain of the *capitana* with one large ship and two small ones, with a number

⁵⁷ There is every reason to believe from the reports of voyages in the gulf only a little later and other statements that very few of the islands were inhabited; certainly the Indians were far from being numberless.

of people. We reached California in an *ensenada* in front of an island where Sebastián Vizcaino went ashore with all the force and ordered the ship to be unrigged, with the intention of marching inland. Having done this and marched a matter of a half a league, he determined to come back and reëmbark. The *ayudante*, a Negro, and I remained, on account of having found people there, peaceable although naked, and decided to follow a well-trodden trail. We might have gone a matter of two leagues to where about a hundred Indians came out to meet us, making signs of peace. Putting down their arms they seated themselves when they reached us, making signs to us to do likewise, which we did without, however, laying aside our arms. We remained looking at each other for an hour. They came up to the Negro to rub his hands to see if the color would come off, and gave him a large fat pearl, but to us nothing. At the end of this time we made signs to them that we wished to leave, and they permitted us to go without doing us any harm. Wherever we went we saw no houses where they could assemble, but they must have had them from where they came out. Being very thirsty I asked them for some water, which they brought me in a shell, and we shortly returned to where Sebastián Vizcaino was, who had given orders for all to embark with the purpose of searching for another better port and people.

Ten leagues from this bay we found a great port, which we called the "Puerto de la Paz" because the Indians came out to meet us peacefully. At the entrance of the port there is an island which we called "Isla de Mujeres". It is uninhabited as people only go there in summer in some small cane *balsas*. In this Puerto de la Paz, he put the people on shore, where they remained some months without making any expedition by land. Here we found the Indians peaceable and they served us in a very friendly manner. As he saw that the people were naked and there were no kinds of seeds to eat, he determined to enter the gulf with the two small ships, leaving the large one in the Puerto de la Paz with all the women and the unnecessary men to make a settlement. The said Sebastián Vizcaino reached 28° inside of the gulf, where he went ashore with his forces, and because of an abuse which a soldier committed on an Indian by giving him a blow, the rest raised a tumult and fled to a wood near the sea. Seeing this, Captain Juan Agustín told Sebastián Vizcaino to embark with half of the force, as the Indians were warlike, and he would remain on guard on land until the shallop should return. As soon as it came

back, the force which was on land embarked, and when all were on board and the Indians saw them shoving off the shallop and thus about to lose their prey, they came out from the wood with great shouts. Shooting many arrows and throwing many lances they wounded many people. Not being able to use their weapons, on account of being so close together, the shallop upset, and twenty-eight [eighteen] men were drowned and killed, only seven escaping by swimming to the ship. This disaster was the reason for not continuing the voyage, and another was that in these parts the people were found to be naked and without seeds. The truth is that he did not go inland and shortly determined to return to New Spain.

I was in the *almiranta* [launch] of which Lope de Argüelles was commander. It became separated from Sebastián Vizcaino one night during a storm and thinking that he had gone ahead of us, we went in search of him and reached $29\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$, where we also found the people naked, but the country seemed to be very good, and, as it was bare, to have mines. All the people were very anxious to settle it and conquer it, as not a single man had become sick, but Sebastián Vizcaino was of the opinion that we should return as the food had given out, he having expected to find it as soon as he went ashore and along the coast. The coast Indians are not cultivators, but sustain themselves by shellfish. From $29\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ we returned in search of Sebastián Vizcaino and found him in the Puerto de la Paz after his return from his disaster. It was determined to return to New Spain as I stated. As a loyal vassal of your Majesty, I say that the conquest of this country is very important, because it has signs of great prosperity, the principal one being the many pearl oysters in which there can be much wealth once rich beds are discovered. Sebastián Vizcaino made no effort to hunt for them as he carried no divers nor apparatus for diving. Having these, however, it is certain that many pearls would be found, because the Indians gave him ten or eleven [?], which would have been worth many ducats if they had not been burned and streaked.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Translated from the copy in the testimonio, 1-1-1/30, fol. 170-175.

BOOK REVIEWS

El Autócrata; Ensayo Político-Social. By CARLOS WYLD OSPINA. (Guatemala: Tipografía Sánchez & De Guise, 1929. Pp. 272).

This is for the historian one of the most stimulating and informative books that has come out of Central America for a long time. It is a study of the personality and career of Manuel Estrada Cabrera, president and dictator of Guatemala between 1898 and 1920. Its author is a citizen of Guatemala who contributed to Cabrera's overthrow by his writings in the press, and who later conversed with the fallen tyrant about important matters concerning his government.

The main part of the book is preceded by a sketch of social and political conditions in Central America before independence, and by a short survey of the administrations of Rafael Carrera and Justo Rufino Barrios. It also includes an illuminating account of the curious popular revolution which overthrew Cabrera in 1920, and of the failure of the short-lived government of Carlos Herrera which followed. The book does not pretend to be systematic history, but rather a group of essays having as their central theme the *milieu* in which autocracies arise and thrive. For, as Señor Ospina says,

the force which impels presidential autocrats to flout the law emanates not so much from their personal tendencies as from the constitution of society behind them (p. 11).

And again,

The autocratic regime is identical everywhere and at all times. It is a drama enacted endlessly upon the world's stage, with the same procedure and the same outcome. Whoever knows one autocrat, knows them all. A single difference may be established: there are fruitful absolutisms, and sterile absolutisms, within the relativity of human affairs (p. 221).

Cabrera's absolutism was evidently wholly of the sterile sort.

Señor Ospina's book is written with frankness and sincerity, and with considerable literary distinction. Although dealing with events so recent, in which the writer had an active share, it reveals political detachment as well. Yet despite the author's disclaimer of partisanship, it is not difficult to perceive that he is not a member of the lib-

eral party. He is evidently willing to believe that the unionist opposition to Cabrera in 1919-1920 had the support and protection of the administration in Washington. Whether true or not—and the evidence adduced is extremely tenuous—it seems that Cabrera believed it to be so, and that this belief unnerved his hand in the moment of crisis.

CLARENCE H. HARING.

Harvard University.

The Life of George Rogers Clark. By JAMES ALTON JAMES. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1928. Pp. xiii, 534. Illus. Maps. \$5.00.)

Whether or not Clark won the Old Northwest for the United States, he was well worth the scholarly biography that Professor James has given us. For the space of a few brief years he was the west's great man, its tower of strength in the lurid border warfare of the revolution. Both then and later he was connected with many other important matters besides fighting, such as land speculation, state-making, and relations with France and Spain. Aside from the interest attaching to the career of a prominent man, his personal story possesses the fascination of tragedy. A man of unusual ability, of many virtues and of signal achievements, he found himself cut down in mid-flight by his enemies and, for no just reason it would seem, discarded and disgraced. This is the man whose story Professor James had to tell, and, without striving for literary effect, he has told it well.

Another writer might have used the same materials to produce a more striking narrative. Some rearrangement of facts, a slight shift of emphasis, an innuendo here and there, a few flights of the imagination and a liberal sprinkling of such words as "hero", "colossus", and "epic"—this is all that would have been necessary to turn the trick. The materials lend themselves to such treatment. Picturesque detail is abundant, and yet certain vital points in Clark's life are shrouded in that obscurity in which biographers of a certain type do their best work. If Professor James had made free use of his material he could have produced a tale of the "frontier underworld" that might even have rivaled in popular interest the current stories of gang warfare in his neighboring Chicago. Professor James, however, is a conscientious and highly competent historian. He knows that such phrases as "frontier underworld" may be misleading, for Clark was neither

a police captain nor an Al Capone. He relates the colorful incidents of frontier history, for they are a part of the story, but he relates them as they occurred—casually. They are the accidents of western history, not its substance.

An excellent illustration of his sober restraint is furnished by his treatment of the undoing of Clark in the years 1786 and 1787, for in this affair there must have been a sore temptation to let the fancy rove. There is some reason to believe that it was through the machinations of the rascally James Wilkinson that Clark was discredited and his career blasted, and on this assumption a recent biographer of Clark has built up a moving story, full of pathos and human interest. Not so Professor James, who finds the evidence against Wilkinson in this affair "not wholly convincing". It need hardly be said that his scholarly reservation deprives the story of dramatic value; but a historian is not a dramatist. The heart interest suffers another severe depression when Professor James relegates to a footnote Clark's legendary romance with the daughter of the Spanish commandant of St. Louis, and there describes it as "a questionable tradition".

In short, this book is a very scholarly biography of the life-and-times type, with the emphasis on the times. It has been executed with a thoroughness worthy of Lyman Draper, who collected the bulk of the sources utilized by Professor James and who for fifty years worked away at a life of Clark. One of the best features of the book is its liberal citation of foreign, especially French and Spanish, sources. The history of the Mississippi Valley in this period cannot be understood without reference to foreign interests and influence. Readers of this REVIEW will be especially interested in the portions of the book that deal with Clark's relations with Spain. During the revolution he received valuable aid from Spanish New Orleans through Oliver Pollock, and coöperated with the Spaniards of Upper Louisiana against the British. After the revolution he created a minor international crisis and contributed to his own undoing by seizing the property of Spanish subjects at Vincennes; sought Spanish sanction for a colony to be established in Louisiana; was associated with the South Carolina Yazoo Company, whose project vitally concerned Spain; was commissioned by Genêt to lead an invasion of Louisiana and Florida; and, when threatened with arrest in 1798 as the holder of a French commission, took refuge in St. Louis. For most of these episodes the author has consulted Spanish sources with profit, and has also made

good use of recent monographs. The only errors of any consequence that have been noted by the reviewer relate to the diplomatic settlement of 1783 (pp. 363, 364). The secret article there mentioned was a part of the preliminary, not the definitive, treaty between the United States and Great Britain; the article did not excite the indignation of Spanish officials, for they did not know of its existence; and the territorial claim of Spain east of the Mississippi River extended northward not to the parallel 32° 30' but, in 1782, to the Great Lakes and, in 1784, to the Tennessee River. "Florida Blanca" should be written "Floridablanca", and "d'Aranda" either "de Aranda" or simply "Aranda". If the author had consulted J. F. Yela Utrilla, *España ante la Independencia de los Estados Unidos* (II. 358-360), he would have found some interesting evidence that the existing American settlements in the west were a factor in the negotiations of 1782 at Paris.

Given the type of biography that Professor James has chosen to write, the reviewer feels that there are two rather important questions which might properly have received fuller treatment. The first is, "What part did land speculation play in Clark's life?" Perhaps the answer is so obvious to the author himself that he did not feel the necessity of stating it. To the reviewer it is not so obvious. That Clark was concerned in such operations there can be no doubt. That he was extensively concerned in them seems probable. Professor James himself states that before setting out from Virginia in 1778 for the conquest of the Illinois country Clark was "so confident . . . of the outcome that he entered into partnership with the Governor [Patrick Henry] for securing possession of a tract of land" (p. 115). With that brief statement the author dismisses the episode. On this topic, as on others, the index is of little assistance, for under "Land speculation" there is not an entry that refers by name to Clark. The second question is, "Why did Clark lose his commanding position in the west?" The wily Wilkinson and the cheering cup do not seem to tell the whole story, as the author would doubtless agree. Was Clark's fall from power merely another instance of that common frontier phenomenon, the displacement of the military man by the lawyer, the farmer and the merchant? Or was it due to the rejection of the specialist by a society that required versatility? Or is there some other explanation?

The total effect of this book is to arouse a feeling of admiration for the author's industry and scholarship. Attention should be called to the appendices, especially to the excellent critical study of Clark's *Memoir*.

ARTHUR PRESTON WHITAKER.

Western Reserve University.

Foreign Intervention in the Rio de la Plata, 1838-1850. A Study of French, British, and American Policy in Relation to the Dictator Juan Manuel Rosas. By JOHN F. CADY. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1929. Pp. xii, 296. Two maps \$4.00.)

Professor Cady's volume is based upon extensive published materials and thorough research in the national archives of Paris, London, and the United States. Additional light might have been thrown upon his subject by the manuscript materials at Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, and Buenos Aires; but there is a limit to human resources and endurance and the author's primary interest was in the intervening European Powers and the attitude of the United States toward their procedure.

There are few works in which the meticulous critic cannot find minor defects. In the monograph now under consideration several Spanish accents are omitted; "Buenos Ayres" appears instead of Buenos Aires; there are a few misprints; the type of the chapter headings is too large for that used in the body of the work; Mrs. Mann's English translation of Sarmiento's *Facundo* is used instead of the Spanish original; Dexter Perkin's excellent book on the Monroe Doctrine should have been examined instead of a mere tentative preliminary article which appeared long before the definitive work; it may seriously be doubted whether Buenos Aires was in 1810 "the foremost city of Spanish America" (p. 4); and lack of "economic interest" (p. 269) was not the important reason why the United States did not concern itself in the Rio de la Plata (Oregon and Mexico would seem largely to furnish the explanation).

Such defects do not seriously mar the work. As it stands, it ranks with the best monographs produced in the field. It reveals a keen mind and on the whole a gifted pen. Professor Cady's success in penetrating French and British motives deserves special commendation. He brings before the reader's view the whole theme and setting of Anglo-French relations, including the complicated domestic politics

of the two countries. With reference to the United States it is significant that he reveals cautious statesmen, a quiescent Monroe Doctrine, and troublesome, feeble, and naïve diplomats. He also throws light upon the character of Rosas and his unusual daughter Manuelita, and he seems to show that this dictator's long rule in the Plata Basin was due in no small measure to his championship of an ardent Americanism. Lastly, he reveals how timid any lone European power is in the matter of intervention in America and how difficult it is for two or more of them to proceed with joint intervention. So far as these powers have been concerned the Monroe Doctrine rarely has been needed!

J. FRED RIPPY.

Duke University.

American Policies Abroad. Mexico. By J. FRED RIPPY, JOSÉ VASCONCELOS, GUY STEVENS. (Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 1928. Pp. 254. \$1.50.)

"*Mexico* is the first volume of the series *American Policies Abroad* published by the University of Chicago Press for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations." The Council distinctly disavows any attempt at propaganda or at advancing any theory of our relations to Mexico. It proposes to present from several different points of view the fundamental elements of the problem without attempting to "enter into a debate" or to "discuss all points of view".

This little book therefore is a symposium in which the historian, Professor Rippy, tells the history of our recent relations with Mexico; a Mexican, Dr. Vasconcelos, reveals Mexican psychology as applied to foreign relations; and the legally minded investor, Mr. Stevens, presents his brief in behalf of American oil interests. Each section is complete in itself, Professor Rippy's covering ninety-nine pages including appendix and bibliographical note; that of Dr. Vasconcelos, forty pages, and that of Mr. Stevens, ninety-seven pages including appendix and references (bibliographical notes). A seven-page index serves for the whole book, as does a two-page preface by the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations.

The first section, entitled "The United States and Mexico, 1910-1927", was completed by J. Fred Rippy March 30, 1928. In this Professor Rippy gives an exhaustive, critical, non-committal, and provocative account of the relations with Mexico of the administrations

of Presidents Taft, Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge. It is based on United States government documents, and personal memoirs, although of course standard secondary works on Mexico have been consulted.

The facts of American-Mexican relations are marshalled with the exactness of the historian and the vividness of the journalist. While the author is rigidly impartial in his statement of fact, he does bring out the idea that much of our non-intervention in Mexico was really intervention in disguise and that American official policy of all administrations between 1910 and 1927 has influenced Mexican internal politics. The motives for such influence are left to the reader to decide, but whatever might be the motives, the results of the policies of nearly all the presidents concerned are shown to have been at times inadvisable, inappropriate and possibly dictated by lack of understanding of Mexican conditions. Especially is this so of the Kellogg note of June, 1925, in which the United States secretary of state attempted to lecture the government of Mexico in the conduct of its own affairs.

This section ends with March, 1928, and the rapprochement between the Coolidge and Calles administrations brought about by our official representative in Mexico, Ambassador Dwight W. Morrow, and our unofficial good-will agents, Will Rogers and Charles A. Lindbergh; the decision of the Mexican Supreme Court, apparently favorable to United States oil interests; and the modification of the petroleum law in conformity with this decision.

Professor Rippy shows that although the oil interests for a long time controlled American administrative policy, there were important classes of people in the United States who were not in sympathy with sacrificing our friendly relations with Mexico to the selfish interests of this one class. Neither the bankers nor the mid-continent oil men had sympathy for the United States oil companies in Mexico; the chambers of commerce in the southwest and elsewhere were primarily interested in maintaining cordial trade relations with Mexico; humanitarians and plain people thought more of equity and the future of the oppressed masses of Mexico than of the international rules of capitalistic nations and the vested interests of United States captains of industry.

Professor Rippy's article is undoubtedly as fair and enlightening about this difficult and little understood question as it is possible for any one writer to make it.

In the second article, entitled "A Mexican Point of View", José Vasconcelos tells how at first Madero was popular with all classes in Mexico until he put an end to the system of concessions under which capitalists and foreign investors had profited during the Díaz regime. His subsequent unpopularity was increased by the unrest of labor under the influence of the revolutions and by the impatience caused by prolonged unsettled conditions. "The *Mexican Herald* and all the big newspapers of Mexico, acting on behalf of the big interests initiated the offensive against the Madero regime." Madero had hopes that President-elect Wilson would be his friend and would recall Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson for supporting the wealthy Mexican conspirators, but Madero was overthrown and murdered one month before President Wilson took the oath of office. As soon, however, as Henry Lane Wilson was recalled, anti-United States sentiment calmed down, at least for a time.

The characterizations by Dr. Vasconcelos of the various presidents and events of the revolution are enlightening and striking. Madero was sacrificed by an United States Ambassador in an attempt to use the power of a great nation in the interests of a group of unscrupulous investors. Victoriano Huerta was a "bloodstained drunkard". Carranza was "an obscure personage who was to give a great deal of trouble both to Mexicans and foreigners on account of his undeniable incapacity for the task that chance had put into his hands". Villa received attention because "he was constantly creating trouble and once in a while committing murder". "Obregon gave up the glory of being a successful unrecognized president of Mexico in order to become a recognized ruler at a price that history may not judge worth paying". "Calles was trying to find a way to give in to the American State Department's requirements and at the same time save his face before the critical eye of Latin American nationalism that has kept such a close watch upon the whole affair". These and other interesting and unusual statements were written by one who must have been close to the leading actors of the Mexican tragedy and who must have known the inner meaning of events. In describing the influence of the United States in this tragedy, the author uses mildness and restraint in spite of his evident patriotism. The following paragraph, however, might force an impulsive denial from a citizen of the United States did it not ring so true as to arouse in him a sense of justice:

It is this persistent endeavor of the revolution to save our resources from illegitimate exploitation that has brought about during the present Calles administration many a law that has been vetoed by the notes of the United States Department of State. Only our military weakness can explain the fact that we are singled out and accused of hating foreigners because we establish limitations to the right of foreigners to purchase our lands; and yet we are doing nothing else but copy American laws. Some even more drastic than ours do exist against the ownership of lands by foreigners in some states of the American union.

This exposition of a Mexican's point of view is most enlightening. In writing it Dr. Vasconcelos has shown true but not bigoted patriotism. He concludes,

In our rights and in the honest feelings of American public opinion at large, we put our trust. May we be able to save, not only peace, but also the best interests of the people of both countries.

The third article, entitled "An American's Point of View", is by Guy Stevens. In it is marshalled an imposing array of arguments selected to show that the United States oil companies in Mexico have been unfairly treated by Mexican governments since 1917. These arguments cover the land laws, the restoration of *ejidos* to the Mexican people, the expropriation for *ejidos*, the division of large estates, and the nullification of former grants, all of which the author claims are confiscatory and unfair to citizens of the United States who own land in Mexico. He calls Mexican agrarian reform a shibboleth with many tragic connotations.

Referring to the "oil phase" of the land question, he states that oil should not be treated as a part of the Spanish patrimony under the colonial regime, and quotes a decree of 1789 by Charles III. referring to coal mines, to the effect that "whereas coal is neither a metal nor a semimetal . . . these mines belong to the owners of the land in which they are situated". It seems to the author, and to the reviewer as well, reasonable to believe that since oil also is neither a metal nor a semimetal it should likewise have enjoyed immunity from royal ownership.

Mr. Stevens then analyzes the various mining and petroleum laws from 1884 to 1925 to prove that oil rights legally acquired by citizens of the United States under the earlier laws were unjustly confiscated by the constitution of 1917. He adds,

All assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, every one of the American-owned petroleum properties and petroleum rights now in question was acquired from private Mexican landowners, and not one was obtained under any concession from any Mexican government.

The discussion of the rights of the oil companies under the constitution of 1917, of the Carranza decrees, and of the various decisions of the Mexican Supreme Court is extremely technical and gives the impression that this article is a clever brief by counsel for the oil companies. In fact the preface of this volume does state that "Mr. Stevens has for several years been director of the Association of Producers of Petroleum in Mexico".

Interesting points brought out under "Economic Aspects" are that between 1921 and 1927 there was a falling off in production of petroleum in Mexico of about 67 per cent; that during this same period the number of persons employed in the oil industry in Mexico dropped from 48,000 to 7,500; and that in 1927 the Mexican government received from oil export and production taxes approximately only eleven million dollars, whereas in 1921 it received close to thirty-two million dollars from this source.

In summing up the "diplomatic phase" the author suggests that the Mexican government, or at least its friends, attempted to complicate the already disturbed relations of the United States with Nicaragua and by its attacks on Yankee imperialism to misrepresent the attitude of the United States throughout Hispanic America. For a brief formula to be followed by the Mexican government Mr. Stevens suggests: "Let the Mexican government do that which is to the best interests of the Mexican people in the long run".

This statement seems to open up the whole question again, for some of us, including the reviewer, have not yet been convinced that the best interests of the Mexican people are necessarily the same as the interests of the United States oil companies in Mexico.

ALFRED HASBROUCK.

Lake Forest College,
Lake Forest, Illinois.

Wald und offenes Land in Süd-Chile seit der spanischen Eroberung.

By OTTO BERNINGER. [Geographische Abhandlungen, dritte Reihe, Heft 1.] (Stuttgart: J. Engelhorn's Nachfolger, 1929. Pp. 130.)

This volume clearly shows how the historian can learn from the geographer. Its author made a journey through the southern part of Chile in 1925 and this book is the result. His investigations concerned chiefly the region between the Río Biobio and the Río Tolten, once the habitat of that warlike people known as the Auracians or Mapuches. Various authors have stated that these Auracians were originally a forest people. Herr Berninger proves, however, by his investigations of the mountain regions, the climate, and the phytogeography of the region that the earliest inhabitants, and especially the Auracians, preferred to live in distinct settlements along the edge of the forest, but with the open stretches of the country left unsettled.

The author, by reconstructing the divisions of wood and open country at the time of the settlement of the colony about 1550, has been able to reconstruct a detailed landscape from the sources he has used, which has all the more value as there are few early maps of the region. His researches with regard to the terrain and the conditions reigning in the district for the period 1550-1660 presented a much more difficult problem, but here, too, his efforts have met with distinct success and authorities are cited for each statement. During the early period, the southern part of Chile, contrary to the belief of many, was not an unbroken forest, for the researches of Herr Berninger show that there was considerable open country which must have been cultivated to maize, and probably, potatoes. It is important for the historian to know, and this Herr Berninger has apparently proved, that changes in the terrain have been brought about rather by phytogeographic and climatic changes than by the work of man. The Auracians frequently abandoned their settlements after a defeat because of superstitious beliefs, and consequent thereto, the forest covered the former place of settlement almost obliterating all marks of it.

It is important in the evaluation of historical events to know the terrain of a given district. Maps alone are inadequate, especially for the early period. While it is true that Herr Berninger has been chiefly interested in geography, yet at the same time he has kept the historian constantly in mind and has furnished him with many facts relative to the former appearance of the terrain of southern Chile, which will aid the historian in reconstructing the history of the re-

gion. The historian will especially commend the author's careful selection and citation of authorities. The photographic reproductions and the maps enhance the value of the volume.

HANS W. HARTMANN.

Zurich, Switzerland.

Paraguay, Land, Volk, Geschichte, Wirtschaftsleben, und Kolonisation. By ADOLF N. SCHUSTER, Consul for the republic of Paraguay at Zofingem, Switzerland. (Stuttgart: Strecker and Schroeder, 1929. Pp. 667. Maps, plates, text illustrations.)

Dr. Schuster is not unknown to students interested in the history and politics of South America. His well-known works dealing with Argentina, namely, *Heimatklaenge von Silberstrom* and *Der Schweizer Argentinier* have been widely read. He has followed these by a new volume on Paraguay.

This work, the reviewer believes to be almost beyond criticism in those things of which it purports to treat. In its encyclopedic characteristics, it is really elevated into the category of standard authorities, for it has set a new norm. The volume opens with a geographical survey which presents much special information. A valuable chapter on mineralogy has been added by Herr Range, and one on the flora by Professor Hochreutiner of Geneva. The chapter relating to the population of Paraguay is of great value and interest, especially to the people of Switzerland, for it shows the Swiss elements that have mingled with the other strains of the people. The author recalls that a Swiss once became president of Paraguay and that José Guggari, who was elected in 1928, was the son of an Italian Swiss.

The historical development is depicted briefly and correctly, and the chapters relating to the constitution, as well as those on the social and political organization and institutions of the country, are instructive and interesting. Much information is given with regard to present political parties. Commerce, industry, and agriculture receive ample treatment. A chapter on immigration and colonization, which will prove of considerable value to those proposing to emigrate to Paraguay, concludes the volume. On the whole, few historical authorities have been cited, but those that have been cited will prove a useful guide to the student.

The text is accompanied by eighteen maps which were made at the Deographisches Institut of Leipzig. Among these are an old

map and one showing an early expedition into the Cordilleras. The appearance of the volume is heightened by eighteen plates consisting of photographic reproductions and over three hundred text illustrations consisting of photographic reproductions, maps, and plans. There are also various tables showing various political and other features. The work, taken as a whole, will be useful.

HANS W. HARTMANN.

Zurich, Switzerland.

Early Texas Album. Fifty Illustrations with Notes. Collected and annotated by C. E. CASTAÑEDA and FREDERICK C. CHABOT. (Austin: 1929. \$50.00.)

Of this large album measuring about 16 x 10 inches, it is understood that only fifty copies have been made. The photographs, which are all well made and clear, range from 1519 to well into the nineteenth century. To the student of the history of Texas, the album will prove interesting and helpful, especially if used in conjunction with historical works on Texas. To some the album will prove at times a source for irritation because the immediate reproduction desired may not be found in it. This is bound to be true, of course, with any compilation that might be made, especially in one restricted to only fifty photographs.

The album consists of the reproduction of maps, plans, views, documents, title pages, and several other kinds of materials. The maps, as a whole, are excellent and this reviewer would like to have found more of them. Perhaps fewer views might have been given and maps inserted in their place. For instance, there is a place for the map of Texas by De l'Isle. Some might complain of the emphasis laid on San Antonio in the views.

The first reproduction is the map showing the "Costas desde Nombre de Dios hasta Florida, 1519, the original of which is in the Archivo de Indias and which was first published in 1900 in Madrid. Another map shows the route of the Aguajo expedition of 1722, which was laid down by Juan Pedro Walker, the first assistant in command of the expedition. There is also an excellent map or plan of the city of San Antonio of 1836, on which the location of the Alamo is shown; another showing the respective positions of the United States and Mexican troops on the Rio Grande during the Mexican War; a map of 1849 laid down by Julius Baedeker, and Austin's map of 1822 which

had already appeared in Barker's *Life of Stephen F. Austin*. Among the portraits reproduced are those of Moses and Stephen F. Austin, James Bowie and his brother, Santa Ana and Sam Houston, and Lorenzo de Zavala. The most important document reproduced is the petition of Moses Austin of December 26, 1820, asking permission of the Mexican government to introduce colonists into Texas. The album would be incomplete without the several views of the old Franciscan missions which are given. Several pictures show the Texas of the late Mexican and early United States period.

This reviewer would rather have seen the celebrated letter of Travis in place of a reproduction of a sheet of writing paper showing views in and near San Antonio. He would also willingly sacrifice several reproductions—perhaps the title pages—and include in their place one of the treaties made by the country of Texas with foreign powers. All these documents exist in the state archives in Austin. The reproduction of ornamental initial letters from printed documents in the García Collection as well as the reproduction of the first page of a typical Spanish genealogy might well have been excused, as they add nothing of importance to the album. A new edition of this ambitious and laudable attempt should contain a list of the reproductions and a short preface would enhance its value. The accompanying notes might be longer in some cases. It should not be difficult to place the entire edition in private collections and the largest libraries.

JAMES A. ROBERTSON.

The Story of Mexico including the "Boys' Prescottt". By HELEN WARD BANKS. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1926. Illus. Pp. ix, 435.)

Cortés the Conqueror. The Exploits of the earliest and greatest of the Gentlemen Adventurers in the New World. By HENRY DWIGHT SEDGWICK. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. [1926]. Pp. viii, 390.)

These two volumes bespeak the never-failing interest excited by Cortés and his conquest of the empire of the Aztecs. The *Story of Mexico* it is true, or at least "The Boys' Prescottt" was first copyrighted in 1916, and so is, in part, a reissue; but that part would scarcely have been reissued unless the publishers had felt there was

a demand for it. This volume is not limited to Cortés and the conquest, and the background incident thereto. Eight of the forty-five chapters carry the story from the time of Cortés to Calles. These are respectively, "Three centuries of viceroys"; "Hidalgo and the cry of Dolores"; the revolution of Morelos"; "The empire of Iturbide"; "Santa Ana and his ambition"; "The empire of Maximilian"; "Díaz the dictator"; and "From Madero to Calles". The main part is, however, the story of the conquest. This is well told, is conservative, and has a wider appeal than to the youthful audience, although it is designed especially for younger readers. The dramatic points of the story are well brought out—perhaps the most impressive being the description (chapter XXVII) of the "noche triste" (the melancholy night), when Cortés and his men battled for their lives with the enraged and fanatical Mexicans. More impressive, perhaps, to him who reads the story of the conquest from the inner angle of achievement is the tale of the rehabilitation of Cortés, the final conquest of the Aztec city, and the beginning of Spanish government. A few errors have been noted. It is now more generally accepted that the date of the discovery of Florida by Ponce de León was 1513 instead of 1512. On p. 325, the date of the New Laws is given as 1572 instead of 1542—probably an error in proofreading or of distraction. The volume has no preface—a regrettable lack. In the part of the volume relating to Cortés and the conquest, the story as told by Prescott has been followed in the main by Miss Banks. The total result is an interesting book, though the eight chapters above noted are necessarily greatly condensed and the story might well have stopped with the Conquest.

Cortés the Conqueror covers much the same ground as the part of the above volume relating to the conquest. The narrative runs along smoothly and the author evinces at times a commendable independence of spirit that refuses to accept as necessarily true generally accepted motives that animated Cortés. As an appendix is given in translation a memorial of Cortés, the original of which (never before published) is in the Library of Congress. An annotated list of the authorities consulted is also given, which includes the letters of Cortés and the narrative by López de Gómara, various collections of documents, *Actos de Cabildo de la Ciudad de Mexico*, the *Historia* of Las Casas, the "Proceso de Residencia contra Pedro de Alvarado"—the most important Spanish sources and several important sources in English.

Mr. Sedgwick, who is the author of a half score or so of books writes in a pleasing style. No new evidence is brought forward in his book, any more than in the other work, but it forms, on the whole, a good guide to the conquest. It is interesting to note that he selects three men of sixteenth century Spain as embodying the "fermenting energy during the earlier part of the sixteenth century" (preface). These are "Charles the King, Ignatius Loyola, with his genius for adoration and organization, and Cortés, the gallant, reckless, deep-revolving, gentleman adventurer". The story of the retreat as told here should be compared with that of *The Story of Mexico*, for one supplies details not told in the other; and this is so throughout the part of each volume devoted to the Conquest.

The Story of Mexico is enhanced by a number of colored illustrations that are helpful and enable one to grasp better the essentials of the narrative. *Cortés the Conqueror* has, among other historical illustrations a facsimile of the Memorial which is translated in the appendix (it should be noted that the memorial is in the hand of a scribe and not of Cortés). Both books might well be made a part of required readings in college classes.

NOTES AND COMMENT

THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF SPANISH HISTORY AT BARCELONA

It is a commonplace among historical scholars that no real understanding of the historical evolution of Hispanic America is possible without an adequate comprehension of the Spanish background. A brief account of the International Congress of Spanish History held in Barcelona during the last two weeks of November, together with some reference to the historical significance of the exposition, should therefore not be without interest to the readers of the *HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*.

Though held in connection with an international exposition the congress was limited in scope. Topics connected with Hispanic America were specifically excluded, as a congress dealing with this field is to be held in Seville during this coming May. Despite this restriction some four Hispanic American countries sent delegates and two of the representatives from Peru read papers largely confined to American themes. Sr. Riva Agüero dealt with the "Precursors of Columbus" and Srta. Angélica Palma (daughter of the famous Ricardo Palma) gave a sympathetic and scholarly appreciation of Viceroy Abascal. The writer, representing Stanford University, was the only accredited delegate from the United States. Europe was well represented. Germany sent no less than seven delegates including such eminent historians as Professor Brandenburg of Leipzig and Professor Finke of Freiburg. France, Great Britain, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Norway, and Roumania were also represented. Even the kingdom of Egypt sent its delegate.

The formal opening of the congress, which took place in the *Aula* of the university, was invested with a pomp and ceremony somewhat novel to those whose notions of historical congresses are associated with the annual meetings of the American Historical Association. Preceded by heralds in resplendent uniforms, all of the higher dignitaries of Catalonia, including the Archbishop of Barcelona, entered the hall in solemn procession to the accompaniment of music from the municipal band. The delegates were welcomed by the minister of justice and

worship. The most important of the formal addresses was delivered by the Duke of Alva, director of the Royal Academy of History and president of the Executive Committee of the Congress. His speech, delivered in Spanish, and repeated in flawless French and English was a lucid statement of the criteria now followed by all honest historical scholars and a plea that these criteria be applied to the interpretation of the history of Spain. Official delegates from the various countries were then called upon for replies to the address of welcome. As was fitting the speakers stressed the historical and cultural bonds which had at various times united their respective countries with Spain. Not always did the examples chosen prove felicitous nor did they invariably rest upon solid historical foundations. Thus the representative of the University of Oslo, Professor Johnson, fell back upon the Vikings and the contributions they had made to Spain in the ninth century. Even more hazardous were the assumptions of the Swedish delegate, Professor Curmann. According to him the Visigoths "who played such a large part in the cultural evolution of Spain" originally came from Sweden. To one, who like the writer was nurtured in the writings of Ranke and his school, it came as something of a shock to hear the Czechoslovak delegate, Professor Kibal, speak with appreciation of the part which Spain took in forcing the Catholic reaction on Bohemia in the seventeenth century. But after all, on an occasion of this sort, the votaries of Clio may perhaps be permitted to make a slight sacrifice of historical accuracy to the cause of international comity.

Naturally a number of eminent Spanish historians took an active part in the congress. Among them may be mentioned Sr. Antonio Ballesteros Barretta of Madrid, whose voluminous *Historia de España y su Influencia en la Historia Universal* is well known to Hispanic students, Professor Angel de Altolaquirre, also of Madrid, who has taken a large part in directing the publications of the Royal Academy of History, and Professor Antonio de la Torre of the University of Barcelona who has written extensively upon the foreign relations of the kingdom of Aragon. Although the congress was held in the old capital of Catalonia the Catalan scholars with a few exceptions held aloof. The explanation is to be found in the intensity of regional pride which leads local scholars to publish even scientific works in Catalan. The fact that the Congress was under semi-official auspices

of the Madrid authorities, and the fact, too, that papers were not admitted in Catalan also doubtless contributed to this abstention.

As is customary in such cases, the congress was divided into various sections: Prehistory and Pre-Roman Civilization; Mediaeval Spain; Modern History of Spain. The papers varied greatly in merit. A number were based on careful research, especially in the archives of Simancas. Many, however, were of a local or antiquarian interest and their authors evinced little historical training. The discussions which followed the presentation of the papers only too often took the form of indiscriminating eulogies. There remained, however, a saving minority which represented a genuine contribution to historical scholarship.

Attendance at the sections absorbed only a fraction of the time of the delegates. The organizing committee was indefatigable in arranging entertainments, excursions, and personally conducted visits to places of interest. One day was devoted to the suppressed monastery of Poblet and to Tarragona with its wealth of Roman monuments. Another was spent on Monserrat, the sacred mountain of Spain, redolent with memories of Loyola. And at the end of the congress the delegates passed three unforgettable days in the Balearic Islands. During these excursions and at various banquets and luncheons were afforded abundant opportunities for those personal contacts which constitute one of the chief justifications for congresses, historical or otherwise. The traditional Spanish courtesy and hospitality were always in evidence.

The exposition itself proved unexpectedly rich in historical interest. Prior to his visit to Barcelona the writer shared the current view that the exposition was of the conventional type and would be chiefly of interest to students of things Hispanic through its revelation of the striking economic progress made by Spain during the past few decades. All of this proved to be true but there was much more. In the beautiful Palacio Nacional, the most striking building in the exposition, Spain has housed a museum of historical and artistic interest hitherto unapproached in the history of the peninsula. In this brief account reference can only be made to a few of the more significant exhibits. In the prehistoric section is a replica of the roof and walls of the famous cavern of Altamira with pictures of bison and other animals now extinct in Europe standing out almost as vividly as they did fifteen thousand years ago when painted by the unknown paleolithic artists.

In another section is a striking reproduction of an Iberian shrine. Then follow section by section exhibits setting forth with beauty and vividness the culture of Spain under the Carthagenians, Romans, Visigoths, and Moors. Naturally the Middle Ages and the Reconquista are particularly stressed and here the great museums and churches of Spain have yielded up their treasures. The latter Middle Ages also receive attention; there is, for instance, a whole section devoted to the Battle of Lepanto. Finally; the National Historical Archives of Madrid have prepared an exhibit of historical manuscripts illustrating striking events in the history of Spain from the thirteenth century to the present. Among the interesting items noted by the writer were the original manuscript of the Treaty of Ryswick, the decree signed by Charles III. for the expulsion of the Jesuits, an autograph letter of Washington to Floridablanca, the original of the treaty of Basel, the credentials of our minister, Pinckney, signed by Jefferson and Madison.

The most spectacular exhibit in the Palacio Nacional is undoubtedly the series of "Cuadros Históricos", fifteen in number, depicting episodes in Spanish history from the days of the Visigoths to the inauguration of the first railroad in 1848. Each "Cuadro" consists of a recess in the form of a stage in which the actors, in full relief, are lifesize. The settings and accessories have been prepared with extraordinary care and reflect the life of the period with rare fidelity. Some of the scenes are intensely dramatic though at no time has there been a sacrifice of restraint or dignity merely to secure effect. Among the scenes which most vividly recall the past glories of Spain are "The Cid bidding farewell to Ximena as he goes into exile", "Alfonso the Learned among his scholars", "The Catholic Sovereigns receiving Columbus in Barcelona", and "Charles V. in the monastery of Yuste".

To the student of history, Barcelona, quite apart from the exposition, offers many delightful surprises. Such buildings as the Cathedral, the Ayuntamiento, the Palacio de la Diputación Provincial and a number of Romanesque and Gothic churches are mute witnesses of the time when the axis of political power had not definitely shifted from Aragon to Castile. But the most impressive evidence of the rôle which Catalonia and Aragon have played in world affairs is afforded by the "Archivo de la Corona de Aragón". In extent and point of importance these archives are comparable to those of Simancas and Seville. Here, adequately housed and conveniently arranged, are available for

students documents dealing with the history of Catalonia and Aragon from the tenth century up through the wars of independence against the French. The nucleus of the collection and the chief treasure of the archives consists of the so-called "Registros del Real Archivo". These "Registros" comprise the letters, privileges, and other documents despatched by the royal government of Aragon from 1257 to 1727. They amount all told to 6,704 volumes, containing more than three million items. By means of this collection it is possible not merely to reconstruct the internal history of Aragon during its apogee under such kings as Jaime I. (1213-1276) and Jaime II. (1291-1327) but also to follow the expansion of Aragon under these monarchs. Professor Finke of Freiburg, who is making a study of the foreign policy of Aragon at this period, informed the writer, with perhaps permissible exaggeration, that he considered the archives of the crown of Aragon to be the most important of Europe if exception be made of the archives of the Vatican. In addition to the "Registros" just noted there are other important sections classified under "Consejo Superior de Aragón", "Procesos", "Generalidad de Cataluña", "Clero Secular y Regular", and "Guerra de Independencia". Naturally the writer made enquiries regarding the value of the archives for the student of Spanish American history. He was informed by the courteous and scholarly director, Sr. F. Vals Taberner, that the commercial and other relations between Aragon and Spanish America under Charles III. and his successors offered a fruitful field of investigation and one which has not yet received the attention it deserves.

A month in Barcelona spent under the conditions described above leaves certain abiding impressions. One is the conspicuous success of the exposition as an exponent not only of Spain's economic renaissance but also of the richness and depth of its cultural life. Another is the genuine and growing interest on the part of both Spanish scholars and laymen in the objective and scientific study of their nation's history. And finally there is the realization that Barcelona in its archives, its university, and its historical monuments, as well as in the devoted labors of its scholars, constitutes an intellectual center surpassed by few cities in Europe.

PERCY ALVIN MARTIN.

Stanford University.

Professor Samuel Guy Inman, of Columbia University is giving a course in Public Law. The course emphasizes the relationship between the United States and the Caribbean countries, with particular attention to the "Caribbean Policy" of the United States, especially since the Spanish American war; naval strategy in relation to the Panama and Nicaragua Canal routes; Taft's development of "Dollar Diplomacy"; a study of the economic and political problems involved in the Platt amendment, the occupation of Haiti and Nicaragua, the United States receivership in Santo Domingo, the guarantee by the United States of the independence of Panama; North American collectors of customs and financial advisers in El Salvador and other Caribbean countries; critical colonial problems related to Porto Rico and the Virgin Islands; labor, educational, and social movements; the Caribbean as a meeting place of Latin and Anglo-Saxon cultures; the relation of the Caribbean to the total Pan American problem and to the League of Nations. Topics for investigation in the course are as follows:

1. Influence of Walker and other filibusters on Isthmian Canal diplomacy.
2. Early efforts to annex Cuba and Santo Domingo to the United States.
3. Influence on diplomatic relations of the Zelaya Régime in Nicaragua.
4. Relations of the United States to movement for Central American Union.
5. Contribution to Inter-American relations of Central American Conference of 1907.
6. Present status of treaties approved by Central American Conference of 1923.
7. Successes and failures of the Central American Court of Justice.
8. Relation of President Roosevelt and the Department of State to the establishment of the Republic of Panama.
9. Attitude of Secretary of State Knox to Caribbean questions.
10. Attitude of Secretary of State Bryan to Caribbean questions.
11. Attitude of Secretary of State Lansing to Caribbean questions.
12. Attitude of Secretary of State Hughes to Caribbean questions.
13. Causes and results of the non-recognition of the Temuco Government in Costa Rica.
14. Relations between tariffs and diplomacy in the West Indies.
15. How far does the Platt Amendment limit the sovereignty of Cuba?
16. Has the Platt Amendment helped or hindered the development of self government in Cuba?
17. The language problem in Porto Rico.
18. The Race Problem in the West Indies.
19. The labor movement in Porto Rico, Cuba, and Santo Domingo.
20. Aviation as a factor in diplomatic relations and naval strategy in the Caribbean.
21. Are small land holdings or large estates preferable in the West Indies?

22. Problems in the development of communications between the Caribbean countries.
23. Ways of handling problems of over and under population in various Caribbean countries.
24. Should the standards of government in the United States be the ones required for the Caribbean countries?
25. Advantages and disadvantages of the supervision of elections by the United States Marines.
26. Relationships of the Department of State to loans to Caribbean Governments.
27. Havana and Panama as centers for international movements.
28. Porto Rico as a nexus between Anglo Saxon and Latin culture.
29. Would the development of factories improve economic conditions in the West Indies?
30. Ways which foreign investors could aid in improving economic and cultural conditions in the Caribbean.
31. Educational exchange between Cuba and the United States.
32. Development of public health in the Caribbean.
33. Work of the Rockefeller Foundation in the Caribbean.
34. American philanthropic work in the Caribbean.
35. Work of American Financial Advisers in various Caribbean countries.
36. Influence of United Fruit Company in Central America.
37. Influence of the National City Bank in the West Indies.
38. Influence of North American tourists and residents in the West Indies.
39. North American public service corporations in Cuba and Guatemala.
40. Influence of sugar producers in the governments of the United States and Cuba.
41. Relation of Costa Rica and Panama to the League of Nations.
42. International Finance in Honduras.
43. What is involved in a "guarantee of independence" made in cases like that of the United States and Panama?
44. Naval bases of the United States in the Caribbean.
45. Catalogue of cases involving landing of armed forces in the Caribbean from Spanish American War to the present.
46. Machinery used by the War, Navy, and State Departments for handling colonies and protectorates in the Caribbean.
47. Analysis of the investigations made by the United States Senate into relations with Caribbean countries since the Spanish American War.
48. Results of eight years of intervention by the United States in Santo Domingo.
49. Has the United States intervention in Nicaraguan affairs aided that country to advance beyond other Central American nations?
50. Influence of the Caribbean Policy of the United States on the proceedings of the Sixth Pan American Conference at Havana.
51. Growth of North American investments in the Caribbean since 1914.
52. Work of the Cuban Society of International Law.
53. How far has the Platt Amendment become a model for the United States in dealing with other Caribbean countries?

54. Problems involved in non-recognition of revolutionary governments.
55. Attitude of South American countries toward intervention in the Caribbean.
56. What effect will the Paris Pact and the new Pan American treaties on arbitration and conciliation have on relations between the United States and the Caribbean countries?
57. Comparison between Great Britain's relation to the Suez Canal and the United States' relation to the Panama Canal.

The following announcement of the American Council of Learned Societies should be of interest to workers in the field of Hispanic American history:

In March, 1930, the American Council of Learned Societies awarded a limited number of grants in aid of research in the humanistic sciences: philosophy, philology, literature, and linguistics, art and archaeology, musicology, cultural and intellectual history, and auxiliary sciences.

The grants in aid of research are of two kinds:

(a) *Small Grants.* These grants are of any amount up to \$300; they may be increased to not more than \$500 when in the opinion of the Committee on Fellowships and Grants, such increase is necessitated by unusual expenses, as of travel. They are available to all scholars possessing the doctor's degree or its equivalent in training, study, and experience, who are citizens or permanent residents of the United States or Canada and who are engaged in specific projects of research for which aid is actually needed. No grants will be made to assist in fulfilling the requirements for any academic degree.

(b) *Larger Grants.* These range in amount from \$750 to \$2000, and are reserved for mature scholars of recognized achievement who are engaged in important undertakings of research to which they can devote at least six months without interruption. Their object is to assist in the advancement of knowledge through aiding individual enterprises of fundamental importance. They are subject to the same conditions of citizenship or residence as the small grants.

The American Council of Learned Societies also offers a number of research fellowships in the field of the humanistic sciences, available in July, 1930. The fellowships are of the post-doctoral type offered by The Social Science Research Council and the National Research Council. Their object is to assist the training of scholars and teachers; they are limited to those who have acquired the Ph.D. or its equivalent and who are still in the "training period". Fellows must be citizens or permanent residents of the United States or Canada, and ordinarily not over thirty-five years of age. The basic stipend is \$1800, subject to adjustment to meet individual needs; allowance may also be made for traveling expenses, etc. Awards will be announced in April.

Applications for both grants and fellowships must be made by January 15 of each year, on special forms provided by the Permanent Secretary of the American Council of Learned Societies, 907 Fifteenth Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

Dr. Watt Stewart, of the Agricultural and Mechanical College, of Oklahoma, is making a study of "The Rôle of American Privateers during the Hispanic American Revolutions".

Hans W. Hartmann, who studied at the University of Pittsburgh under Professor N. A. N. Cleven, has just been granted the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by the University of Zurich. Dr. Hartmann will continue his studies in Hispanic American history.

Professor Arthur Preston Whitaker will have two courses at Columbia summer school; one of which will deal with the revolutionary period of Hispanic America, 1760-1830. Professor Whitaker has also accepted a call to Cornell University and will begin his duties there next September. It is understood that he will develop there, among other subjects, studies in the history of Hispanic America.

Professor J. Fred Rippy will participate during the summer in the Institute of Politics at the University of Virginia.

The Institute of Historical Research of the University of London plans to reproduce *The Statutes of the Realm*. Should this important project materialize many students of history will be under a deep debt of gratitude to the Institute. It is proposed to limit the number of sets to approximately the number of subscribers. Communications with regard to the project may be sent to the Secretary and Librarian of the Institute, whose address is Malet Street, W.C. 1, London.

The eighth annual interim Anglo-American Historical Conference will be held at the Institute of Historical Research on Friday, 4 July, 1930. By invitation of the University of London a full quinquennial conference, similar to those of 1921 and 1926, will take place at the Institute in 1931, probably from the 13th to 17th July. Particulars of both conferences may be had from the secretary of the Institute of Historical Research, Malet Street, W.C. 1.

C. E. Castañeda, librarian of the García Collection in the University of Texas, is continuing the publication of documents for the history of Mexico from materials in the García Collection—a series begun by the famous Mexican scholar Genaro García. The first volume of the continuation, which has already appeared, will be reviewed

in a later number of this REVIEW. It may be said here that this is an enterprise of considerable importance; and it is hoped that the series will be continued until the most important documents in the collection have been published. The publication is under the auspices of the Mexican government. In recognition of his service in editing these documents, Mr. Castañeda has been elected a corresponding member of the Sociedad de Geografía y Estadística of Mexico. He read a paper in Mexico in April of this year before the Society.

Professor Percy Alvin Martin, of Leland Stanford University, who is on leave this present academic year, will attend the Third Congress of Spanish American Geography and History, which will be held on May 2 of this year. The Ambassador for Spain in the United States extended an invitation to the Managing Editor of this REVIEW to attend the Congress, and in case he could not, to appoint a delegate. Professor Martin was thereupon appointed such delegate. In addition he has also been appointed delegate for The Florida State Historical Society. During the present semester, Dr. Charles H. Hackett, of the University of Texas, is giving Professor Martin's classes at Stanford.

Professor Earl J. Hamilton, of the Economics Department of Duke University, will represent that institution at the Congress of Spanish American Geography and History.

Professor N. Andrew N. Cleven, of the University of Pittsburgh, expects to go to Mexico in August of this year, and thence to Central and South America.

Miss Charmion Shelby, who is working toward her doctorate under Professor Charles W. Hackett, is writing a thesis on "Spanish-French Colonial Relations, 1730-1755". She has been recently using the manuscripts bearing on this in the Library of Congress, and will also visit other institutions.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SECTION

THE DIPLOMATIC MONOGRAPHS OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT

One of the ideals of every investigator in diplomatic history should be the examination of all the official documents bearing upon the topic of his research. Hitherto this has not been possible for scholars who have dealt with Inter-American diplomacy. Officials of the State Department of the United States have only recently assumed a liberal attitude toward archival investigators, permitting them to examine documents bearing upon a period so recent as 1900. Doctor Tyler Dennett was the first historian to be granted this privilege and the writer of the present article was probably the second.

Such a liberal policy has yet to be adopted by most of the nations of Hispanic America, but a tendency in this direction may be observed. Among these countries Mexico appears to be taking the lead in this respect. A quarter of a century ago Professor Herbert E. Bolton was permitted to begin the arduous investigations which resulted in the publication (1913) of his *Guide to the Materials for the History of the United States in the Principle Archives of Mexico*. This very thorough work called attention to many manuscripts bearing upon the relations of the United States and Mexico, but in diplomatic matters Professor Bolton was compelled to confine himself largely to the period previous to 1860. In the preparation of my volume entitled, *The United States and Mexico* (published in 1925) I had the privilege of examining the valuable Bolton Transcripts relating to this early period, but I did not have access to the Mexican archives bearing upon a more recent era. While engaged in the preparation of his *War With Mexico* (published in 1919), Justin H. Smith was allowed to examine Mexican archives for that period. Professor France Scholes is now engaged in making for the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress photostats of all important diplomatic documents which bear upon the relations of the United States and Mexico from the beginning of the Mexican movement for independence down to a comparatively recent date. When this task shall have been completed it will then be possible for scholars to pursue in the United States in an entirely

satisfactory manner, so far as the documents are concerned, serious investigations on the large subject of United States-Mexican relations.

It is understood, however, that Professor Scholes will not make photographs of documents already published or which are likely to appear in the near future. For this reason any diplomatic documents published by the Mexican government or in process of being published by that government will continue to be very useful to scholars engaging in research in the United States. For scholars who do not have the privilege of pursuing their investigations in the Library of Congress or who are interested in the diplomatic relations of Mexico with the other countries of the world these Mexican publications will prove even more useful. Even if these published documents were accessible as photostats in the Library of Congress, the Mexican publications would still be of great importance because of their classification and the introductory essay contained in each volume.

The Mexican publications to which reference has been made are issued under the general series title of "Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano". The first number of this work appeared in 1923 and as this brief account is written, the thirty-second number has just appeared. In a sense it may be said that this important enterprise represents a continuation of a project begun in 1910 but suspended in 1913 after three volumes had been issued under the general series heading "La Diplomacia Mexicana". The following is a list of the publications of the more recent enterprise with brief critical annotations:

- Number 1. *La Diplomacia Mexicana. Pequeña Revista Histórica*. By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1923. Pp. 41. As indicated by its title, this number is a brief historical survey of the foreign relations of Mexico. It was written at a critical period in Mexico's diplomatic history and contains defects resulting from the author's passionate patriotism. There are no documents, but there are valuable quotations from documents as well as from various Mexican authors who have written upon the subject of Mexico's foreign relations.
- Number 2. *Noticia Histórico de las Relaciones Políticas y Comerciales entre México y el Japón, durante el Siglo XVII*. By Ángel Núñez Ortega, 1923. Pp. 128. This number contains various brief essays and documents bearing upon the relations of Mexico and Japan, 1603-1614. It presents very little which has not appeared in print elsewhere but it nevertheless constitutes a convenient and valuable compilation.
- Number 3. *Incidente Diplomático con Inglaterra en 1843*. By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1923. Pp. 31. On September 11, 1843, President Santa Anna gave a state dance in the National Palace of Mexico. A British flag was displayed

along with other war trophies. Apparently it had been seized from the insurgent Texans. The British minister demanded that it be taken down and when his demand was refused, left the dance in a rage and suspended relations. The matter was not settled until March, 1844, when the flag was turned over to another British minister. This monograph contains a brief introduction and the documents relating to the incident.

Number 4. *Las Relaciones entre México y Perú. La Misión de Corpancho*. By Genaro Estrada, 1923. Pp. 227. This volume deals with the relations of Mexico and Peru prior to 1864, emphasizing the period 1861-1863 when Manuel Nicolás Corpancho was in Mexico on a special diplomatic mission. Besides a valuable introduction by the Mexican scholar and diplomat, Genaro Estrada, it contains numerous documents relating mainly to the subject of American solidarity.

Number 5. *El Decreto de Colombia en Honor de D. Benito Juárez*. By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1923. Pp. 27. This brief number contains, besides the introductory remarks of Peña y Reyes, a glowing tribute to Juárez adopted by the Colombian Congress on May 2, 1865. It also contains the correspondence relating thereto and reveals, like the previous number, a strong Pan-American sentiment.

Number 6. *Personas que han tenido a su Carga la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores desde 1821 hasta 1924*. By the research staff of the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Relations, 1924. Pp. 35. This list, with dates, of the numerous diplomats who have had charge of the Mexican foreign office is exceedingly valuable for all investigations into the foreign relations of that country.

Number 7. *Lucás Alamán. El Reconocimiento de nuestra Independencia por España y la Unión de los Países Hispano-Americanos*. By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1924. Pp. 114. In this volume is presented a very important collection of correspondence covering the years 1829-1832. It reveals Alamán, who has generally been supposed to have been an enemy of republics and of Mexico's independence, in a new light, exerting himself in apparent good faith in an effort to secure the recognition not only of Mexico but of the other states of Spanish America. The threat of a Mexican invasion of Cuba is successfully employed in order to secure the coöperation of England, and there is also a certain amount of coördination between Mexico and the other Spanish American governments; but all negotiation proved futile. Peña's introduction is valuable.

Number 8. *Don Manuel Eduardo de Gorostiza y la Cuestión de Texas*. By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1924. Pp. 206. This volume contains correspondence exchanged between the United States and Mexico regarding the Republic of Texas, a brief biography of Gorostiza, and a "Report" on Texas which Gorostiza read before the Mexican Council of State. Most of the documents bear upon the occupation of Texas by General Gaines in 1836 and the interruption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico which resulted largely from this action.

- Number 9. *León XII y los Países Hispano-Americanos*. By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1924. Pp. 97. This issue presents a group of valuable documents relative to Leo XII.'s famous encyclical exhorting the Spanish Americans to remain loyal to Ferdinand VII. and extolling the virtues of the Spanish monarchs. Although this encyclical related to all the colonies, the material included by Peña y Reyes is confined mainly to Mexico. It covers the dates 1824-1826.
- Number 10. *Notas de Don Juan Antonio de la Fuente, Ministro de México cerca de Napoleon III*. By Antonio de Peña y Reyes, 1924. Pp. 101. This number is a reprint of correspondence published more than sixty years ago in the periodicals of Mexico. It thus makes available in convenient form materials which would otherwise hardly be accessible to the student of Mexican diplomacy. As the title indicates, the documents bear upon the period of French Intervention, more specifically upon the years 1861-1862, or the period of Fuente's service in Paris.
- Number 11. *La Anexión de Centro América a México*. By Rafael Heliodoro Valle, 1924. Pp. lvii, 169. This compilation of the erudite Central American scholar contains documents and other writings of the year 1821. They have been collected largely from various works which have appeared during the last century. A bibliography is included as well as a scholarly introduction dealing mainly with the relations of Mexico and Central America during the colonial period. Although comparatively little of the material presented consists of hitherto inedited documents, the volume is of great value.
- Number 12. *La Concesión Leese*. By Fernando Iglesias Calderón, 1924. Pp. 193. The documents contained in this volume are taken from the well known *Correspondencia de la Legación Mexicana en Washington durante la Intervención Extranjera*. Aside from the convenience of such a compilation, the present work has the great merit of presenting a critical analysis of the grant. The value of this analysis does not seem to be impaired by the circumstance that it was written by the son of the Minister of Fomento who had some part in drawing up the terms of the concession. The concession was in the form of a contract for the colonization of a large portion of Lower California. Like many of their predecessors, Leese and his associates were unable to carry out the terms of their agreement. The correspondence covers the period from 1864 to 1872.
- Number 13. *El Tratado Mon-Almonte*. By Antonio Peña y Reyes, 1925. Pp. xxxiv, 157. The inedited documents presented in this number relate to a critical episode in the history of Mexico. The Mon-Almonte Treaty was virtually forced upon the Conservative government of Mexico by Spain, assisted by the strong pressure of the French and English governments as "mediatory" powers. The introduction to the collection gives a brief biographical account of the career of Juan N. Almonte, son of the revolutionary hero Morelos. The correspondence relates to the years 1859-1860.
- Number 14. *El Dr. Vicente G. Quesada y sus Trabajos Diplomáticos sobre México*. By Fernando González Roa, 1925. Pp. 199. This volume consists largely of long quotations, with running comment of the editor, taken from the various

autobiographical publications of a distinguished Argentine scholar and diplomat. Only a small portion of the work relates to Quesada's brief mission in Mexico (1891) and to his arbitration of the claims of two citizens of the United States against Mexico. In addition, there is a section on the Falkland Islands and two other sections relating to ecclesiastical patronage in Spanish America, with special reference to Mexico and Argentina.

- Number 15. *Lord Aberdeen, Texas y California*. By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1925. Pp. xxii, 72. This interesting collection of inedited documents deals with the efforts of Mexico, England, and France to prevent the annexation of Texas by the United States. It also contains a few documents on California's connection with these negotiations. Owing to the fact that this correspondence has already been examined by Rives and Justin Smith and conclusions based thereon presented in their published works, the specialist in Hispanic American diplomacy will find little new in the present compilation; yet no scholar can fail to welcome it or to appreciate the editorial introduction.
- Number 16. *Diario de un Escribiente de Legación*. By Genaro Estrada, 1925. Pp. xx, 286. This diary of Joaquín Moreno, now published for the first time, contains interesting and often important data regarding the United States, France, and Italy, as well as Mexico. Its importance is increased by the fact that the author was for some time secretary to Lorenzo Zavala, who was prominently connected with the Texas independence movement. The diary covers the years 1833-1836.
- Number 17. *Las Relaciones Diplomáticas de México con Sud-América*. By Jesús Guzman y Raz Guzman, 1925. Pp. xvi, 179. This is in part a reprint of the *Memorias* of Núñez Ortega published in Mexico City in 1878. It is supplemented, however, by other documents bearing upon the relations of Mexico with Cuba, Panama, Colombia, Argentina, and Peru.
- Number 18. *El Barón Alleye de Cyprey y el Baño de las Delicias*. By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1926. Pp. xix, 87. These documents deal with Franco-Mexican relations, 1843-1845. The Baron, who was the minister of France in Mexico City, was insulted while at one of the public baths of the city and when his demand for reparation was refused, he asked for his passports and left the country.
- Number 19. *El Congreso de Panama y Algunos Otros Proyectos de Unión Hispano-Americana*. By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1926. Pp. xxvii, 262. As Señor Peña y Reyes remarks in his excellent prologue, the purpose of this number is to set forth the attitude of Mexico toward various projects of creating a union of the states of Hispanic America. The documents cover the period from 1822 to 1898 and reveal on Mexico's part some enthusiasm for a movement which failed to produce any important results. They are an important contribution to the bibliography of the subject.
- Number 20. *Los Precursores de la Diplomacia Mexicana*. By Isidro Fabela, 1926. Pp. 206. This monograph, written by a well known Mexican historian and amply illustrated by documents drawn from various works already published, possesses great value for the student of American diplomacy. It deals with

Mexico's foreign relations during the period 1742-1824 and is not colored by any prejudice unless it be that of severity toward the United States. It is, however, suggestive rather than exhaustive. The archives of England, France, Spain, and Colombia must contain other documents which would throw considerable additional light upon the subject.

- Number 21. *Relaciones entre México y Venezuela. Breves Notas históricas.* By Manuel Landaeta Rosales, 1927. Pp. 16. This consists of a number of detached notes on a multitude of matters, ranging from the expedition organized by Diego de Ordaz to Bartolomé Salón. There are also lists of Mexican and Venezuelan diplomats that are very useful to the investigator.
- Number 22. *El Tratado de Paz con España.* By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1927. Pp. xxix, 222. For two reasons this number of the *Archivo* is important and valuable: it contains the Mexican documents bearing upon the first treaty between Spain and the Mexican nation, including the treaty itself; and the editorial introduction presents a brief biographical sketch of Miguel Santa María, the very interesting Mexican patriot and diplomat who represented the Aztec nation in the negotiation of the agreement.
- Number 23. *La Primera Guerra entre México y Francia.* By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1927. Pp. xl, 343. The documents of this volume cover the years 1837 to 1839 and relate to the "Pastry War" between France and Mexico. France used its fleet in order to coerce Mexico into granting satisfaction for injuries suffered by Frenchmen residing in Mexico. The matter was settled through British mediation. The prologue presents a brief survey of Franco-Mexican relations, 1827-1839.
- Number 24. *La Anección de Centro America á México.* By Rafael Heliodoro Valle, 1928. Pp. 469. This is a continuation of Number 11 and the second volume of Dr. Valle's excellent compilation of documents upon the subject. As in the case of the previous number, little hitherto unpublished material is presented but much of it would otherwise be inaccessible to the students of Pan-America. The documents cover the period 1821-1822 and the work will be continued.
- Number 25. *Don Juan Prim y su Labor Diplomática en México.* By Genero Estrada, 1928. Pp. xxviii, 251. The documents here presented relate to the intervention of Spain along with England and France in Mexico, 1861-1862. General Juan Prim was the Spanish plenipotentiary, and this number contains two of his speeches in the Spanish Cortes as well as the correspondence between him and the Mexican government and the other intervening powers. General Prim was sympathetic toward Mexico and his attitude was probably largely responsible for the withdrawal of Spain from the joint enterprise. Dr. Estrada's introduction gives a brief survey of the relations between Spain and Mexico from 1836 to 1861.
- Number 26. *La Insubsistencia de una Convención de Reclamaciones.* By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1928. Pp. xxx, 214. The documents contained in this number relate to the Hispano-Mexican claims convention of November 12, 1853. The failure of Mexico to comply with the terms of this agreement and further

injuries suffered by Spaniards residing in that country were largely responsible for Spain's joining the coercive action against Mexico in 1861. These drastic measures on the part of Spain caused Mexico to declare the convention void and refuse to renew relations with the late mother country until 1871. Between 1877 and 1883 a somewhat bitter exchange of notes occurred with reference to the matter, but Mexico maintained its position and the difficulty was settled without unfortunate incidents. The prologue of the late Peña y Reyes presents a valuable discussion of the question up to the year 1861. The documents cover the period 1851 to 1883 and consist of diplomatic correspondence and newspaper comment.

- Number 27. *Las Relaciones entre México y el Vaticano*. By Joaquín Ramírez Cabañas, 1928. Pp. xciv, 237. This volume should be read along with Number 9. The documents which it contains cover the years 1822 to 1860, with emphasis upon the earlier period. The editorial introduction is very valuable. It deals mainly with the relations of church and state in New Spain during the colonial period, but it devotes considerable attention to the national period not only in Mexico but elsewhere in Spanish America.
- Number 28. *La Labor Diplomática de D. Manuel María de Zamacona como Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores*. By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1928. Pp. xxv, 160. Señor Zamacona was Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Relations from July 13 to November 26, 1861, during a critical period in the diplomacy of his country. The documents of this number throw much light upon the projected tripartite intervention. One brief section bears upon Seward's proposed treaty designed to forestall intervention by a loan well secured by a mortgage upon Mexico's public lands. The introduction furnishes a brief biography of Zamacona.
- Number 29. *Las Memorias Diplomáticas de Mr. Foster sobre México*. By Genaro Estrada, 1929. Pp. xxii, 143. In presenting to the public this Spanish edition of that portion of John W. Foster's *Diplomatic Memoirs* (New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1909. Two vols.) which relates to Mexico, Dr. Estrada evinces excellent taste. Specialists in the United States have long considered Foster's work valuable for the period which it covers (1875 ff.). The prologue gives a brief survey of Foster's diplomatic career with special emphasis upon his Mexican mission.
- Number 30. *Comentarios de Francisco Zarco sobre la Intervención Francesa*. By Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, 1929. Pp. xxxv, 303. This volume contains a compilation of Zarco's newspaper articles written during the first years of French Intervention in Mexico (November, 1861 to March, 1863). Zarco was an able writer and diplomat and an ardent Liberal. The editor's prologue discusses the background of French intervention and Zarco's relation to the political events of the period.
- Number 31. *Algunos Documentos sobre el Tratado de Guadalupe y la Situación de México durante la Invasión Americana*. By Antonio de Peña y Reyes, 1930. Pp. xiii, 413. This, the last volume of Peña y Reyes before his death, contains in all 55 documents, dating from December 11, 1845 to May 30, 1848. Some of these documents have been printed before and many have been known,

but the compilation will prove very useful to the student as it gathers together a great deal of valuable material touching the treaty of Guadalupe. The preface is interesting and as noted before in other publications edited by Peña y Reyes is tinged by his strong national feeling. As the last volume of this active editor, the work will have added importance.

Number 32. *Un Esfuerzo de México por la Independencia de Cuba*. By Luis Chavez Orozco, 1930. Pp. li, 231. This valuable volume contains correspondence as follows: of the Mexican legation in the United States and Colombia; of Santa Anna; of several Cubans living in Mexico; of Joel R. Poinsett, U. S. minister to Mexico; of Francisco Pizarro Martínez, Mexican secret agent in New Orleans; of Jose Ignacio Basadre, Mexican agent in Haiti; and three letters by a Mexican to the editors of the *Correo de los Paises Bajos*. The documents from the United States fill over a third of the volume and date from 1825-1829, forming, indeed, the most important part of the volume. The correspondence from New Orleans is especially important. Chavez Orozco's preface, which is well annotated and shows considerable use of William R. Manning's compilation, is an excellent piece of work. The title of the book is well chosen.

Such is the list of publications issued during the years 1923 to March, 1930, and the plan appears to be to continue them indefinitely. Already Dr. Genaro Estrada, Sub-Secretary of Foreign Relations, has placed every student of American diplomacy under deep obligation to him. In the publication of materials dealing with its foreign relations, Mexico is clearly destined to a high rank among the nations of the world. In the selection of documents the editors reveal a strong sentiment of nationalism as well as a desire for Hispanic American solidarity; but there must be some basis of selection unless all of the documents are to be published, and perhaps this basis is about as good as any.

J. FRED RIPPY.

Duke University.

THE PERUVIAN COLLECTION OF DUKE UNIVERSITY

For over thirty years the well known Peruvian bibliophile, Don Francisco Pérez de Velasco, gave much of his time to his favorite hobby of collecting books dealing with the history, politics, foreign relations, social conditions, government, and, to some extent, with the literature of Perú. His efforts were crowned with success and he lived to see in his possession one of the best collections of Americana on the South American continent. In his quest for books on the history of Perú, he came across many rare and valuable copies of works on other subjects which he added to his already important library.

Among the three thousand items making up the portion of this collection recently purchased by Duke University there are several books or sets of books deserving special mention, either because of their value or because of their rarity, or both. The *Sumario compendioso de las cuentas de plata y oro*, by Juan Díez Freile, printed in Mexico, 1556,¹ has been seen only by very few collectors. Dr. Pedro de Villagómez, *Carta de exhortación contra las idolatrías de los indios del Arzobispado de Lima* (Lima, 1649); Fray Joannem de Vega, *Institutiones Grammaticae* (Lima, 1595); and other works dealing with the early missions in South America are so rare that they have escaped the diligent and exhaustive research of Father Streit and are not cited in his excellent work.²

There is a collection of one hundred and eight volumes of *Guías del Perú*, an annual publication giving miscellaneous information on the country, covering a period of about a century and a half. The volumes corresponding to the eighteenth century are exceedingly rare and valuable. Another important set is that of the *Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica de Lima*. Although of recent date, a complete collection of this publication is not easily found. Two manuscripts deserve special mention, namely: *Pareceres del Concilio de Lima* and a book of poems of the Peruvian poet Caviades. Over a hundred other comparatively rare works of special interest to students of Hispanic American History—among them the reports of cabinet officers and boundary commissions—would be mentioned in detail if space permitted.

¹ Modern spelling has been used in writing these titles.

² Robert Streit, O. M. I., *Bibliotheca Missionum* (Aachen, 1924):

Of periodicals and newspapers there is an enviable array. The *Mercurio Peruano* from 1791 to 1797 is here, one set complete and another with only a few numbers missing. Besides, there are about one hundred volumes of bound newspapers beginning with the early years of the *Gaceta del Gobierno* and extending throughout the stormy period of the dictatorships. There are also several literary and scientific reviews.

Many books do not deal with Peru but with Spain, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, in fact, with all South America, nevertheless their importance to the student of history is not diminished. Studies of the languages of the aborigines of Peru and of other regions of the continent are also numerous, there being a collection of grammars and prayer books of the Aymará and Quechua languages beginning with those printed by the first Catholic missionaries who went there during the period of the conquest and extending to the latest Gospel printed for the use of American and British Protestant missionaries now in those regions.

R. O. RIVERA.

Duke University,
February 1930.

NOTES

The Life of Miranda by William Spence Robertson has at last been issued in two volumes from the press of the University of North Carolina. This important work, which has been issued in most excellent form, will be reviewed in an early number of this REVIEW. Scholars have long been awaiting these volumes from Professor Robertson who is the only logical scholar, either in the United States or any other country, to write this life.

Dr. Irving A. Leonard of the department of Spanish of the University of California at Berkeley, is the compiler of a bibliographical study on Sigüenza y Góngora, which was published recently in Mexico by the government in its bibliographical series that has been mentioned so often in this REVIEW. This work, entitled *Ensayo Bibliográfico de Sigüenza y Góngora*, will be mentioned more at length in a future number of the REVIEW. Dr. Leonard's study on Sigüenza y Góngora recently published by the Press of the University of California will soon be reviewed in this periodical.

In connection with the preparations for the celebration in Caracas, Venezuela, of the anniversary of the death of Bolívar the minister of the interior, by a decree dated January 14, 1930, authorized the publication at government expense of a work entitled "Historia de Venezuela desde el Descubrimiento hasta 1830" by Dr. Eloy G. González. The edition of this history is to consist of 3000 copies, in two volumes of about 550 pages each.

The World Peace Foundation list of books on Hispanic America was published in *The Library Journal* for November, 1929. The aim subserved in compiling and publishing the list is "to offer a guide to the best available material as recommended by composite expert opinion." The books are those recommended by outstanding professors of Hispanic American history. The books selected in the order of selection are as follows: William Spence Robertson, *History of the Latin-American Nations*; Graham H. Stuart, *Latin America and the United States*; H. G. James and P. A. Martin, *Republics of Latin America*; J. H. Latané, *The United States and Latin America*; F. García Calderón, *Latin America, Its Rise and Progress*; W. R. Shepherd, *The Hispanic Nations of the New World*; James Bryce, *South America: Observations and Impressions*; S. G. Inman, *Problems in Pan Americanism*; Hutton Webster, *History of Latin America*; J. Fred Rippy, *Latin America in World Politics*; W. R. Shepherd, *Latin America*; William S. Robertson, *Hispanic-American Relations with the United States*; W. W. Sweet, *History of Latin America*; J. Warshaw, *The New Latin America*; D. G. Munro, *The Five Republics of Central America*; Chester Lloyd Jones, *Caribbean Interests of the United States*; J. Fred Rippy, *The United States and Mexico*; William S. Robertson, *The Rise of the Spanish American Republics as Told in the Lives of their Liberators*; H. I. Priestly, *The Mexican Nation*; C. H. Haring, *South America Looks at the United States*; E. G. Bourne, *Spain in America*; Ernest Gruening, *Mexico and its Heritage*; P. A. Martin, *Latin America and the War*; N. A. N. Cleven (ed.), *Readings in Hispanic American History*; Clarence F. Jones, *Commerce of South America*; J. B. Lockey, *Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings*.

Miss Alice Stone Blackwell has compiled and translated an anthology entitled *Some Spanish-American Poets*, which was published in

1929 by D. Appleton & Co. Miss Blackwell is already well known for her valuable contributions to our intellectual and cultural acquaintanceship with Spanish America. The present volume includes two hundred and seven poems by eighty-nine authors representing nineteen countries, and both the original Spanish and the translation into English are given. Spanish American poetry is rich in amount as well as in esthetic values. It is also varied. In its later development during the last twenty or thirty years after the throes of political and economic organization and with absence of political motivation, it has, through such gifted exponents as Rubén Darío, Amado Nervo, José Santos Chocano, José Asunción Silva, and others, established standards not inferior to the contemporary poetry of Spain. It certainly merits the attention of cultured men and women of the United States; and acquaintanceship at least with the best of this will bring rich esthetic recompense and increased respect for the value of the culture of our southern neighbors. The selection of material for an anthology is not a grateful task. Inevitably the reader to some extent familiar with the field will miss many of his favorite gems. It is so in the present volume, and this the translator and compiler was well aware of, confessing in her preface that she chose those poems which pleased or interested her. The collection is representative in that it covers the various republics and is not confined to any particular period or movement. Naturally, the later poets are most strongly represented. The translations are well done, some being exceptionally happy. Occasionally prose is the translator's medium instead of verse. The work, taken as a whole, is a valuable contribution to the literature rendering accessible to English-speaking persons some of the beauties of Spanish American verse.—C. K. JONES.

Maggs Brothers of London had on exhibition at the Library of Congress during a large part of 1929 some early materials relating to the discovery and history of America, from 1492 to 1814. For this, the company compiled a special catalogue, entitled *An illustrated Catalogue raisonné of one hundred and six original Manuscripts, Autographs, Maps, and printed Books illustrating the Discovery and History of America from 1492 to 1814 loaned by Maggs Bros., of London exhibited at the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., Spring, 1929.* Like all of the catalogues emanating from this house, this is an excellent piece of bibliographical work. This small folio of 239 pages is

illustrated with maps, facsimiles, and woodcuts taken from some of the materials noted. Among these historical jewels are noted an original letter of Charles V. to Cortés, 1524 (MS.), besides early printed materials by Cortés; Drake and Hawkins material; early material on California, Florida, and New Mexico; a copy of Garcilaso de la Vega's *La Florida del Inca* (Lisbon, 1605); a *Novus Orbis* of Grynaeus of 1632; a *Trois Mondes* of La Popilinière of 1582; *History of Trauayle*, by Richard Willes (1577); *Arte de Navegar* (1545) by Pedro de Medina; and a copy (the third known to be in existence) of Cabeza de Vaca's *Relacion* (Zamora, 1542). One error has been noted (and these bibliographical catalogues of Maggs Bros. are remarkably free from errors): namely Fort Caroline was built at St. Augustine by René Goulain de Laudonnière (p. 57). Fort Caroline was, of course, built very near Jacksonville.

The same concern has also issued a catalogue entitled: *A Catalogue of Fifty-Three rare Americana selected from the Stock of Maggs Bros., Bookseller*. (London, 1928). A number of these titles (among them a Davila Padilla of 1596) relate to Hispanic America. There are also Hispanic American materials listed in the same company's catalogue entitled: *Medicine, Alchemy, Astrology and Natural Sciences* (1929), this being Catalogue No. 520 and being a book of 617 pages.

Henry Stevens, Son and Stiles of London has also issued some attractive catalogues recently which should be on the shelves of the teacher and student of Hispanic American history. Among these are the following: *Rare Americana, a Catalogue of historical and geographical Books, Pamphlets and Manuscripts relating to America, with numerous annotations bibliographical and descriptive* (2156 titles). Catalogue No. 3 new series, 1929, has one section (pp. 120-126) treating of Spanish and Portuguese America, and another section (pp. 126-150), of the West Indies. No. 4 is all of rare Americana, many being of Hispanic America.

Among other notable recent catalogues is *Eine Sammlung seltener Bücher*, this being Katalog 591 of Hiersemann. The same dealer also advertises a collection of South American autographs. The manuscripts concerned relate to various of the conquistadores, to Tupac Amaru, and the battle of Ayacucho, and range in date from 1543 to

1839. Among the signatures of these documents are those of Juan de la Torre and Nicolas de la Rivera who accompanied Francisco Pizarro, Jeronimo de Loaisa, the first archbishop of Lima, and Maria de Escobar, who is said to have introduced wheat culture into Peru. The signatures of Sucre and others of his period are also on some of the later manuscripts. Altogether there are sixteen lots of documents.

The *Bulletin* of the Pan American Union in various numbers has published the following material:

- August, 1928—Interamerican Museum Coöperation; Recent economic Progress in Paraguay.
- September, 1928—Some features of educational advance in Brazil; the banking Structure of Argentina; Bibliography as an Aid to international Understanding.
- October, 1928—The National Library of Chile; Public Instruction in Uruguay; Seventy Years of Argentine Immigration.
- November, 1928—The Romance of Nitrate; Paraguay and the United States; Sanitary Education in Chile.
- December, 1928—Public Instruction in Paraguay.
- January, 1929—Migratory Movements to South American Countries; Higher Education in the Argentine Republic; Cuban Government and the Tobacco Industry; Argentine and Brazil's hundred Years of Peace.
- February, 1929—Organization of Public Hygiene in Paraguay; Pan American Sanitary Code; Road Building and Road Builders in Latin America.
- March, 1929—Summary of Archaeological Work in the Americas in 1928.
- April, 1929—Uruguay makes intensive Campaign to eliminate Illiteracy; International Congress of Universities to be held in Habana, Cuba.
- May, 1929—Guatemalan Historical Bibliography; Women in Venezuelan Literature; American Personalities in Chilean History.
- June, 1929—Mexico's Institute of Hygiene; Settlement of the Tacna-Arica Controversy.
- July, 1929—The Interamerican Conference on Bibliography; Illumination and Miniatures in colonial Mexico; Maria Andrea Parada de Bellido: A Peruvian Heroine of Independence.
- August, 1929—Progress of Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation, Bolivia and Paraguay; Colombia's Highway to the Sea; The International Railways of Central America: An important new Link.
- September, 1929—Newer Aspects of Education in Mexico; The Indigenous and Creole Art of Chile.
- October, 1929—National and international Organisms for the Protection of Infants.
- November, 1929—Bolivian-Paraguayan Boundary Dispute: Important official Documents.

Among recent publications of the Academia de la Historia de Cuba are the following:

Anales de la Academia de la Historia de Cuba, X. Enero-December, 1928. La Habana, Imprenta "El Siglo XX", 1928. Pp. 235.

In addition to various reports brought in by the members, this contains an article by Camilo Desbruge, entitled "La Gran Colombia y la Independencia de Cuba", pp. 208-225. This was first published in the *Boletín de la Biblioteca Municipal de Guayaquil*, in 1913, and reproduced in *Revista Cubana*, IX, No. 2 (1914), 81-93 and No. 3, 173-182.

The Academia also published discursos and informes as follows:

La Vida de la Academia de la Historia (1928-1929). Memoria leída por el Secretario Ing. Juan Antonio Cosculluela. Informes presentados por los Señores Capitán D. Joaquín Llaverías, Archivero, D. Carlos M. Trelles, Bibliotecario, Dr. José A. Rodríguez García, Director de Publicaciones, Dr. Emeterio S. Santovenia, Tesorero. La Habana, Imprenta "El Siglo XX", 1929. Pp. 56.

José Antonio Echeverría. Discurso leído por el Académico de número Dr. Juan Miguel Dihigo y Mestre en la sesión solemne celebrada el 10 de Abril de 1929, al colocarse el Retrato de aquél en la Galería de Historiadores de Cuba. La Habana, Imp. "Avisador Comercial", 1929. Pp. 27.

Llaverías, Joaquín: La Comisión militar ejecutiva y permanente de la Isla de Cuba. Discurso leído . . . el 10 de Octubre de 1929. La Habana, Imprenta "El Siglo XX", 1929. Pp. 195.

Morell de Santa Cruz, Pedro Agustín: Historia de la Isla y Catedral de Cuba . . . con un Prefacio de Francisco de Paula Coronado. La Habana, Imprenta "Cuba Intelectual", 1929. Pp. 307.

González Alcorta y la Libertad de Cuba. Discurso leído . . . en 4 de Julio de 1929 al colocarse el Retrato de aquél en la Galería de Historiadores de Cuba. La Habana, Imp. "Avisador Comercial", 1929. Pp. 27.

Santovenia y Echaide, Emeterio de: José Manuel Mestre, Discurso leído . . . el 10 de Abril de 1929 al colocarse el Retrato de aquél en la Galería de Historiadores de Cuba. La Habana, Imp. "Avisador Comercial", 1929. Pp. 23.

Valverdi y Mauri, Antonio L.: Manuel de la Cruz. Discurso leído . . . el 19 de Febrero de 1929 al colocarse el Retrato de aquél en la Galería de Historiadores de Cuba. La Habana, Imprenta "El Siglo XX", 1929. Pp. 33.

In No. 44 (October-December, 1928) of the *Boletín de la Academia de la Historia* of Caracas, Venezuela appeared the following articles: "Doctor R. Villanueva Mata"; "Temas para una Biografía de Juan Vicente González", by Luis Correa; "La Constitución Boliviana", by Victor Andres Belaunde; "Bolivar en México", by Pedro M. Arcaya; "Archivo del General Miranda", (continued); "Papeles de Don Antonio Leocadio Guzmán", Tomo II.; "El Gaucho: su Información

social", by Pablo Blanco Acevedo; "El Gobernador Cañas y Merino", by Luis Alberto Sucre; "Documentos relativos a la Historia colonial Venezuela" (continuation); "Aniversario de la Academia"; "Viaje a la Parte Oriental de Tierra Firme" (continuation), by Francisco Depons. No. 45 (January-March, 1929) has the following: "Homenaje al Doctor Cristóbal Mendoza", by Luis Correa; "Biografía del Doctor Mendoza", by Vicente Dávila; "El Diario de Miranda en los Estados Unidos", by William Spence Robertson; "El Sepulcro de Bolívar en Santa Marta", by Julio Samper y Grau; "El tercer Obispo de Venezuela", by N. E. Navarro; "La Sorpresa de Ceollpahuaiico", by Germán G. Yañez; "Archivo del General Miranda" (continuation); "El cuarto Centenario de la Fundación de Coro"; "Documentos relativos a la Historia colonial de Venezuela"; "Viaje a la Parte oriental de Tierra Firme" (continuation), by Francisco Depons; Catálogo de Folletos de la Academia Nacional de la Historia" (continuation).

The Archivo del Folklore Cubana in recent issues contains the following articles: Vol. III. No. 3 (July-September, 1928)—"La milagrosa' del Cementerio de la Habana", by Fernando Ortiz; "El Jejen (*Oecaeta Furens*)", by Félix Poey; "Los Bandos de las Fiestas populares cubanas", by Dolores M. de Ximeno; "Mundamba y mi Foco (Tradición cardinense)", by Herminio Portell Vila; "Folklore Médico cubano: El Excremento animal como Medicina", by Fernando Ortiz; "El Folklore del Niño cubano", (continuation), by Sofía Córdova de Fernández; "Juegos infantiles cubanos". No. 4 (October-December, 1928)—"La Ciencia del Folklore", by Aurelio M. Espinosa; "Nuevas variantes de Romances populares", by Ramón A. Laval; "El 'Diablito' Nánigo (*Acotación de Etnografía afrocubana*)", by Israel Castellanos; "El 'Aja' de las Habaneras", by Fernando Ortiz; "Coplas políticas de AntaZo", by Herminio Portell Vila; "Los Negros Curros—Sus Carácteres:—Lenguaje" (continuation), by Fernando Ortiz; "La Cueva de Chepa López (Tradición cubana)", by Antonio Vachiller y Loraes; "El Folklore del Niño cubano: Je Juegos comunes de Niños y Niñas", by Sofía Córdova de Fernández; "Laborar, Laborantes, Laborantismo", by X. X. y X; "Altars de Cruz", by Herminio G. Leyva; "Carreras de S. Juan y S. Pedro", by Manuel A. Alonso; "La Copla política en Cuba"; "La Indecencia en las Iglesias de Antaño".

"News Letter" No. 1, from *Charles Thomson* Secretary Fellowship of Reconciliation in Central America, dated Guatemala City, Guatemala, November 20, 1929, has been sent out. The letter gives various types of information relative to Guatemala which is presented under subheads as follows: Guatemala City; On the public mind; Guatemala's people; On what do they live; And Politics?; "A Feudal Republic"; A Look at certain Groups; And what do they think of the Yankee? The writer of this letter says in his opening paragraph: "This news letter is an attempt to help you put Guatemala on your mental map. It does not purport to be particularly authoritative; necessarily it is sketchy and impressionistic. But it may serve to bring you some of the things you would see and hear, if you were down here for two weeks."

Ernesto Nelson, the veteran educator has recently published another volume entitled *La Salud del Niño: Su Protección social en Legislación y en las Obras*. The author was delegate for Argentina at the fourth Pan American child congress held at Santiago de Chile in 1924 and to the first general child congress held at Geneva in 1925. He has also attended various conferences in the United States.

La Nueva Democracia, 419 Fourth Ave., New York, has recently announced that books published in Hispanic America may be ordered through its medium. More or less difficulty is experienced in obtaining books from those regions and this seems to be a good opportunity to those who do not have personal acquaintance with publishers.

The *Boletín de el Libro y el Pueblo*, published by the Department of Libraries of the Secretariat of Public Education in Mexico, contains in its issue for September 1929, a list of recent publications, mostly by the government, as follows:

- Anuario del Observatorio astronómico de Tacubaya, para el Año de 1929. Compiled under the direction of Ing. Joaquín Gallo, Tacubaya, Talleres Linotipográficos de la Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento. Pp. 295.
- Apuntes sobre algunos Temas de Geografía e Historia de Mexico y de los Estados Unidos y sugerencias de clase para uso de los Maestros en Relación con los Proyectos de Amistad infantil internacional. Mexico, Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1928. Pp. 24.
- Aventuras extraordinarias del mexicano Jurenito y sus discípulos.—(En la paz, en la guerra y en la revolución; en Paris, Mexico y Roma, en el Senegal, en

- Kinesima, en Moscú y otras partes. Prologo por Nicolás Bujarin, Director de la "Pravda" de Moscú). Direct translation from the Russian by Isaac Zeitlin and Ricardo Marin. Ediciones "Oriente", 1929. Pp. 365.
- Catálogo de Ceuntos, Bibliotecas y otros Libros para Premios. Mexico, Sociedad de Edición y Librería Franco-Americana, S. A., 1929. Pp. 80.
- Código Federal del Trabajo de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. (Proyecto.) Mexico, Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1928. Pp. 110.
- Conferencia sobre Organización científica del Trabajo. By Vicente Lombardo Toledano. Mexico, Publicaciones de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1928. Pp. 6.
- Constanza. By Guillermo Jiménez. 2d ed. Mexico, Herrero Hermanos, 1929.
- Cuaderno de Notas. By Guillermo Jiménez. Mexico, Editorial "Aguilas", 1929. Pp. 164.
- La Educación literaria de los Adolescentes. By Salvador Novo. Mexico, Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1928. Pp. 32.
- A los Maestros normalistas de Mexico. Mexico, 1929. Pp. 9.
- Los Métodos de Lectura americanos. Su adaptabilidad al Español. By Professor Gregorio Torres Quintero. Mexico, 1928. Pp. 196.
- Memoria de los Trabajos realizados por el Departamento de la Estadística nacional. Mexico, 1928. Pp. 64.
- Mexico en Sevilla. Breves Apuntes de la Feria o Exposición Iberoamericana que se verificará en el Año de 1929, en la Ciudad de Sevilla. . . . By José de Godoy. 3d ed. Mexico, Talleres Linotipográficos de la Papelería Nacional, 1929. Pp. 36.
- La Region arqueológica de Casas Grandes Chihuahua. By Carmen Alessio Robles. Mexico, Imprenta Núñez, 1929. Pp. 46.